SLN Reserve

pnakasone wrote:

Fox2! wrote:it is much more difficult to achieve this skill and experience level when you do not have regular access to your assigned equipment. Does the SLN have reserve ships in orbit above Core worlds, which presumably have the greatest part of the reserve personnel, at least to give some hands-on time? Or are all of the reserve hulls collected in great armadas of ghost ships, with captains and admirals logging "space" duty while sitting at the local equivalent of Duffy's Tavern?

It probably started out as former but over time degraded to the latter. The SLN lacked a threat they had to be ready to meet on a short notice. So why keep the reserves at such a readiness level when no one could ever challenge or seriously hurt what you have active anyway?

True. BF has what, 4 or 5 times the number of (non-pod laying) active SDs that RMN had at its peak? Who needs to drill the Reservists? They'll scratch the paint!

Of course, meaningful number of these ships haven't left the Core in hundreds of years, and hadn't engaged in combat above the division level in a millennium? And they are scattered though out the Core Worlds and the Shell? Not concentrated in sufficient number to take on the Home or Capital Fleets, nor with the Fleet Train to get to Manticore or Haven and project offensive power. Never mind the capability to take on the Buttercup level Eighth Fleet.

My point is that the reserve is useless once it surpasses a certain point unless the entire navy is geared to a potential mass mobilization and includes a logistic element within it. Mobilizing 4 times your active capital ships even if we made the assumption that they were all up to date would swamp your logistics if they are geared to support your active ships plus say 20%. It would be like the US navy having 40 Aircraft carriers in reserve on top of their 10 active carriers, they may have the crews for them and the aircraft for them but if they don't have the ability to support all 50 carriers at once or even 20 carriers at once the reserve loses its value.

Maintaining a reserve that is small enough to be kept modern, and having an organic logistics assets with it goes farther than having a reserve so large that it has 600 years worth of ships and little to no logistics capabilities of it's own.

Sigs wrote:
Maintaining a reserve that is small enough to be kept modern, and having an organic logistics assets with it goes farther than having a reserve so large that it has 600 years worth of ships and little to no logistics capabilities of it's own.

That's true if the purpose of the reserve is to augment your fighting force. Not so much if your reserve's primary purpose is to serve as the nucleus for graft, feather bedding and rank inflation.

Fox2! wrote:

Sigs wrote:
Maintaining a reserve that is small enough to be kept modern, and having an organic logistics assets with it goes farther than having a reserve so large that it has 600 years worth of ships and little to no logistics capabilities of it's own.

That's true if the purpose of the reserve is to augment your fighting force. Not so much if your reserve's primary purpose is to serve as the nucleus for graft, feather bedding and rank inflation.

When the reserve was first stared it was what it was intended to be a reserve for SLN. But over the centuries it morphed into to the mess they have now.

From personal experience in OTL, I was involved (minor understatement) in our Army Aviation which was nearly all rotary wing. People complained that we trained a great many helicopter pilots who left for civilian jobs as soon as they completed their ROSO (Return of Service Obligations). In reality if we did have a crisis, there is a great reserve of trained pilots maintaining their pilot license currency ferrying tourists or whatever, who would be available, most retaining their reserve status, connections and patriotism.

Sigs wrote:My point is that the reserve is useless once it surpasses a certain point unless the entire navy is geared to a potential mass mobilization and includes a logistic element within it. Mobilizing 4 times your active capital ships even if we made the assumption that they were all up to date would swamp your logistics if they are geared to support your active ships plus say 20%. It would be like the US navy having 40 Aircraft carriers in reserve on top of their 10 active carriers, they may have the crews for them and the aircraft for them but if they don't have the ability to support all 50 carriers at once or even 20 carriers at once the reserve loses its value.

There's a partial exception to that, which is if you expect way more attrition in combat units than in logistical support units. In that case you wouldn't be planning to support more than, say 12, carriers at once, but you expect to have them sunk or sent back for prolonged yard time fairly frequently. In that using the reserve to surge a new carrier each time one is knocked offline isn't that much more logistical burden than supporting the original 10.

Now this falls apart if the reserve carriers require significant yard time to get combat ready, since that part of the logistics pipeline probably doesn't exist (yard space, workers, parts, etc) - plus of course they wouldn't be ready yet when the war attrition starts knocking off your pre-war active ships.


But yes, in general it counterproductive to have a reserve bigger than you can supply if activated - better to scrap some and divert that money into extra logistics to actually be able to support the activation of a useful reserve. But that doesn't look as 'sexy' to politicians - claiming hundreds of SD looks more impressive to non-military folks than a balanced force of logistics, screen, and 60 SDs -- even if the later is the one that's actually military useful.

Daryl wrote:From personal experience in OTL, I was involved (minor understatement) in our Army Aviation which was nearly all rotary wing. People complained that we trained a great many helicopter pilots who left for civilian jobs as soon as they completed their ROSO (Return of Service Obligations). In reality if we did have a crisis, there is a great reserve of trained pilots maintaining their pilot license currency ferrying tourists or whatever, who would be available, most retaining their reserve status, connections and patriotism.

That's a point a lot of people don't see or consider. A large number of highly skilled civilian pilots work not only ferrying tourists but servicing off-shore platforms, construction, power-line repair, etc were military trained.

Also a large number of airline pilots are or were Air National Guard / USAF trained.

Actually quite a few job specialties have both civilian and military parallels, especially those requiring a high degree of training. It's hard for the services to keep highly qualified and experienced personnel when they can, after a time hang up the uniform and make twice to five times the money with far better working hours and conditions and not nearly so much chicken-flop.

