Honorverse ramblings and musings

Simply throwing planes and pilots into the mix is not a recipe for success. Squadrons have to be trained to work together or what you are doing is throwing them away.

Don

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n7axw wrote:Simply throwing planes and pilots into the mix is not a recipe for success. Squadrons have to be trained to work together or what you are doing is throwing them away.

Don

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IIRC there were essentially complete squadrons from the damaged Shōkaku that could have been transferred together to the Zuikaku. But the Japanese strict doctrine of keeping a squadron permanently assigned to the same carrier denied them that ability to match a carrier without squadrons with squadrons whose carrier was being repaired.

Contrast that with the USS Yorktown. Not only did the yard at Pearl patch her up just well enough in a couple days, but squadrons (VB-3 and VT-3j were ‘poached’ from USS Saratoga (away completing refit) while a VF-3 was constituted from 16 and 11 pilots from VF-42 and VF-5 respectively to replace planes and squadrons devastated n the earlier battle. That somewhat scratch force gave the US badly needed force against the more numerous IJN. But with less effort than that the IJN, by overriding their doctrine, could have put a 5th fleet carrier up against the US’s 3

I actually was thinking about the surface actions. Where the US, with radar, typically got their asses handed to them by the IJN without radar.

kzt wrote:I actually was thinking about the surface actions. Where the US, with radar, typically got their asses handed to them by the IJN without radar.

Only at the start of the war. Even at the Solomons, the Japanese had the advantage. By the time, the US was at the Philippines, things were very different.

ldwechsler wrote:Only at the start of the war. Even at the Solomons, the Japanese had the advantage. By the time, the US was at the Philippines, things were very different.

Yeah, that was what I said. Despite all the terrible training, mindset and doctrine that the USN demonstrated at the start of the war things did improve.

kzt wrote:

ldwechsler wrote:Only at the start of the war. Even at the Solomons, the Japanese had the advantage. By the time, the US was at the Philippines, things were very different.

Yeah, that was what I said. Despite all the terrible training, mindset and doctrine that the USN demonstrated at the start of the war things did improve.

Okay, yeah, the US surface groups seemed to have significantly more doctrinal and training problems in the early war than the carriers did.


Some of it was over reliance on radar before they figured out how to really do it well. Some of the radar issue was technological (not having a good way to repeat radar displays to the flag) but some of it was bad procedures (relying on radar at night but the Admiral not commanding from the ship with the most updated radar - or not taking radar coverage into consideration with assigning dispositions)

Then there was bad intel on Japanese torpedo range, so cruisers settled down for a nice steady gun fight, without evasive maneuvers because they believed themselves to be out of range.

But I seem to recall (not going to try to dig up a reference now) at least once USN forces caught the Japanese by surprise, launched torpedoes, and then opened fire too soon (before being spotted and before the torpedoes had time to cover the range) vastly reducing changes of actually getting a torpedo hit.

kzt wrote:

pappilon wrote:And to repeat, it is in the matter of DOCTRINE: The basic principles of ship design, weapons mix, mission, the compromises that are made, training etc., the entire mindset of the military beaurocracy where the SLN is so far behind the GA, the Andermani, and the MAlign.

As was the USN behind the IJN in 1941. Which is why there were not many USN victories until US code breakers were able to provide critical help to the operational units.

Yes and no, on that. The code braking was a significant help but it was also a number of other factors too. The IJN at the start of the war had the best trained and most experienced pilots in Asia. Saboro Sakia one of the few surviving prewar trained pilots had two or three years of combat experience before Pearl Harbor. Read up on the carrier strikes in February March and April by Halsey and Fletcher. Those were 'training' flights with live ammunition. While the IJN was conducting operation after operation and were wearing out men and material. The IJN was on almost constant combat operations from PH to Midway.

kzt wrote:

pappilon wrote:And to repeat, it is in the matter of DOCTRINE: The basic principles of ship design, weapons mix, mission, the compromises that are made, training etc., the entire mindset of the military beaurocracy where the SLN is so far behind the GA, the Andermani, and the MAlign.

As was the USN behind the IJN in 1941. Which is why there were not many USN victories until US code breakers were able to provide critical help to the operational units.

Yes and no, on that. The code braking was a significant help but it was also a number of other factors too. The IJN at the start of the war had the best trained and most experienced pilots in Asia. Saboro Sakia one of the few surviving prewar trained pilots had two or three years of combat experience before Pearl Harbor. Read up on the carrier strikes in February March and April by Halsey and Fletcher. Those were 'training' flights with live ammunition. While the IJN was conducting operation after operation and were wearing out men and material. The IJN was on almost constant combat operations from PH to Midway.[/quote]

Exhausting all their men. Remember it was only six months. Also, the real fighting was first done in the raid on Pearl Harbor. Not much fighting until Coral Sea and soon after Midway.

A key element was the poor tech of the Americans and Brits. The fighter planes "Buffaloes" were helpless against the Zeroes. However, due to some good planning and a real lot of luck, four of the six great Japanese aircraft carriers were destroyed at Midway and a huge percentage of their top aircrews died as well.

The Shokaku and Zuikaku both had damage from Coral Sea so they were not there and they might have swayed the battle.

