Case Zulu!!!

Brom O'Berin wrote:While this contradiction in use of Case Zulu was pointed discussed even before the initial snippets of that part of SoSag were released in 2004, I don't recall if DW ever directly commented on it. The response that was received (via a late and honored friend of his) did indicate it was a variance in RMN vs RMMC comm practices. Personally, that never stood well with me, as IMHO the depth of shown RMMC integration into the RMN crews is too great for separate lexicons using identical codes to exist, or to risk the chance of confusion by Marine personnel.

"OK, hold on, Sarge - was that a Navy or a Marine Case Zulu that was just issued?"

dscott8 wrote:In On Basilisk Station, when Honor sends word back to Manticore that the Peeps are coming, it's noted that "Case Zulu" is never, ever used for any other purpose than to announce an imminent invasion. Yet, in The Shadow of Saganami, when Hexapuma's Marine company goes to take out Norbrandt's hidden bunker, "Case Zulu" is used to annouce that the enemy has modern heavy weapons and the action shifts from a police function to a military assault. What's up with that? Sloppy com discipline, or is this a Marines versus Navy procedural thing?

Ever been in the navy, the USN uses a whole host of different codes and slang, than what USMC uses.

john964 wrote:Ever been in the navy, the USN uses a whole host of different codes and slang, than what USMC uses.

Having different codes/slang is not a problem. Having the same code mean something different things in different contexts can be a problem if the context is not 100% clear at all times.

TheMonster wrote:

john964 wrote:Ever been in the navy, the USN uses a whole host of different codes and slang, than what USMC uses.

Having different codes/slang is not a problem. Having the same code mean something different things in different contexts can be a problem if the context is not 100% clear at all times.

Look up the joint acronym dictionary.
There are common-use terms/acronyms/code words that have multiple meanings in the same service.

E.G. Ever read/watched "We Were Soldiers..."?
Broken Arrow ment a US unit about to be over-run during that time - yet at the same time [and still] Broken Arrow also ment and means a damaged nuke no matter which service...

Sorry, you seem to figuratively mixing apples, oranges, banans and kangaroos,

Acronyms are simple a shortened way of referring to a much mentioned item or action common to a specific group - large or small - of persons. They may even become adopted and used by those outside the original group. OTOH, another group with a different focus may give one or more new meanings to the same acronym. As you rightly referenced, just the usage internal to DOD has many examples of acronyms with multiple meaning - each based on which group is using it.

Slang is where an altered meaning is put on a common term, often in order for a select group to communicate private messages in a public fora. However, like acronyms, repetitive usage typically reveals the amended meaning, where if the group is popular or elite, the slang term falls is adopted into common usage and eventually the original meaning is often forgotten and lost.

Code words are created for a number of reasons - brevity is most common, but clarity of meaning and security of communications are nearly as frequent. When security is involved, a "common" code term may be reused (often with a prefix or suffix, etc) to mislead those without the extra knowledge. So, yes, Broken Arrow was a Vietnam War code term. As an OPREP 3 category, it has a very different meaning - which was once classified but became very public and very popular when used in media entertainment.

However, there are also select terms for which only one meaning is assigned, deliberately. From what MWW wrote in OBS, Case Zulu appeared to fall into that category. Which explains why its re-use in SoSAG was so jarring - it broke the usage rules for the category of codeword that it appeared to be.

Montrose Toast wrote:

TheMonster wrote:

john964 wrote:Ever been in the navy, the USN uses a whole host of different codes and slang, than what USMC uses.

Having different codes/slang is not a problem. Having the same code mean something different things in different contexts can be a problem if the context is not 100% clear at all times.

Look up the joint acronym dictionary.
There are common-use terms/acronyms/code words that have multiple meanings in the same service.

E.G. Ever read/watched "We Were Soldiers..."?
Broken Arrow ment a US unit about to be over-run during that time - yet at the same time [and still] Broken Arrow also ment and means a damaged nuke no matter which service...

kzt wrote:

looktowindward wrote:Actually, you were misinformed. The reason why we don't use "repeat" in that manner is that repeat is an artillery proword - it means repeat the last indirect fire order. If you used "repeat" instead of "say again", someone would shoot something at someone - not the intent.

