1) Tanks moved on strategic distances mostly by ships, railroads or road trailers. Tanks do not move for long distances on their own. The tracks are quickly worn-out on paved roads (and the roads didn't like it too).
I stand corrected, I should have specified that I was thinking once deployed. Strategic movement is done by other means, yes I was not thinking of this or thought it was in question.
Once deployed though, tank units have moved, on their own, incredible distances. If they are not pulled back from the front, and for the duration of the campaign, they keep going. There´s plenty of evidence of this, from the German campaign in France in 1940, to Barbarossa, with some incredible examples. Patton´s drive to the Rhine, or the soviet offensive of 1944, are examples of tank units moving thousands of miles by their own.
In 1920-1930s, there was a problem of moving tanks from railroad station to the frontlines - because tracks of this time were of low durability, and any prolonged road trip could worn them out. That's why many nations became interested in the concept of tanks, capable of moving both on tracks and wheels (Christie tank and its Soviet BT-series descendants). But by the end of 1930s, progress in metallurgy allowed to make durable tracks, so the problem was solved.
I´m unsure about what do you mean here. That the tracks were more resistant and therefore they can use roads or cross country indifferently? If that´s the case, we will have to agree to disagree and all I can do is respectfully point out to you the historical cases in which the absence of paved or minimum quality roads hindered mechanized operations. Particularly in Autumn 1941 for example, the advance towards Moscow is halted JUST because the mud. It even has a name in Russia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rasputitsa
I didn´t mean just the tanks. I meant for mechanized warfare and all necessary services that go with it. Includying all the logistics that an armored force needs. By necessity, tank units are followed by supply convoys that are simply not capable of stepping away from the road net. You can find an analysis here by the actual german Chief of Transportation during the war, dated 1953.
https://www.allworldwars.com/Comments-on-Russian-Roads-and-Higways-by-Max-Bork.html
I would direct your attention to this bit of the conclussions.
The capacity of the Russian rail and road net under went considerable seasonal variations. During the muddy season in the spring and fall, which usually lasted for eight weeks, a very heavy burden was placed on the railroad because most of the roads became impassable. Consequently, the capacity of the rail net had to be checked and improved in advance of these seasons, and the railheads had to be moved as close as possible to the front line.
.2) You are trying to view tanks as WW2-era weapons. Try to think instead in WW1 categories: tanks as infantry support weapon, armored "machinegun suppressors"
Yes, I specifically said so didn´t I? Mechanized warfare, which does not include WW1. But even at that, I don´t think it´s a good example or a good way for Charis to introduce the tank. They were only successfull when employed en masse, and without a developed doctrine or communications they never could exploit the breaches they got into the front. It has been argued that the most important achievement of the tank in WW1 weren´t the breaches in the German front, but the impact those breaches had, psicologically, in the German High Command, specifically Ludendorff, since they couldn´t stop it and couldn´t avoid the Allies doing it anytime, anywhere they could gather the strenght. Death by a thousand cuts.
If Charis were to employ the same approach and go for a Mark IV, the F17 or a combination of both, they would be introducing a weapon without the doctrine they know it enables, and running the risk someone else does it for them. Not only that, it wouldn´t be the force multiplier Charis needs. It would be a door knocker for pitched fights like what we saw in the last year of fighting in Siddarmark, but nothing else.
3) Again, radio is not needed as long as you use tanks for direct infantry support. Infantry platoons were not equipped by radios till WW2 (and even then, only US could afford it). Tank designed to operate with infantry does not need radio - better it have signal button on its rear, so infantry could attract attention of the tank commander (Japanese tanks have such arrangement from 1930s)
The british experimented with this in the 20s, with Liddell Hart and Fuller as thinkers. The British Army established the Experimental Mechanized Force in 1927, and by 1934 decided to create a Mobile Division... and in typically british fashion the establishment fought back so hard it only became a reality in 1937. The point is that the Salisbury exercises, and similar exercises showed that for unit coordination, for mechanized warfare, you needed radios in the tanks. The UK, USA and GER did use them, and other countries were starting to.
There is the same difference here. You don´t need radio for an infantry tank in a WW1 capacity. You do need it for mechanized warfare.
4) Why don't concentrate on something much more adequate, like Char B1? Slow, well-armored, compact infantry support tank, armed with hull-mounted gun and turret-mounted machinegun would be an order of magnitude simpler and more valuable.
There are a myriad of reasons why the Char B1 was a flawed design even being a good tank for 1940. First, the commander was the only person in the turret, and had to be commander, spotter, gunner and loader at the same time. The 75mm was a howitzer and needed to traverse the whole body to aim. More importantly, it was slow and had limited range having to refuel frequently.
Again, if you want WW1 this was a good doorknocker, but in actual not just mechanized, but movement warfare, it was outclassed. Deployed with the infantry in what was called Divisions Cuirassées, and needing to refuel so frequently, when they retreated they were left behind. We are talking most of around 190 tanks in 3 divisions if I remember correctly, out of action (1940 german offensive) because they were in the wrong place, for the wrong reason, with the wrong characteristics, and simply were left behind. Again, doctrine.
It could have been different. When employed in hastily organized tank divisions in combination with the Somua S35 it was very effective, and very resistant to german guns (Guderian comments on this, having tried even to use a captured french 47mm anti tank gun to no avail).
Also, Panther was not "best" in any way. Look on their post-war service; while captured Pz-IV served for quite a long, Panthers were quite soon removed from arsenals.
Each thing in their context. The Panzer V was a complex machine and more expensive by far than the IV. It was also, from 1944 onwards, the best medium tank avalabile to the Wehrmacht and one of the best tanks of the war. It had better armor, more speed, fired faster, and a better high velocity gun that was superior to most of allied guns, including soviet ones. To illustrate this, I leave you the copy of a soviet report testing guns between it and the T34/85.
A Wa Pruef 1 report dated 5 October 1944 estimated that when set at a 30-degree angle the T-34-85's upper glacis could be penetrated by the Panther's 7.5 cm KwK 42 from 300 m (330 yd), the mantlet from 1,200 m (1,300 yd) and the turret front from 2,000 m (2,200 yd) while the T-34-85's 85 mm ZiS-S-53 could penetrate the Panther's frontal turret from 500 m (550 yd).
That´s 4 times the range.
Nevertheless, if I were to choose a design I would also choose the IV. Reliable, so well thought it was upgraded constantly from 1939 to 1945. Cheaper, and less complex. There were better tanks, like the T34, but not as easily modified (for the 85mm gun the turret had to be totally redesigned in the T34 for example).
5) The main concept of tanks, is to break the enemy frontline defenses fast.
I don´t know what the relation to what I said is. I would say that, in combination with other arms, they do break the front fast but the key is that they EXPLOIT the breach fast, turning static warfare into movement warfare. They do save lives compared to trench warfare, by the buckload.
Invigorating conversation thank you. I would summarize that you obviously favour a WW1 approach as Charis best option. I disagree with you in that sense, IF they are going to go the tank route and IF they CAN technically go there they should go all the way, specially in what regards to military thinking.
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