It took another year or so before the Corsair really gave the navy air superiority and in some areas the Japanese remained ahead.

Two important rules that might have meaning in the Honorverse:

Change can come quickly if necessary.

It takes time to build ships. The US began a huge building program in 1940. By late 1943, they had a huge numerical superiority that kept growing. There were not many big Japanese ships built during the war. And, yes, they did build those super battleships but by the time they were completed, they were not much more than targets.

ldwechsler wrote:

kzt"quote="pappilon wrote:And to repeat, it is in the matter of DOCTRINE: The basic principles of ship design, weapons mix, mission, the compromises that are made, training etc., the entire mindset of the military beaurocracy where the SLN is so far behind the GA, the Andermani, and the MAlign.

As was the USN behind the IJN in 1941. Which is why there were not many USN victories until US code breakers were able to provide critical help to the operational units.

Yes and no, on that. The code braking was a significant help but it was also a number of other factors too. The IJN at the start of the war had the best trained and most experienced pilots in Asia. Saboro Sakia one of the few surviving prewar trained pilots had two or three years of combat experience before Pearl Harbor. Read up on the carrier strikes in February March and April by Halsey and Fletcher. Those were 'training' flights with live ammunition. While the IJN was conducting operation after operation and were wearing out men and material. The IJN was on almost constant combat operations from PH to Midway.[/quote]

Exhausting all their men. Remember it was only six months. Also, the real fighting was first done in the raid on Pearl Harbor. Not much fighting until Coral Sea and soon after Midway.

A key element was the poor tech of the Americans and Brits. The fighter planes "Buffaloes" were helpless against the Zeroes. However, due to some good planning and a real lot of luck, four of the six great Japanese aircraft carriers were destroyed at Midway and a huge percentage of their top aircrews died as well.

The Shokaku and Zuikaku both had damage from Coral Sea so they were not there and they might have swayed the battle.

It took another year or so before the Corsair really gave the navy air superiority and in some areas the Japanese remained ahead.

Two important rules that might have meaning in the Honorverse:

Change can come quickly if necessary.

It takes time to build ships. The US began a huge building program in 1940. By late 1943, they had a huge numerical superiority that kept growing. There were not many big Japanese ships built during the war. And, yes, they did build those super battleships but by the time they were completed, they were not much more than targets.[/quote]


Look at the movement of the IJN carriers. After PH CSG depart for home, most arrive back in Japan in late December except for Soyru and Hyru which help with the Wake Island operation arrive about a week later. Most of the month of January is spent doing minor refits. February is spent in mopping up operations in NEI. Then back to Japan and preparing for Indian Ocean raid that runs from March 31 to April 10. Then back to Japan, Sh and Z depart for Operation MO (Battle of Coral Sea)

Hi ldwechsler,

A couple of tweaks may help this discussion, I hope.

The Yamato and Musashi were finished by '42 IIRC, the Shinano was still unfinished or incomplete when she was sunk in late '44.

It was the Hellcat that provided air superiority from mid '43 onward, the Corsairs not going aboard carriers until after the kamikazes made themselves known in October '44, and suffering some 400 crashes in the monthes long process before Okinawa in April '45, while the RN had found a solution to getting the Corsair safely aboard in early '44; Ernie J King refused to admit the RN could teach the USN anything again, and USN pilots and ships suffered the consequences again.

L

ldwechsler wrote:

kzt wrote:quote="pappilon"
And to repeat, it is in the matter of DOCTRINE: The basic principles of ship design, weapons mix, mission, the compromises that are made, training etc., the entire mindset of the military beaurocracy where the SLN is so far behind the GA, the Andermani, and the MAlign.
quote
As was the USN behind the IJN in 1941. Which is why there were not many USN victories until US code breakers were able to provide critical help to the operational units.

Yes and no, on that. The code braking was a significant help but it was also a number of other factors too. The IJN at the start of the war had the best trained and most experienced pilots in Asia. Saboro Sakia one of the few surviving prewar trained pilots had two or three years of combat experience before Pearl Harbor. Read up on the carrier strikes in February March and April by Halsey and Fletcher. Those were 'training' flights with live ammunition. While the IJN was conducting operation after operation and were wearing out men and material. The IJN was on almost constant combat operations from PH to Midway.

Exhausting all their men. Remember it was only six months. Also, the real fighting was first done in the raid on Pearl Harbor. Not much fighting until Coral Sea and soon after Midway.

A key element was the poor tech of the Americans and Brits. The fighter planes "Buffaloes" were helpless against the Zeroes. However, due to some good planning and a real lot of luck, four of the six great Japanese aircraft carriers were destroyed at Midway and a huge percentage of their top aircrews died as well.

The Shokaku and Zuikaku both had damage from Coral Sea so they were not there and they might have swayed the battle.

It took another year or so before the Corsair really gave the navy air superiority and in some areas the Japanese remained ahead.

Two important rules that might have meaning in the Honorverse:

Change can come quickly if necessary.

It takes time to build ships. The US began a huge building program in 1940. By late 1943, they had a huge numerical superiority that kept growing. There were not many big Japanese ships built during the war. And, yes, they did build those super battleships but by the time they were completed, they were not much more than targets.[/quote]