Jonathan_S wrote:

Sigs wrote:My point is that the reserve is useless once it surpasses a certain point unless the entire navy is geared to a potential mass mobilization and includes a logistic element within it. Mobilizing 4 times your active capital ships even if we made the assumption that they were all up to date would swamp your logistics if they are geared to support your active ships plus say 20%. It would be like the US navy having 40 Aircraft carriers in reserve on top of their 10 active carriers, they may have the crews for them and the aircraft for them but if they don't have the ability to support all 50 carriers at once or even 20 carriers at once the reserve loses its value.

There's a partial exception to that, which is if you expect way more attrition in combat units than in logistical support units. In that case you wouldn't be planning to support more than, say 12, carriers at once, but you expect to have them sunk or sent back for prolonged yard time fairly frequently. In that using the reserve to surge a new carrier each time one is knocked offline isn't that much more logistical burden than supporting the original 10.

Now this falls apart if the reserve carriers require significant yard time to get combat ready, since that part of the logistics pipeline probably doesn't exist (yard space, workers, parts, etc) - plus of course they wouldn't be ready yet when the war attrition starts knocking off your pre-war active ships.


But yes, in general it counterproductive to have a reserve bigger than you can supply if activated - better to scrap some and divert that money into extra logistics to actually be able to support the activation of a useful reserve. But that doesn't look as 'sexy' to politicians - claiming hundreds of SD looks more impressive to non-military folks than a balanced force of logistics, screen, and 60 SDs -- even if the later is the one that's actually military useful.

Another factor we have not discussed is another part of the logistics train, the ammo. In 1900, the cost of ammo in an SD or DN was approximately the cost of the SD or DN - or more. In wartime doubling (or quintrepling) the number of platforms not only increases the number of missiles required to be available to fill the magazines of the ships, but also increases the number of missiles consumed in a given time. Does the SLN have enough missiles currently to fully arm another 2300 ships AND continue operations? A ship without a sufficient number of weapons (And counter missiles) is worse than useless, and fleets sent out with less than full magazines and insufficient refills is at risk to a peer opponent, let lone a superior foe.

Theemile wrote:Does the SLN have enough missiles currently to fully arm another 2300 ships AND continue operations?

No, the SLN doesn't have the resources to reactivate and arm even a small percentage of the Reserve Fleet. The whole Reserve Fleet is a paper tiger that exists primarily as a channel for funding corruption and an excuse to inflate SLN budget requests.

On paper, the SLN Reserve should have up to 50% with crews and commanders of the "Weekend Warrior" type. In Practice, virtually none of the Reserve is complete, parts having been sold off in the black market, and a skeleton command element splitting the payroll for crews that don't exist.

The main problem with the SLN reserve is that the reality doesn't match the paperwork and budget line-items. If reality and paperwork were even close, a significant portion of the Reserve could be activated within months. Because of corruption I'd be surprised if 0.01% could even get out of the boneyards to a decent repair dock.

Weird Harold wrote:

Theemile wrote:Does the SLN have enough missiles currently to fully arm another 2300 ships AND continue operations?

No, the SLN doesn't have the resources to reactivate and arm even a small percentage of the Reserve Fleet. The whole Reserve Fleet is a paper tiger that exists primarily as a channel for funding corruption and an excuse to inflate SLN budget requests.

On paper, the SLN Reserve should have up to 50% with crews and commanders of the "Weekend Warrior" type. In Practice, virtually none of the Reserve is complete, parts having been sold off in the black market, and a skeleton command element splitting the payroll for crews that don't exist.

The main problem with the SLN reserve is that the reality doesn't match the paperwork and budget line-items. If reality and paperwork were even close, a significant portion of the Reserve could be activated within months. Because of corruption I'd be surprised if 0.01% could even get out of the boneyards to a decent repair dock.

My question was mostly rhetorical, I do believe you are correct. A properly designed reserve would have several tiers of readiness, and plans and resources to activate then as necessary.

1)An active reserve fleet - this is the weekend warriors we've discussed above and their ships spread around the star nation. The ships would actually be actively used ships, but not part of the active fleet. They would be provisioned and armed, with ready spares on hand.

Various Units would include logistics, support and escorts in the proper ratios.

2)A "ready reserve" fleet - this group would be kept at a readiness level with full provisions and small caretaker crews onboard and rotating maintenance crews would keep the ships ready at low operating levels, with modern ammunition and provisions either in place or ready to load and be ready to reactivate that portion at a short notice. Spare crews from the reserve Weekend warriors would fill out the crews when needed.

Logistics units would be included in the proper ratios.

3)A "replacement reserve" fleet. Ships kept to a modern standard, but completely mothballed. These would be brought out of storage as required on a 1:1 ratio to replace attrited units or to bolster fleet numbers. Ships would require mild amounts of yard time to re-enter the active fleet

No planned logistics units or crews would be assigned to these ships, nor would any ammunition be allocated. Some logistics, support and escort ships would be in the replacement reserve, but not in an active capacity.

4)A "Parts spare" fleet. Ships too old, damaged or warn out to be activated, but still have parts required to keep up the fleet. Some could be reactivated with extensive yard time and rebuilding.

No planned logistics units or crews would be assigned to these ships, nor would any ammunition be allocated. Some logistics, support and escort ships would be in the parts spare reserve, but not in an active capacity.

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The above is very similar to what the US has kept for years (mostly for AF and Army hardware, less so for Navy). Unfortunately, The SLN reserve appears to be comprised mostly of #3 and 4, with perhaps a very small group of #2