New passive defense system

namelessfly wrote:Thank you for the texttev entry with citation. This is exactly as my tortured brain cells recalled it.

We have Frontier Fleet sending observers and based on the scenes in SFtS where the FF intelligence officer gets sidelined for being an alarmist, some officers in Frontier Fleet have been taking note of developments.

Actually Frontier Fleet didn't do a damn thing until Monica. The alarmist report that got the junior officer in trouble in STFS was sourced from Monican after action reports and sensor data. The reason is that the Monicans were the first observers not exercising operational security about their combat capabilities after the fact - as any Alliance or Haven fleet would have done.

That means you're not getting sensor data from half the system away, with possibly inferior sensors or alternately trying to get a navy rating drunk to spill classified after action reports, but you're getting first hand testimony from people who were in the middle of the battle and who genuinely want to share their story.

Monica probably is the best source of information anyone had until Spindle, and it's actually better than Spindle for showing the defensive toughness of modern ships.

Unfortunately for anyone trying to get info from that battle, most of the Manticoran fleet was 1905 or earlier vintage. The fact that the Monicans were still new to the SLN equipment also distorted the results. There was also only about a minute of MDM's being used outside of normal missile ranges as well.

The really good sensor data after Monica is all one-way...showing Manticoran missiles slicing through SLN defenses. Good for getting ideas on new offensive missiles. Useless for learning how to defend against missile storms.

Some of the SDF's may have gained pretty good information with long range sensors and/or human intelligence. The Mesan Alliance didn't do too badly - for example they got right what happened at Lovatt. They have not seemed to have much success in replicating what they saw. So far only the Andermani really have done well, and they had deep penetration of the SKM military for decades (based on Honor's encounter in Honor Among Enemies).

Even the Andermani missed the entire defensive side of Ghost Rider, and aside from stealth and sensor suites, proved to be pretty far behind even Haven when they first joined the Alliance.

solbergb wrote:

namelessfly wrote:Thank you for the texttev entry with citation. This is exactly as my tortured brain cells recalled it.

We have Frontier Fleet sending observers and based on the scenes in SFtS where the FF intelligence officer gets sidelined for being an alarmist, some officers in Frontier Fleet have been taking note of developments.

Actually Frontier Fleet didn't do a damn thing until Monica. The alarmist report that got the junior officer in trouble in STFS was sourced from Monican after action reports and sensor data. The reason is that the Monicans were the first observers not exercising operational security about their combat capabilities after the fact - as any Alliance or Haven fleet would have done.

That means you're not getting sensor data from half the system away, with possibly inferior sensors or alternately trying to get a navy rating drunk to spill classified after action reports, but you're getting first hand testimony from people who were in the middle of the battle and who genuinely want to share their story.

Monica probably is the best source of information anyone had until Spindle, and it's actually better than Spindle for showing the defensive toughness of modern ships.

Unfortunately for anyone trying to get info from that battle, most of the Manticoran fleet was 1905 or earlier vintage. The fact that the Monicans were still new to the SLN equipment also distorted the results. There was also only about a minute of MDM's being used outside of normal missile ranges as well.

The really good sensor data after Monica is all one-way...showing Manticoran missiles slicing through SLN defenses. Good for getting ideas on new offensive missiles. Useless for learning how to defend against missile storms.

Some of the SDF's may have gained pretty good information with long range sensors and/or human intelligence. The Mesan Alliance didn't do too badly - for example they got right what happened at Lovatt. They have not seemed to have much success in replicating what they saw. So far only the Andermani really have done well, and they had deep penetration of the SKM military for decades (based on Honor's encounter in Honor Among Enemies).

Even the Andermani missed the entire defensive side of Ghost Rider, and aside from stealth and sensor suites, proved to be pretty far behind even Haven when they first joined the Alliance.

Actually there was almost no sensor data from Monica.

From SFtS:

There was virtually no hard data from the actual attack on Monica. Any sensor data which had been available had either been destroyed along with Eroica Station's military components and the ships the Manticorans had engaged, or else swept up afterward by the Manticoran "investigation teams" which had swarmed over the Monican wreckage. Yet even though hard data was effectively impossible to come by, Thurgood had drawn certain very disturbing conclusions from the reports of as many Monican survivors as he'd been able to interview.

I find it hard to believe that there was any doubt that hundreds of SDF's would have sent observers to a war involving Manticore.

Remember the Wormhole Network, and how important it is to the League. Any threat to that network would be a threat to any star system that depends on it, and a LOT of star systems depend on it.

Without any doubt whatsoever, nearly every major SDF who had merchant hulls passing through Manticorean wormholes would be sending at least some fact finders to see how likely it would be that they might have to find new routes for their shipping, or send military escorts with convoys. Anything else would be foolish, even by Sollie standards.

I'm extremely suprised that there hasn't been mention of escort vessels belonging to SDF's passing through Manticore space (or trying to) at least every now and then.

Given the fact that Beawulf and the Andermandi grant passage to Manticoran warships, I would be surprised if Manticore denied passage to warships belonging to various SL SDFs during a time of peace. Israel even sends attack subs that are presumably nuclear armed through the Suez canal.

I'd expect that lots of light warships from various SL members and independant systems' SDFs have transited the wormhole junction on a routine basis. This gives Manticore a chance to look them over just as they get to sneak a peak at Manty ships. You'll notice that they are excluded from Gryphon space as well as Trever's star and other areas.

Cheopis wrote:I find it hard to believe that there was any doubt that hundreds of SDF's would have sent observers to a war involving Manticore.

