BEOWULF - THE KARMA SUITSYA

glott wrote:

cthia wrote:Again, I can't understand why many of you are so quick to easily accept the bastardization of John Harrington's quote and your willingness to support the many who are in power to take advantage of that quote. Yet, why should the same strategy not be open to the League, with all of this rampant talk about legal issues in the face of a dying superpower!

Emergency, on-the-spot, war powers is what the Mandarins enacted. They ignored proper protocol, yes. But they did so in light of "the spirit of the law" AND THEIR SURVIVAL!

The "spirit of the law" supports their actions considering the untenable position they were in. They were desperate. Just like the Havenites were when they attempted the same thing. They went for a Hail Mary pass and it was intercepted. Their trick play even ended up in a safety for the other team. Both plays were not only thwarted, but were turned into offense for the enemy - the worst possible outcome for a play, because someone gave the other team the playbook. And they got clobbered!

The Mandarins went for a sucker punch, out of desperation to save itself and the League. As any entity would do. As any navy would do, that it even has the raw innate human will and right to do, survive! Again, it was nothing less than what Haven tried with the first BOM. Hit them while they are unaware, unsuspecting and one big happy family, utilizing the element of surprise. It is self-preservation. They didn't have time to bother with "niggling little details" like going through the League Assembly. That would have taken too much time and time was not a luxury the SLN had. In fact, it could have been argued that if the Mandarins failed to act decisively, facing the inevitable death to the League and the threat to Old Earth, would have been treasonous...

Given what they thought was obvious, that the Manty Home defenses were gutted. And that the writing on the wall says that if they do not score, and score big, during the two minute warning, they are doomed.

What is wrong about a decision to make a quick thrust down the heart of an enemy and to a system that is on your long range plans to absorb anyway, when you see a weakness in the system's heart? To wait and let that moment pass would have been highly irresponsible of the League. The League was expansionistic, they didn't just become so overnight.

"But they just don't want Beowulf to secede!"

Of course they don't! You can't fault them there. Beowulf's junction represents a direct axis of threat into the League. Beowulf's secession would threaten the League at its core, from within, like a disease. Many of you continue to allow your prejudices to color your logic. It is difficult to remain emotionally detached, fair and impartial, when you are a reader.


****** *

After being alerted, Beowulf proceeded to pull at the stitch that was the snitch, thus exacerbating the glitch even further. They did not elect to sew the stitch up. They elected to pull at the system glitch that provided a snitch, instead of stitching the stitch that is a snitch, thus resisting the itch to unravel the plan even further.

Beowulf was bad. Really really bad. It doesn't matter if you and I don't think they were bad. We don't weigh 800#.

Relevant bit underlined.

Now I know that this may provoke strong feelings, but I really am not trying to offend anyone.

But when I read this post, particularly the underline bit. It seems like a justification for any surprise attack. Just change "system" to "nation" and it could be the Japanese rationale for Pearl Harbor.

cthia wrote:As Americans, we can become downright indignant regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl.

But, looking at it reasonably from the true vantage point of war - Pearl Harbor is a legitimate military target thus an understandable objective of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Well planned. Well executed. The Japanese simply missed what should have been one of their most important objectives in the attack of Pearl Harbor. They failed to destroy the oil supply sitting in tankers in a field off Pearl. Which is ironic when you consider the reason the Japanese attacked Pearl in the first place was because of their own shortage of oil.

Japan responded with devastating attacks on Pearl Harbor and Singapore, and then seized the rich oil fields of the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo in a swift and brilliant campaign.

There were twenty-one vessels sunk or damaged. American airpower on Oahu was smashed; American dead totaled 2,403, with 1,178 wounded. Whereas the Japanese losses were 29 planes, 55 airmen, five midget submarines, and nine crewmen, insignificant compared to the damage done to the Americans.

Can we truly fault the Japanese for tactical brilliance executed almost flawlessly?

tlb wrote:

cthia wrote:As Americans, we can become downright indignant regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl.

But, looking at it reasonably from the true vantage point of war - Pearl Harbor is a legitimate military target thus an understandable objective of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Well planned. Well executed. The Japanese simply missed what should have been one of their most important objectives in the attack of Pearl Harbor. They failed to destroy the oil supply sitting in tankers in a field off Pearl. Which is ironic when you consider the reason the Japanese attacked Pearl in the first place was because of their own shortage of oil.

Japan responded with devastating attacks on Pearl Harbor and Singapore, and then seized the rich oil fields of the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo in a swift and brilliant campaign.

