BEOWULF - THE KARMA SUITSYA

Once again not willing to parse quotes.

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor might have been a decisive strategic victory if it had been preceded by an unambiguous declaration of war. A lot of Americans were isolationist who disapproved of Roosevelt's interventions in Europe and Asia. They knew that he was provoking Japan and Germany. A formal, unambiguous declaration of war followed a few hours later by the Pearl Harbor attack would have robbed Roosevelt of the righteous indignation that united the US. The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet would have been accurately perceived as a consequence of Roosevelt's incompetence rather than an unforgivable provocation.

This of course presumes that Japan could have destroyed the Pacific fleet after sacrificing strategic surprise. IMHO, US commanders had their heads inserted so deep in their craniums that a Japanese victory was plausible. It would have required a surface action and carrier vs carrier battle as well as the airstrike with serious Japanese losses. A follow on strike to destroy the oil tank farms and dry docks would have been necessary.

Such a battle followed by an offer of peace that leaves Hawaii and the Philippines unmolested would likely have resulted in a negotiated peace and Roosevelt's impeachment or resignation.

TFLYTSNBN wrote:Once again not willing to parse quotes.

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor might have been a decisive strategic victory if it had been preceded by an unambiguous declaration of war. A lot of Americans were isolationist who disapproved of Roosevelt's interventions in Europe and Asia. They knew that he was provoking Japan and Germany. A formal, unambiguous declaration of war followed a few hours later by the Pearl Harbor attack would have robbed Roosevelt of the righteous indignation that united the US. The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet would have been accurately perceived as a consequence of Roosevelt's incompetence rather than an unforgivable provocation.

This of course presumes that Japan could have destroyed the Pacific fleet after sacrificing strategic surprise. IMHO, US commanders had their heads inserted so deep in their craniums that a Japanese victory was plausible. It would have required a surface action and carrier vs carrier battle as well as the airstrike with serious Japanese losses. A follow on strike to destroy the oil tank farms and dry docks would have been necessary.

Such a battle followed by an offer of peace that leaves Hawaii and the Philippines unmolested would likely have resulted in a negotiated peace and Roosevelt's impeachment or resignation.

I'm not sure it follows that Rooseveldt's replacement, Henry Wallace, would have been amenable coming to terms with a fascist power. He was close to the Kremlin after WWII and that suggests he would have been leery of Japan. Furthermore, what would the US have used as a causi beli against Hitler if they came to terms with Japan immediately after Peral Harbor?

No, Japan did not have the economy to survive a protracted war with the US. No honest appraisal by the Department of War of Japan's prospects would have suggested otherwise. Coupled with Wallace's prediliction to supporting the Soviet's if not England would have made him as eager as Rosseveldt to use Pearl Harbor as a causi beli for entering Europe's war. Afterall, the US decided they could afford to engage in a 2 front war supporting the Soviets and England in Europe and attacking Japan in the Pacific. That argues the U.S. did not fear Japan enough as a threat to their industrial base. Neither did the U.S. fear Germany's ability to attack that industrial base. Absent such attacks, they could out produce their enemies. So long as they had a foothold in Europe, they could ultimately attack Germany. So long as they retained Hawaii, they would launch assaults into the Pacific against Japan.

So, I highly doubt Japan would have gotten a quick surrender had they been more open in the declaration of war prior to their attack. That and the additional risk to their task force would have made attacking Pearl Harbor in circumstances other than a sneak attack foolish. Had the U.S. gotten a bigger piece of the Imperial Navy at Pearl Harbor even had they lost more ships including all their carriers, the US could have recovered MUCH more quickly to actually shorten the war. Japan could not risk losing any one of those ships in the task force attacking Pearl Harbor.

tlb wrote:I am sorry to keep this going; but I think that if your thesis was simply the following

[CAVEAT:] None of my threads are simply "the following."


