AClone wrote:runsforcelery wrote:
Guys, I'm not sure where the idea that even all monitors (with freeboards lower than 14 inches were deathtraps in bad weather comes from. IIRC, the only ACW monitor that foundered due to sea conditions was the Monitor herself, and there were any number of early ironclad warships with extremely limited freeboard which were considered "bad seaboats" but were not considered inherently unsafe at sea. At least one of the ACW monitor designs (I'll try to look up the name for a later reply) survived a Force 10 off Cape Hatteras with over four feet of water over her weather decks. As long as deck openings are sealed and intakes and exhausts for things like fire rooms and ventillators are raised high enough to be above the water, you can submerge a steam powered ship and she'll still be just fine. Uncomfortable, scary as hell, and not something anyone in his right mind would enjoy experiencing, but perfectly survivable.
Thanks for the clarification, RFC. Presumably Charisian ironclads would be better handled than Dohlaran galleys crossing the Cauldron.
And since you've brought up Civil War-era submarines... [G]
Okay, said I'd check, and it turns out I was wrong:
two monitors were lost in bad weather during the ACW:
Monitor herself (987 tons displacement, with air intake pipes and smoke pipe only about 4-1/2 feet tall,
not enouogh height above deck to function properly in heavy seas) and
Weehawken, a
Passaic class ship (1,900 tons displacement; these were the second class of monitors, with twice the tonnage, a radically different underwater hull form, taller ventilators, and a much taller smoke pipe), which had previously demonstrated her ability to ride out heavy weather remarkably well. It should be pointed out, however, that she sank
at anchor in heavy weather off Morris Island, Charleston, SC, primarily because water entered the hull through an improperly secured hawse pipe and an open hatch. Apparently, she'd just taken on ammo forward, which had increased her displacement more than anticipated, and that submerged hull openings which certainly would have been kept closed up at sea. There's no doubt that monitors, with their low freeboard, were more vulnerable to heavy weather than ships with greater freeboard, but it was
Lehigh (also a
Passaic-class ship), which rode out the Force 10 with her decks 4.5 feet underwater.
Onondaga (2,551 tons displacement) crossed the Atlantic when she was sold to France,
Monadnock (3,400 tons displacement) passed the Straits of Magellan
under her own power when she traveled from the East Coast all thr way to San Francisco; and
Miantonomah (also 3,400 tons displacement) crossed the Atlantic
twice in a 17,800-mile voyage, only 1,000 miles of which was made under tow (and that was to save fuel, not because of any conditions of weatherliness).
The original
Monitor had a
lot of design flaws (not surprisingly in the very first unit of a totally new class of warship), including the "raft" hull form whose overhang made her inherently less seaworthy than she would otherwise have been and the fact that her pumps used leather belts to provide power, which had . . . unfortunate consequences when she started flooding and the belts in question got wet. I promise that the Charisians won't make those particular design errors. And I should also point out that these are casemate, broadside ironclads, not monitors, and that there is no reason why they should be any inherently less seaworthy than any other vessels of their displacement and tonnage . . . plus they have not one but two reliable power plants. I point this out because a ship under power, properly handled, can survive almost any weather conditions you want to name at sea unless something drastic intervenes. For example, the DDs Halsey lost in the Great Typhoon in 1944 were all very short on fuel because of his decision not to rebunker before the weather closed in. Lack of fuel led to loss of stability as the ships' designed displacement and weight distribution changed, and that loss of stability was apparently the immediate cause of loss in the cases of all of the DDs lost. The same thing could obviously happen to
any vessel . . . just as even the
Titanic could rip her hull open on a spur of ice and go down in 1912.