Coal Colliers

The author has reduced the number of "battleships" from twelve (the original plan) to six, and to three based upon the three of twice the original tonnage under construction at Delthak. The other three planned hulls should be (should have been) converted to colliers to provide timely coal supply between stockpiles and the ships.

The U.S. Navy in WWII succeeded due to its ability to move supplies forward and keep the fleets supplied which increased the tempo of the Navy's operations to a level the Japanese with its limited ability to supply fuel beyond the main IJN base at Brunei which was and is an oil origination port.

WES wrote:The author has reduced the number of "battleships" from twelve (the original plan) to six, and to three based upon the three of twice the original tonnage under construction at Delthak. The other three planned hulls should be (should have been) converted to colliers to provide timely coal supply between stockpiles and the ships.

The U.S. Navy in WWII succeeded due to its ability to move supplies forward and keep the fleets supplied which increased the tempo of the Navy's operations to a level the Japanese with its limited ability to supply fuel beyond the main IJN base at Brunei which was and is an oil origination port.

Umm, what? The number was dropped to 6, with 3 being completed early. But I remember nothing about canceling the other 3. In fact, I remember discussing how the first 3 would come out first. Then the first 3, then 3 more, would definitely change how the rest of that class were built.

As to your desire for coal haulers, there will be plenty of obsolete galleons that will be available to haul coal around the world. While waiting on the massive iron transports that will be built soon.

WES wrote:T..snip..
The U.S. Navy in WWII succeeded due to its ability to move supplies forward and keep the fleets supplied which increased the tempo of the Navy's operations to a level the Japanese with its limited ability to supply fuel beyond the main IJN base at Brunei which was and is an oil origination port.

In contrast, the Russian Baltic fleet redeployment and its resupply failed miserable during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) and in the end the battle with the Japanese Navy was very one-sided in that the Russian fleet was annihilated.

If you haven't read The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Journey to the Battle of Tsushima I can warmly recommend it.

Joat42 wrote:

WES wrote:T..snip..
The U.S. Navy in WWII succeeded due to its ability to move supplies forward and keep the fleets supplied which increased the tempo of the Navy's operations to a level the Japanese with its limited ability to supply fuel beyond the main IJN base at Brunei which was and is an oil origination port.

In contrast, the Russian Baltic fleet redeployment and its resupply failed miserable during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) and in the end the battle with the Japanese Navy was very one-sided in that the Russian fleet was annihilated.

If you haven't read The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Journey to the Battle of Tsushima I can warmly recommend it.

I must mildly disagree. The Russian fleet got there at all, which must be viewed as a logistical miracle.

However, one of my sources -- have not seen in many years -- asserts that they were carrying Russian tropical grade ammunition, made with extra water, which had the technical fault that its explosive load often did not explode. The japanese flag was hit many times with dud shells. The same ammunition was used without effect during the Kronstadt mutiny, or so the source claimed.

phillies wrote:I must mildly disagree. The Russian fleet got there at all, which must be viewed as a logistical miracle.

However, one of my sources -- have not seen in many years -- asserts that they were carrying Russian tropical grade ammunition, made with extra water, which had the technical fault that its explosive load often did not explode. The japanese flag was hit many times with dud shells. The same ammunition was used without effect during the Kronstadt mutiny, or so the source claimed.

I can certainly believe that the early 20th century Russian military had problems with ammunition quality. What I wonder is if the problem was really due to tropical grade ammunition as your source said. Or if it was due to a more general quality control issue.

Henry Brown wrote:I can certainly believe that the early 20th century Russian military had problems with ammunition quality. What I wonder is if the problem was really due to tropical grade ammunition as your source said. Or if it was due to a more general quality control issue.

Considering that I believe I once saw a claim that as much as one-third of the shells used near Ypres Belgium in 1916 failed to detonate, I think the Russians were not the only ones with quality control problems.

I've seen similar remarks. And you're right about 1900s QA.

That said, in defence of the shell-makers it has to be noted that gunners, for some strange reason, take a dim view of shells that explode when the gun is fired. That means that fuses, as a rule, need to hit something fairly hard before they go off, and by the later battles of Ypres hard was in very short supply on the western front. Many of those shells functioned as they were designed - they just weren't designed to slide smoothly into 3m-deep soup.

Castenea wrote:

Henry Brown wrote:I can certainly believe that the early 20th century Russian military had problems with ammunition quality. What I wonder is if the problem was really due to tropical grade ammunition as your source said. Or if it was due to a more general quality control issue.

Considering that I believe I once saw a claim that as much as one-third of the shells used near Ypres Belgium in 1916 failed to detonate, I think the Russians were not the only ones with quality control problems.

This site offers a good explanation. Including drawings!

Louis R wrote:I've seen similar remarks. And you're right about 1900s QA.

That said, in defence of the shell-makers it has to be noted that gunners, for some strange reason, take a dim view of shells that explode when the gun is fired. That means that fuses, as a rule, need to hit something fairly hard before they go off, and by the later battles of Ypres hard was in very short supply on the western front. Many of those shells functioned as they were designed - they just weren't designed to slide smoothly into 3m-deep soup.