I like peering under the skin—where the truly juicy and succulent discussions really lurk. Like the current discussion of the THING in the Honorverse Ramblings and Musing's thread. Good book discussions are like steak. Don't dry out my steak.

cthia wrote:

tlb wrote:I am sorry to keep this going; but I think that if your thesis was simply the following

[CAVEAT:] None of my threads are simply "the following."


I like peering under the skin—where the truly juicy and succulent discussions really lurk. Like the current discussion of the THING in the Honorverse Ramblings and Musing's thread. Good book discussions are like steak. Don't dry out my steak.

I prefer to peer under the skirt where the truly juicy and succulent...

cthia wrote:

tlb wrote:I am sorry to keep this going; but I think that if your thesis was simply the following

[CAVEAT:] None of my threads are simply "the following."


I like peering under the skin—where the truly juicy and succulent discussions really lurk. Like the current discussion of the THING in the Honorverse Ramblings and Musing's thread. Good book discussions are like steak. Don't dry out my steak.

TFLYTSNBN wrote:I prefer to peer under the skirt where the truly juicy and succulent...

A watering hole where also is found the not so juicy or succulent. LOL

TFLYTSNBN wrote:Once again not willing to parse quotes.

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor might have been a decisive strategic victory if it had been preceded by an unambiguous declaration of war. A lot of Americans were isolationist who disapproved of Roosevelt's interventions in Europe and Asia. They knew that he was provoking Japan and Germany. A formal, unambiguous declaration of war followed a few hours later by the Pearl Harbor attack would have robbed Roosevelt of the righteous indignation that united the US. The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet would have been accurately perceived as a consequence of Roosevelt's incompetence rather than an unforgivable provocation.

This of course presumes that Japan could have destroyed the Pacific fleet after sacrificing strategic surprise. IMHO, US commanders had their heads inserted so deep in their craniums that a Japanese victory was plausible. It would have required a surface action and carrier vs carrier battle as well as the airstrike with serious Japanese losses. A follow on strike to destroy the oil tank farms and dry docks would have been necessary.

Such a battle followed by an offer of peace that leaves Hawaii and the Philippines unmolested would likely have resulted in a negotiated peace and Roosevelt's impeachment or resignation.

You have an interesting theory there that certainly may hold water. It is quite a bit related to Kael Posavatz' equation in another thread.

IMO, certainly something the successful attack on Pearl Harbor did accomplish was put the Imperial Japanese Navy in an unlikely position where it could have won. The US Navy just got lucky, or we had God on our side.

cthia wrote:

TFLYTSNBN wrote:Once again not willing to parse quotes.

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor might have been a decisive strategic victory if it had been preceded by an unambiguous declaration of war. A lot of Americans were isolationist who disapproved of Roosevelt's interventions in Europe and Asia. They knew that he was provoking Japan and Germany. A formal, unambiguous declaration of war followed a few hours later by the Pearl Harbor attack would have robbed Roosevelt of the righteous indignation that united the US. The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet would have been accurately perceived as a consequence of Roosevelt's incompetence rather than an unforgivable provocation.

This of course presumes that Japan could have destroyed the Pacific fleet after sacrificing strategic surprise. IMHO, US commanders had their heads inserted so deep in their craniums that a Japanese victory was plausible. It would have required a surface action and carrier vs carrier battle as well as the airstrike with serious Japanese losses. A follow on strike to destroy the oil tank farms and dry docks would have been necessary.

Such a battle followed by an offer of peace that leaves Hawaii and the Philippines unmolested would likely have resulted in a negotiated peace and Roosevelt's impeachment or resignation.

You have an interesting theory there that certainly may hold water. It is quite a bit related to Kael Posavatz' equation in another thread.

IMO, certainly something the successful attack on Pearl Harbor did accomplish was put the Imperial Japanese Navy in an unlikely position where it could have won. The US Navy just got lucky, or we had God on our side.

