GloriousRuse wrote:So, a technical niggle before we begin: 11 inch guns are frickin railway cannons and naval weapons. 280mm shells are huge, their recoil is huge, the guns are huge. I think Krupp produced one battery of "light" 11 inchers that only weighed 20 tons in travel configuration. The brits I believe managed to produce a very short ranged ground variant of their naval gun that was "only" 11 tons, but was considered a direct fire weapon. I'll give it that dragons are worth four horses.
As a base measure, the classic deuce and a half has about 130hp to move 2.5 tons offroad, or 32 dragon power. You can see where this math is going...even reduced to 3 mph in fields, we're looking at 34 dragons in trace to move the Krupp gun. Moving these things is not, in any way, easy.
Anyhow....
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The East Front Comparison.
I'll absoultely agree the operational and tactical picture, minus RW, is far more East than West. Besides the comparatively larger area stretching Charis's limited and inherently less mobile baloon recon, this still doesn't explain the collapses.
The Romanian campaign actually comes to mind, with Ludendorff perfecting there what would become the artillery innovations later in the west. Or as someone pointed out Brusilov with the proto-sturmtroop ideas. Those campaigns saw the Central Powers trading casualties at about 1:2, and a roughly equivalent exchange rate for Brusilov during the heady early days.
It exhausted the attacker in both cases, and secured land the size of a few large provinces. Casualties were measured in in the 500k+ range for the victorious Central Armies in Romania, and the literally each side lost over a million men in the Brusilov Offensive.
Charis has to take, much, much, more land. And it most certainly does not have the manpower reserves of a WWI great power since it ha literally in a generation lept from early renassaince to early 1900s. If Charis is pre-colonial England, it has a population of less than 5M, double up for the Empire (if any one has a known number, please chime in). At WWI mobilization levels, it can put 1M men (or 11%ish of the known population) under arms across two generations committed.
If it kills churchmen at 10:1, and only needs to knock them below 80% before they outmaneveur them or break them in morale, doing five times as well as the Central Powers in the East...
About 20% of the ICA is lost. In one campaign season.
The poppies are growing in many, many fields.
Lets forget "how could they smash the lines", and lets ask " how is Charis not falling to an October Revolution?", and "How is the nation of Charis going to deal with having a nation and society shattering loss rate in the future?" When people talk about Europe losing a generation of young men and the fall of the world order, they aren't even beginning to touch what just happened to Charis's demographics.
I think it's evident that you and I are not going to agree on this, however —
First, I misspoke slightly, it's not a "10"-11"-inch" weapon; the Charisian "superheavy" is a 10" weapon which weighs about seven and a half tons and fires the same round as the naval weapon, a 500-pound HE shell. Traction is not that huge a problem, since you are substantially underestimating draft dragon, who can tow 30 tons in good going and 10 in semi-decent going and about 5 in rotten going, so two of them could tow a single gun without too much difficulty, and they were harnessed in quadruple teams. Please note that none of these guns are being towed across a shell-churned no man's land, either. (They do have to cross the area of their bombardment when the front advances, but there hasn't been the sort of prolonged artillery duel that shatters the water table and produces the bottomless mud of Flanders.)
The majority of the Charisian heavy artillery are 8" and 6" guns which were actually highly mobile as long as they stayed out of the muck and the mud of the Western Front (which they never encountered). Oh, and the Charisians didn't deploy "two or three" observation balloons; they deployed scores of them before the fighting was over; I just didn't see any reason to put you aboard all of them, so you only saw a few of them, whereas the Church and the Mighty Host saw a whole big bunch of them.
Unlike any of the armies which went to war in 1914, their enemies (1) know nothing about modern artillery or its effects; (2) are equipped with single shot caplock rifles (not a machine gun in the bunch); (3) have no mortars in support (I know, I know; the mortar came after 1914, but the church has only just begun to develop and deploy mortars of its own); and (4) are badly off balance strategically due to the deception measures Nahrmahn proposed (which, in effect, created a gap on the most critical portion of the entire Church front). Then we crank in the fact that the Charisians have aerial observation; have magazine rifles with centerfire cartridges; have scads of mortars in support; have adopted highly sophisticated infantry tactics; have flamethrowers and effective hand grenades; have the advantage of the initiative; and are operating in an environment where neither side can maintain anything like sufficient operational density over such vast distances. This means that they (1) have the strategic, operational, and tactical initiative throughout; (2) have vastly superior logistics (not only compared to their opponents but in many ways, superior to those of World War I); (3) can concentrate overwhelming power on chosen strategic points and achieve massive numerical superiority, as well as superior firepower; (4) have total "aerial superiority" (which means that the Church is going to achieve tactical surprise only if it can make its entire approach march in the dark, in the fog, or under cover of rain); and (5) they have sejins (and SNARCs), which means they have detailed and highly accurate intelligence on their opponents' strength, disposition, supply state, morale, and even their battle plans, although the inner circle can't share all of that information with all of their field commanders or their allies.