Yup. The response to "repeat, over" is "shot, over".

.........................Splash.

The example provided were both OPREP 3 code words.
Just differing subsections of OPREP 3.
There is duplication all through the services which is why the US has to publish a 2.5 inch thick book that defines all the various uses...

From what I can make of it, it works sort of like this:

Suppose that eight years after the the First Gulf War, with US troops stationed in Kuwait, Iraqi recon patrols had skirmished with US troops at the Kuwait border in what appeared to be preparation for a general attack on the US forces as part of a new invasion of Kuwait. The OPREP-3 message to the National Military Command Center wound carry the flagwords PINNACLE indicating national-level interest and FRONT BURNER indicating a pre-conflict attack or hostile act against US forces. It could be abreviated as OPREP-3PFB. It merits the PINNACLE flagword because the government and all of the service chiefs have to prepare to respond.

In contrast, during the airwar part of Desert Storm, when the Iraqis were encountered trying to move into Khafji, including the PINNACLE flagword in the FRONT BURNER report to CENTCOM would do nothing but encourage the government and the service chiefs to micromanage from Washington a battle that the CENTCOM commander should be let alone to fight.

In the passage from OBS, when an authorized recipient enters Honor's "authentication code Lima-Mike-Echo-Niner-Seven-One" into their comm system, it seems to generate the equivalent of PINNACLE flagword message of national-level interest while confirming the sender's authority to issue the message as well as identity of the sender. That indicates to the recipient that the FRONT BURNER equivalent Case Zulu message indicates a pre-conflict attack or hostile act of national-level interest on the assigned station of the sender.

"'Mr. Venizelos, you will commandeer the first available Junction carrier to relay the following message to Fleet HQ. Message begins: Authentication code Lima-Mike-Echo-Niner-Seven-One. Case Zulu. I say again, Zulu, Zulu, Zulu. Message ends.'" She heard McKeon suck air between his teeth at her shoulder. "That is all, Mr. Webster," she said softly. "You may transmit at will."

Once again, I remind you - in the listed example, you are talking about two totally different levels of communication. Both of which are extremely case and context specific.

Tactical level Marine communications (even if copied by their home base/ship) are not something that will be of direct interest to the Admiralty. Even if someone high up in the Admiralty eventually hears the recording of the transmission, they would understand that the context and purpose was completely different. More likely to hear the recording would be high-level Marine Officers, who would review procedures and evaluate what occurred for training purposes.

Now, strategic level communications between a ship captain or squadron/task force/fleet commander and the RMN's Admiralty - particularly with the specific coding that was part of Honor's transmission - would cause a completely different reaction... and would be received by a completely different level of command inside the Admiralty.

You aren't comparing apples to oranges, since apples and oranges can end up on the same table as part of the same meal. This is more like comparing apples to automobiles - two items that simply cannot be compared at all.

Renegade13 wrote:Once again, I remind you - in the listed example, you are talking about two totally different levels of communication. Both of which are extremely case and context specific.

Tactical level Marine communications (even if copied by their home base/ship) are not something that will be of direct interest to the Admiralty. Even if someone high up in the Admiralty eventually hears the recording of the transmission, they would understand that the context and purpose was completely different. More likely to hear the recording would be high-level Marine Officers, who would review procedures and evaluate what occurred for training purposes.

Now, strategic level communications between a ship captain or squadron/task force/fleet commander and the RMN's Admiralty - particularly with the specific coding that was part of Honor's transmission - would cause a completely different reaction... and would be received by a completely different level of command inside the Admiralty.

You aren't comparing apples to oranges, since apples and oranges can end up on the same table as part of the same meal. This is more like comparing apples to automobiles - two items that simply cannot be compared at all.

But my car is Candy Apple Red.

Can I compare my apple to my Apple?