A couple of very minor historical points: 1- the Japanese intention was to declare war on the US minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Somehow they miscalculated time zone differentials. Yeah, rookie mistake. (2) 4 days after the Pearl Harbor attack, Germany declared war on the US rendering moot any discussion of getting involved in Europe's war with or without prior warning y Japan.

The assumption was that Japan did not want the US involved in a war against them. Had the US not declared war on December 8th, I doubt Germany would have declared war when they did. It was in Germany's interest to defeat their current enemies before adding another. Declaring war on a still neutral US would have been needlessly risky. My point was that any possible successor to Rooseveldt would have been as willing to engage Japan in a war after Pearl Harbor. This would have been true regardless of an earlier Declaration of War by Japan. All that earlier declaration would have done was to risk more damage to the IJN it could not have made good before the US rebuilt its losses.

PeterZ wrote:The assumption was that Japan did not want the US involved in a war against them. Had the US not declared war on December 8th, I doubt Germany would have declared war when they did. It was in Germany's interest to defeat their current enemies before adding another. Declaring war on a still neutral US would have been needlessly risky. My point was that any possible successor to Rooseveldt would have been as willing to engage Japan in a war after Pearl Harbor. This would have been true regardless of an earlier Declaration of War by Japan. All that earlier declaration would have done was to risk more damage to the IJN it could not have made good before the US rebuilt its losses.

Keep in mind that Yammamoto did not want to go to war against the US at all. He knew it was almost certainly a losing proposition...knew of the factories beyond the reach of Japanese weapons.

The attack was an effort to stop the US through terror. But, as noted, it only went so far. And, with really bad luck, it did not get any of the American aircraft carriers.But it did force the US to spend years crossing the Pacific to get close enough for a real attack on Japan.

cthia wrote:IMO, certainly something the successful attack on Pearl Harbor did accomplish was put the Imperial Japanese Navy in an unlikely position where it could have won. The US Navy just got lucky, or we had God on our side.

pappilon wrote:A couple of very minor historical points: 1- the Japanese intention was to declare war on the US minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Somehow they miscalculated time zone differentials. Yeah, rookie mistake. (2) 4 days after the Pearl Harbor attack, Germany declared war on the US rendering moot any discussion of getting involved in Europe's war with or without prior warning by Japan.

PeterZ wrote:The assumption was that Japan did not want the US involved in a war against them. Had the US not declared war on December 8th, I doubt Germany would have declared war when they did. It was in Germany's interest to defeat their current enemies before adding another. Declaring war on a still neutral US would have been needlessly risky. My point was that any possible successor to Rooseveldt would have been as willing to engage Japan in a war after Pearl Harbor. This would have been true regardless of an earlier Declaration of War by Japan. All that earlier declaration would have done was to risk more damage to the IJN it could not have made good before the US rebuilt its losses.

ldwechsler wrote:Keep in mind that Yammamoto did not want to go to war against the US at all. He knew it was almost certainly a losing proposition...knew of the factories beyond the reach of Japanese weapons.

The attack was an effort to stop the US through terror. But, as noted, it only went so far. And, with really bad luck, it did not get any of the American aircraft carriers.But it did force the US to spend years crossing the Pacific to get close enough for a real attack on Japan.

The attack on Pearl Harbor did NOT put the Japanese in a position where they had a chance to win. The Japanese hope was that enough early victories would make Washington realize that resistance was futile.

The note that the Japanese intended to be delivered in Washington DC prior to the attack did NOT announce hostilities, only the belief that negotiations were not going to lead to agreement. The actual declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain was not made until after the attacks on Pearl Harbor and Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong.

If the Japanese had not wanted the US to go to war with them, then why the attack? The Japanese thought that they were the great warrior race and no one could challenge them. Rather than hoping the US would not go to war, they believed that the US would be too craven to go to war.

Once the problem with US torpedoes was fixed the US submarines took the war right to the Japanese coast. The US did spend years getting ground and air forces close enough for an invasion. but throughout that period unlimited submarine warfare delivered major blows to the Japanese war industry and effort.