There were twenty-one vessels sunk or damaged. American airpower on Oahu was smashed; American dead totaled 2,403, with 1,178 wounded. Whereas the Japanese losses were 29 planes, 55 airmen, five midget submarines, and nine crewmen, insignificant compared to the damage done to the Americans.

Can we truly fault the Japanese for tactical brilliance executed almost flawlessly?

I hesitate to interrupt your monologue; but the simple answer is "YES, We Can". It may be technically brilliant to sneak up behind someone and shoot them in the back; but we still consider it cowardly and dishonorable. The declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain was not made until after the attacks on Pearl Harbor and Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong. The note that was intended to be delivered in Washington DC prior to the attack did NOT announce hostilities, only the belief that negotiations were not going to lead to agreement.
To say that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor because of the shortage of oil is only indirectly true; the US had placed various trade embargos on Japan because of their behavior in China (a country in which the US had a long term benevolent, even paternalistic, interest). To remedy their shortage of raw materials, the Japanese government planned to acquire those in Southeast Asia; rather than moderate their behavior. The attack on the US fleet was meant to defend against active US interference in those moves.

Willmott (1982) points out that the Japanese estimates assumed a single great fleet engagement in keeping with Decisive Battle Doctrine, rather than the long war of attrition and nearly continuous operations that actually took place.

cthia wrote:The Japanese were being squeezed by the US economically. Making it difficult for them to attain oil - the Lion's share of Japans oil was from the US - could itself be considered an act of war. They imported 90 % of their oil. Sanctions can strangle a country. Ask North Korea and China, who both have bandied about a claim that the US is waging acts of war.

If you fail to realize that your policies are acts of war, then you are irresponsible towards war. The US froze Japanese assets in the US but Roosevelt decided not to tighten the noose further by shutting off their access to US oil for the same reasons mentioned above. Roosevelt felt that that particular move would be too agressive and could be misconstrued as an act of war. He wasn't ready to pull the trigger, but it was coming. The Japanese knew war with America was imminent, and they weren't going to be stupid and give America the time it needed.

-- snip --

Japan underestimated the amount of oil it would need to wage war. They made the same mistake the Havenites made, essentially thinking they could wage a short victorious war. Which could be the reason they failed to destroy the oil fields at Pearl. Thinking they would not become a factor of the war.

Willmott (1982) points out that the Japanese estimates assumed a single great fleet engagement in keeping with Decisive Battle Doctrine, rather than the long war of attrition and nearly continuous operations that actually took place.

The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants.

In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.

A military man can scarcely pride himself on having "smitten a sleeping enemy"; it is more a matter of shame, simply, for the one smitten. I would rather you made your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does, since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he will soon launch a determined counterattack.

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.

cthia wrote:The Japanese were being squeezed by the US economically. Making it difficult for them to attain oil - the Lion's share of Japans oil was from the US - could itself be considered an act of war. They imported 90 % of their oil. Sanctions can strangle a country. Ask North Korea and China, who both have bandied about a claim that the US is waging acts of war.

If you fail to realize that your policies are acts of war, then you are irresponsible towards war. The US froze Japanese assets in the US but Roosevelt decided not to tighten the noose further by shutting off their access to US oil for the same reasons mentioned above. Roosevelt felt that that particular move would be too agressive and could be misconstrued as an act of war. He wasn't ready to pull the trigger, but it was coming. The Japanese knew war with America was imminent, and they weren't going to be stupid and give America the time it needed.

-- snip --

Japan underestimated the amount of oil it would need to wage war. They made the same mistake the Havenites made, essentially thinking they could wage a short victorious war. Which could be the reason they failed to destroy the oil fields at Pearl. Thinking they would not become a factor of the war.

Willmott (1982) points out that the Japanese estimates assumed a single great fleet engagement in keeping with Decisive Battle Doctrine, rather than the long war of attrition and nearly continuous operations that actually took place.

tlb wrote:Unlimited trade is NOT an entitlement; restricting trade in response to Japanese Army atrocities is not an act of war. If the Japanese had felt that trade with the US was more important than building an overseas empire, then they could have changed their behavior and the trade with the US would have been restored. You point out that the US was not being irresponsible.
Some quotes from Admiral Yamamoto:

The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants.

In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.

A military man can scarcely pride himself on having "smitten a sleeping enemy"; it is more a matter of shame, simply, for the one smitten. I would rather you made your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does, since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he will soon launch a determined counterattack.

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.

