kzt wrote:pnakasone wrote:Most security systems and technology fail-safes are not designed to stop some one like Horace Harkness who has been described as one of the best hackers and engineers in the series.What really helped his efforts was that PRN tech was designed to be easily maintained by low skilled and trained personal(at least compared to RMN standards).
Well, no most are high on flash and buzzwords and cool new features. And cheap to build.
Serious systems are in fact designed to stop experts. That is why DoD communication electronics has the APL instead of just the FIPS certification. As another example, some of the most experienced safecrackers in the world work for UL testing safes. They get the blueprints and lots of time to examine a sample inside and out. Then they lock it and attempt to break in, getting the tools and time the cert the mfg wants says it can resist. That's because the insurance companies that created UL have a lot of interest in keeping crooks out of safes long enough for the police to show up.
DoD should scrap everything they have now and start anew. They should proceed as if rats are in their system at the very moment. Once your system has been compromised and the infiltrators are allowed to roam your system unchecked for years. Trash it!
Everyone just doesn't seem to understand the nature of the beast. It is difficult to impossible to shield a system that is connected to the outside world because the designers DO NOT HAVE ACCESS TO A THEORY OF EVERYTHING! Someone always knows more than you do.
Designing security measures is a career for most people who are employed to do it. Yet it is a passion and a career for many hacktivists. And hactivists greatly outnumber anyone else -- it is the 12-yr-old kid next door, all over the world. How the hell anyone think they can all be shut out is beyond me. Unless, as my own Cray, IS NOT CONNECTED TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD IN ANY SHAPE OR FORM!
And even then my protection isn't foolproof. An infected thumb drive and voila.
The CIA and the DoD have both been infiltrated. Trying to really secure the systems with the research of HACMS is the premise of this thread.
The main point I tried to share is that NO method is foolproof because the system must remain usable -- and the users themselves represent a weak link. As weak as the link that leads back to the designers. There is one side of Air Force One that is never allowed to be seen -- probably because if one knows the lay of the land...
Anonymous hacktivists group.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_ ... _Anonymous
LulzSec
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LulzSec
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/70699.html
http://www.cio.com/article/2371547/secu ... s-say.html