Castenea wrote:runsforcelery wrote:No SL grasers and no LACs. At the crucial moment, she's on her own.
Oh, and no pods, either.
And the RMN's practice
is to design its ships to stand up to its own weapons and tactical doctrine (as much as humanly possible, at least) because they've been the biggest. baddest
offensive machine around for like the last 25-30 years. Why design your ships to stand up to the
second baddest weapons mix when you have complete specs on the baddest of the bad and can design accordingly?
In fact, the rule of thumb of
all competent naval designers has been to design their ships to resist their own weapons because logic suggests that at the time they build the thing, it will be the newest ship in their fleet and probably (at least briefly) in the world. Hence its weapons are the standard its defenses have to be able to meet.
This is known as a logical consequence.
I would go for the reason a ship is generally designed to stand p to it's own guns are a bit more prosaic than just the jingoistic bit about our guns are the best in the world.
You know all specs on your own weapons, and if you have any questions about your new armoring scheme standing up to the guns, you only need to construct a sample and reserve range time. This may be a bit more complicated in practice than I make it sound, but your likely enemies are not going to make it easy to use their guns for testing.
There is a reason why working models of Soviet military equipment was highly desired by NATO. Defectors who brought such examples over tended to be well taken care of.
I beg to differ on the "jingoistic" nature of the argument.
Of course the fact that you know the specs on your own hardware is one of the main reasons you use it as the threat you design against. You need to know penetrations before you can calculate armor against it, and you
know you have accurate numbers on your own guns . . . assuming the weapon actually exists and isn't still in the prototype stage when you're designing the ship, as happened with the British
Queen Elizabeths and (to some extent) the USN
Iowas.
However, the "this is the baddest gun in the world" thinking is also very much a part of it, and not just because or national chauvinism.
Until the Washington Treaty, gun calibers and shell weights were in a steady upward spiral in all navies. That meant that each new class of ship, as it was introduced, generally represented a new gun with a new standard of destructiveness, and one therefore had to design against that threat, not the one that had applied last week or against the earlier generations of gun in service abroad. Until Josephus Daniels became SecNav under Woodrow Wilson, USN gun caliber had been climbing in a steady line from the
South Carolina on. The same process had been going on abroad, although the Germans were slower to increase caliber. That was because they were designing a special purpose fleet optimized for combat in the
very limited arena of the North Sea (where both sea states and visibility tended to be limited), whereas other Navies were designing for true blue water conditions. This progression can be seen clearly by looking at the US design process (dates are the dates the ships were
ordered, not the dates they were completed):
SC-class: (1905) 8 x 12"/45 (4x2)
DE-class: (1906) 10 x 12"/45 (5x2)
FL-class: (1908) 10 x 12"/45 (5x2)
WY-class: (1909) 12 x 12"/50 (6x2)
NY-class: (1910) 10 x 14"/45 (5x2)
NV-class: (1911) 10 x 14"/45 (2x3; 2x2)
PA-class: (1912) 12 x 14"/45 (4x3)
NM-class: (1914) 12 x 14"/50 (4x3)
TN-class: (1915) 12 x 14"/50 (4x3)
CO-class: (1916) 8 x 16"/45 (4x2)
SD-class: (1919) 12 x 16"/50 (4x3)*
(The
Lexington-class BCs would have mounted 8 x 16"50)
So between 1905, when
South Carolina was ordered, and 1909 (just 3 years later), when
Wyoming was ordered, broadside had increased by 50% and penetration at short range had increased by about 2.5" against Krupp cemented armor. Note that
none of these 12" ships were actually in service when New York, the first of the
14" designs was actually designed and ordered. The same breakneck pattern was apparent overseas, especially with the British Royal Navy and the IJN, both of whom were consistently pushing caliber and shell weight upward,
but naval intelligence was . . . sort of sucky during this period. Don't forget that as late as 1943 ONI estimated
Yamato had 16" guns (not 18") and, as late as 1940, thought the
Nagato-class was good for only 22 knots when they were actually capable of just over 26. (The belated discovery of how fast they really were is one reason the
South Dakota IIs suddenly had their design speed upped from 25 knots to 28
very late in the design process.)
The Navy thought it had better intelligence than it had, but even what it thought it had was full of holes. So rather than design their ships to resist some theoretical foreign weapon upon which they might or might not have solid numbers --- and bearing in mind that from the very beginning of the Dreadnought era the USN was constantly pushing to up its gun calibers --- it only made sense to design ships to stand up to the same weight of metal they were capable of firing at an enemy. The 16'/45 of the
Colorados (technically the
Washington-class) were originally intended for the
Tennessee-class, but SecNav Daniels refused to sanction the increase in armament. Likewise, when it was time for the
Washingtons, he refused to sanction an increase in tonnage over the
Tennessees, which was why they wound up with an 8-gun main battery rather than the 12-gun battery the General Board had wanted. The
North Carolina was designed to resist 14" fire (although from a much heavier 14" shell than the earlier ships had fired) because of the naval limitation agreements and because that 14" shell was --- you guessed it --- the heaviest and most destructive shell
known to be in service when she was designed. When FDR certified (after he'd been safely reelected as a peace-loving sort of guy) that foreign navies were busting the 14" limit in their new ships, she was upgunned from 12 x 14" to 9 x 16", but it was impossible to improve her armor at that late state in the design process. Hence she was the first "unbalanced" design the USN had produced since the
South Carolinas.
My point is that there was a very sharp upward trend in armament and that shell weight increases as the
cube of the increase in shell diameter, which meant that each upward bound in caliber meant a
huge difference in penetration and destructiveness. It was only when the USN introduced the super-heavy shell in about 1940-42 that there was a major increase in penetration
without an increase in shell diameter. (In fact, BuOrd
rejected a designed --- and proofed --- 18" gun because it believed (correctly) that its new 16" shell would be at least as deadly, would have a higher rate of fire, and would allow more rounds on the same tonnage, and --- most importantly ---
more shells in each salvo than an 18" armament would.)
All of the above is the reason I made the point (and I suppose I could have done it in a more serious, reasoned sort of way) that one big reason to design to match your new ship's armament was that (at least in USN practice) it really
was going to represent the new
ne plus ultra in destructiveness unless those pesky political considerations supervened.