TFLYTSNBN wrote:I will not attempt to parse through the ebedded quotes but I believe that it was Cythia who commented that they Beawulf Terminus of the MWJ was a strategic threat to the SL Core Worlds. It appears that the Beawulf terminus is even more of athreat to the SL than the Trevors Star terminus was to the Republic of Haven. ThebSL core was originally settled with slower than light ships that were often willing to settle a marginally habitable planet or even a system with no habital planets in order to have reasonable transport times and costs from Sol.

Assuming that somewhere in SLN Intelligence there is some nerd who everyone refuses to listen to who has actually been paying attention to the Haven Sector Wars. This nerd has noticed how possesion of the Trevors Star Terminus was a force multiplier for the RMN. The terminus enabled Eigth Fleet to succesvively raid Haven's core systems with minimal transit times for resupply and repair.

Imagine Eigth Fleet using the Beawulf Terminus to rapidly transit to Sol system to punch it out yet still be able to rapidly return to Manticore to defend the home system or jump to Trevors Star, Basailisk, Gregor or other Terminae to either defend or attack. Then Eigth Fleet returns to punch out another SL core system onde, twice, thrice. Meanwhile; the next fleet mustered by the SLN is still in hyper on its way to Manticore hopping that may be they have enough missile sponges, I mean SDs, to absorb RMN missile fire.

Oh, BTW, since Beawulf had become the arsenal of the RMN that manufactured MDMs and other highest tech goodies for the RMN, nuking Beawulf industry was a legitimate military tactic. They just didnt need to be so genocidal about it.

cthia wrote:The Japanese were being squeezed by the US economically. Making it difficult for them to attain oil - the Lion's share of Japans oil was from the US - could itself be considered an act of war. They imported 90 % of their oil. Sanctions can strangle a country. Ask North Korea and China, who both have bandied about a claim that the US is waging acts of war.

If you fail to realize that your policies are acts of war, then you are irresponsible towards war. The US froze Japanese assets in the US but Roosevelt decided not to tighten the noose further by shutting off their access to US oil for the same reasons mentioned above. Roosevelt felt that that particular move would be too agressive and could be misconstrued as an act of war. He wasn't ready to pull the trigger, but it was coming. The Japanese knew war with America was imminent, and they weren't going to be stupid and give America the time it needed.

-- snip --

Japan underestimated the amount of oil it would need to wage war. They made the same mistake the Havenites made, essentially thinking they could wage a short victorious war. Which could be the reason they failed to destroy the oil fields at Pearl. Thinking they would not become a factor of the war.

Willmott (1982) points out that the Japanese estimates assumed a single great fleet engagement in keeping with Decisive Battle Doctrine, rather than the long war of attrition and nearly continuous operations that actually took place.

tlb wrote:Unlimited trade is NOT an entitlement; restricting trade in response to Japanese Army atrocities is not an act of war. If the Japanese had felt that trade with the US was more important than building an overseas empire, then they could have changed their behavior and the trade with the US would have been restored. You point out that the US was not being irresponsible.
Some quotes from Admiral Yamamoto:

The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants.

In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.

A military man can scarcely pride himself on having "smitten a sleeping enemy"; it is more a matter of shame, simply, for the one smitten. I would rather you made your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does, since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he will soon launch a determined counterattack.

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.

cthia wrote:Why Déjà vu, is that you?

You are making the same mistake that you made in this thread. When antagonizing an opponent, it does NOT matter what YOU think. Only that the Japanese thought so. Just as it didn't matter whether anyone else thought that Beowulf was treasonous to the League. Regardless, it doesn't apply here. Roosevelt was well aware of the dangers of committing acts of war with his policies. He just wasn't aware that he had already crossed the line regarding Japanese sensibilities.

You people of the South don't know what you are doing. This country will be drenched in blood, and God only knows how it will end. It is all folly, madness, a crime against civilization! You people speak so lightly of war; you don't know what you're talking about. War is a terrible thing! You mistake, too, the people of the North. They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and they will fight, too. They are not going to let this country be destroyed without a mighty effort to save it … Besides, where are your men and appliances of war to contend against them? The North can make a steam engine, locomotive, or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or pair of shoes can you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical, and determined people on Earth — right at your doors. You are bound to fail. Only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, shut out from the markets of Europe as you will be, your cause will begin to wane. If your people will but stop and think, they must see in the end that you will surely fail.

cthia wrote:The Japanese were being squeezed by the US economically. Making it difficult for them to attain oil - the Lion's share of Japans oil was from the US - could itself be considered an act of war. They imported 90 % of their oil. Sanctions can strangle a country. Ask North Korea and China, who both have bandied about a claim that the US is waging acts of war.