I might also point out that Charis does not, in fact, have to take "much, much more land." Charis's objective is the destruction of the Army of God and the Mighty Host, but they don't have to defeat it man-to-man on the battlefield to secure that objective. They aren't trying to conquer territory; they are trying to threaten and, if possible, sever the logistical lifeline of an enormous army which cannot survive if cut off from its base of supplies. And that lifeline is, for all intents and purposes, a single, thousand-mile long canal. The critical factor isn't the total density of manpower divided by the thousands of miles of frontage, nor does the area of Charis's conquest matter in the least. What matters is the density of manpower concentrated at the critical points and whose logistics are being threatened by whom. And, unlike the armies on the Western Front — or even on the Eastern Front, in many ways — there is no redundancy in the Church's logistics. Nobody is going to be laying track around a damaged junction or throwing up a trestle bridge to replace one that was burned out. If the canal is dynamited, or if the locks are destroyed, there is no routing around it.
I think that part of the problem is that you're talking about what happened in 1914-1918 when all of the armies involved were at least in shouting range of one another in terms of technology and technique. But we aren't talking about two World War I armies here. We're talking about an army which might be as good as those deployed in the Crimean War up against an army whose doctrine has been formulated by someone with all the lessons of World War I and World War II at his fingertips and which is equipped with magazine bolt action rifles and 1918-level artillery trains and logistics which are probably inferior to World War I's on the strategic level (see my comment about canals above) but are very arguably superior to World War I's on the operational and tactical levels.
As for the October Revolution scenario, Russia had a total population of 166,000,000 in 1914, suffered somewhere around 5,000,000 battlefield casualties, and lost roughly 4,000,000 POWs. Combining all of the above, you get a total loss rate of call it 9,000,000, of which under 2,000,000 were KIA on the field (I have no idea what percentage of the WIA later died in hospital . . . assuming they made it that far). So, that's roughly 5.4% of the total prewar Russian population, obviously concentrated in men of military age. If you assume that all 4,000,000 POWs eventually made it home (I rather doubt they did), then the casualty rate drops to roughly 3%. (The best estimate of actual Russian dead that I could find was about 1.9%, but that's only a small percentage of the total casualty rate, which is what I'm using here.)
The Charisian Empire has a population of approximately 75,000,000 at the time of At the Sign of Triumph (1.9 times that of France in 1914), of which roughly 3,500,000 (4.6% of the total population) is in uniform between the ICN and the ICA, and less than 500,000 are in-theater for the campaign against Rainbow Waters and the Army of God. Assuming that every single one of them had been killed, that would've represented 0.06% of the total Charisian population. Or, proportionately, 1% of the Russian casualty rate (counting POWs; or all the way up to 2% of the Russian casualty rate, not counting the POWs). Of course, in absolute terms, the total destruction of Charis's field army would have amounted to about 10% of Russia's total casualties, not counting POWs. But, no, no matter how you slice it, Charis did not bleed itself white in the fighting.
For that matter, French war dead were about 1,400,000, with another 4,266,000 WIA, for a total of 5,666,000 out of a population of only 39,600,000, or roughly 14% of the total population. It's little wonder that France wasn't eager to go back to war again twenty years later, especially when one recalls that the Western Front's casualties were shared between several nations and total Allied casualties were in the vicinity of 7,500,000.
Charis's loss rate was grievous, but it was also only a small percentage of the one you seem to be postulating. And with all due respect, I think that given the actual tactical environment, the knowledge possessed by both sides (tactically, strategically, operationally, and technologically), the difference in infantry tactics; the density — and the brevity — of the majority of the Charisian artillery preparations, the orders of magnitude of difference between the effectiveness of the artillery of the two sides (one of them, after all, was using TNT and achieving artillery densities comparable to those of 1916 while the other one was using black powder in smaller, cast-iron projectiles and had far fewer guns), and the enormous difference in the density of the small arms fire the two sides could lay down, there aren't that many poppies growing in Charis.