If you fail to realize that your policies are acts of war, then you are irresponsible towards war. The US froze Japanese assets in the US but Roosevelt decided not to tighten the noose further by shutting off their access to US oil for the same reasons mentioned above. Roosevelt felt that that particular move would be too agressive and could be misconstrued as an act of war. He wasn't ready to pull the trigger, but it was coming. The Japanese knew war with America was imminent, and they weren't going to be stupid and give America the time it needed.

-- snip --

Japan underestimated the amount of oil it would need to wage war. They made the same mistake the Havenites made, essentially thinking they could wage a short victorious war. Which could be the reason they failed to destroy the oil fields at Pearl. Thinking they would not become a factor of the war.

Willmott (1982) points out that the Japanese estimates assumed a single great fleet engagement in keeping with Decisive Battle Doctrine, rather than the long war of attrition and nearly continuous operations that actually took place.

tlb wrote:Unlimited trade is NOT an entitlement; restricting trade in response to Japanese Army atrocities is not an act of war. If the Japanese had felt that trade with the US was more important than building an overseas empire, then they could have changed their behavior and the trade with the US would have been restored. You point out that the US was not being irresponsible.
Some quotes from Admiral Yamamoto:

The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants.

In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.

A military man can scarcely pride himself on having "smitten a sleeping enemy"; it is more a matter of shame, simply, for the one smitten. I would rather you made your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does, since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he will soon launch a determined counterattack.

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.

cthia wrote:Why Déjà vu, is that you?

You are making the same mistake that you made in this thread. When antagonizing an opponent, it does NOT matter what YOU think. Only that the Japanese thought so. Just as it didn't matter whether anyone else thought that Beowulf was treasonous to the League. Regardless, it doesn't apply here. Roosevelt was well aware of the dangers of committing acts of war with his policies. He just wasn't aware that he had already crossed the line regarding Japanese sensibilities.

tlb wrote:Not my mistake; the mistake belongs to the Japanese in starting a war that they had no chance to win. The Japanese hope was that Americans had no stomach for war and would settle; Pearl Harbor had exactly the opposite effect and the USA went for unconditional surrender instead. A quote that William T. Sherman made before the Civil War to Prof. David Boyd at Louisiana State Seminary is appropriate here (just substitute Japan for South and USA for North):

You people of the South don't know what you are doing. This country will be drenched in blood, and God only knows how it will end. It is all folly, madness, a crime against civilization! You people speak so lightly of war; you don't know what you're talking about. War is a terrible thing! You mistake, too, the people of the North. They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and they will fight, too. They are not going to let this country be destroyed without a mighty effort to save it … Besides, where are your men and appliances of war to contend against them? The North can make a steam engine, locomotive, or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or pair of shoes can you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical, and determined people on Earth — right at your doors. You are bound to fail. Only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, shut out from the markets of Europe as you will be, your cause will begin to wane. If your people will but stop and think, they must see in the end that you will surely fail.

In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.

cthia wrote:You are making the same mistake that you made in this thread. When antagonizing an opponent, it does NOT matter what YOU think. Only that the Japanese thought so. Just as it didn't matter whether anyone else thought that Beowulf was treasonous to the League. Regardless, it doesn't apply here. Roosevelt was well aware of the dangers of committing acts of war with his policies. He just wasn't aware that he had already crossed the line regarding Japanese sensibilities.

tlb wrote:Not my mistake; the mistake belongs to the Japanese in starting a war that they had no chance to win. The Japanese hope was that Americans had no stomach for war and would settle; Pearl Harbor had exactly the opposite effect and the USA went for unconditional surrender instead. A quote that William T. Sherman made before the Civil War to Prof. David Boyd at Louisiana State Seminary is appropriate here (just substitute Japan for South and USA for North):

You people of the South don't know what you are doing. This country will be drenched in blood, and God only knows how it will end. It is all folly, madness, a crime against civilization! You people speak so lightly of war; you don't know what you're talking about. War is a terrible thing! You mistake, too, the people of the North. They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and they will fight, too. They are not going to let this country be destroyed without a mighty effort to save it … Besides, where are your men and appliances of war to contend against them? The North can make a steam engine, locomotive, or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or pair of shoes can you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical, and determined people on Earth — right at your doors. You are bound to fail. Only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, shut out from the markets of Europe as you will be, your cause will begin to wane. If your people will but stop and think, they must see in the end that you will surely fail.

cthia wrote:Well, if you can understand that reality, it should be a simple hop, skip and a jump in realizing the Japanese could scarcely afford NOT to strike first, strike fast and strike decisively.

But! Ones beliefs are worth dying for for ones with beliefs. See Burdette's battle with the heathenous harlot of satan.