Remember the Wormhole Network, and how important it is to the League. Any threat to that network would be a threat to any star system that depends on it, and a LOT of star systems depend on it.

Without any doubt whatsoever, nearly every major SDF who had merchant hulls passing through Manticorean wormholes would be sending at least some fact finders to see how likely it would be that they might have to find new routes for their shipping, or send military escorts with convoys. Anything else would be foolish, even by Sollie standards.

I'm extremely suprised that there hasn't been mention of escort vessels belonging to SDF's passing through Manticore space (or trying to) at least every now and then.

solbergb wrote:Actually Frontier Fleet didn't do a damn thing until Monica. The alarmist report that got the junior officer in trouble in STFS was sourced from Monican after action reports and sensor data. The reason is that the Monicans were the first observers not exercising operational security about their combat capabilities after the fact - as any Alliance or Haven fleet would have done.

That means you're not getting sensor data from half the system away, with possibly inferior sensors or alternately trying to get a navy rating drunk to spill classified after action reports, but you're getting first hand testimony from people who were in the middle of the battle and who genuinely want to share their story.

Monica probably is the best source of information anyone had until Spindle, and it's actually better than Spindle for showing the defensive toughness of modern ships.

...snip...

Actually he had been discredited for decades as of what is said in MoH.

MoH Chapter 32 wrote:
...snip... Unfortunately, she’d also followed his tracks through the reports everyone else had systematically ignored, as well, and her own sense of anxiety had grown steadily sharper in the process. The number of other reports which had apparently been creatively misfiled—and they’d discovered and managed to hunt down—had only made things even worse.

So the reports were out there. In fact it is stated that he was rebuked for understating the threat based on the minimum numbers he had submitted. Which were probably toned down to attempt to get people to consider them. Didn't work and it is much easier to shoot the messenger. Who you discredited decades ago.

T2M

I do not know what was actually in any of the reports but that is another thing I would love to see, but there is no real chance of us seeing them. Not going to sell to the general public and I would rather DW wrote stories anyway.

thinkstoomuch wrote:So the reports were out there. In fact it is stated that he was rebuked for understating the threat based on the minimum numbers he had submitted. Which were probably toned down to attempt to get people to consider them. Didn't work and it is much easier to shoot the messenger. Who you discredited decades ago.

The Russo-Japanese war showed in pretty stark terms how machine-guns, artillery, grenades and barbed wire would reshape the battle field, and the reports by the German, UK, French and US observers had essentially NO effect on their armies.

The observers involved included people like John J. Pershing USA, Max Hoffmann Germany, Douglas MacArthur USA, William Gustavus Nicholson UK, François Oscar de Négrier rance (who published the english text "Lessons from the Russo-Japanese War" in 1905). These were not unknown faceless bureaucrats, they were well known military officers, from senior field grade to senior flag officers. What they actually saw was all effectively ignored.

Thirdbase wrote:

SWM wrote:I'm wondering where so many people got the idea that there were SDF observers around the Manticore-Haven wars. We know that there were some observers from tech firms, but I don't believe there is any text indicating that individual SDFs sent observers.

SFtS:
<quotation follows>
Because it's mentioned in the text.

Excellent! I did miss something. Thanks!

Heck you can go back to the Civil War to predict WWI trench warfare. The breech loading rifle killed cavalry as a strike force and there were echoes in Crimea too.

Part of what messed up military thinking was the Prussian unification into Germany and their easy defeat of France. That was something of a logistics triumph, with interior lines and railways allowing very rapid troop shifts. Because in that war the defense never got established, people ignored counterexamples, both earlier and later.

To be fair, the first part of WWI was a lot like the Franco-Prussian war. Right up to the Marne. And the eastern front did not in fact result in an instant stalemate either, it was fairly dynamic.

Meanwhile the other lesson of the Russia-Japan war got blown way the hell out of proportion, with battleships being seen as the be-all and end-all of power and prestige. Given the resources and propaganda spent on them, they really never lived up to the hype in the first war (one messy engagement that ended in essentially a draw) and they proved fairly poor at commerce protection or deep water warfare in WWII. They were pretty good for establishing a close blockade around Europe, so I guess the Brits got some value for their money.

And then another example of wrong lessons learned. Maginot line anyone?

kzt wrote:The Russo-Japanese war showed in pretty stark terms how machine-guns, artillery, grenades and barbed wire would reshape the battle field, and the reports by the German, UK, French and US observers had essentially NO effect on their armies.

The observers involved included people like John J. Pershing USA, Max Hoffmann Germany, Douglas MacArthur USA, William Gustavus Nicholson UK, François Oscar de Négrier rance (who published the english text "Lessons from the Russo-Japanese War" in 1905). These were not unknown faceless bureaucrats, they were well known military officers, from senior field grade to senior flag officers. What they actually saw was all effectively ignored.

What I was thinking about had more to do with ship design lessons on compartmentalization and such. Russian fleet that got pounded in the straights(forgot the name) is quite similar to what happened to Crandall.

I forget not everyone has gone to the same damage control training I had when I was in. Or for that matter climbed around inside the voids on warship. There I go making assumptions in my own mind. I thought it was really obvious in relation to why I think DW really, really does not like BC(P)s. Could also be due to design differences between say galleons and a true ship of the line but I am not informed enough on that to form an opinion.

Mea Culpa.
T2M

[quote="solbergb"]Heck you can go back to the Civil War to predict WWI trench warfare. The breech loading rifle killed cavalry as a strike force and there were echoes in Crimea too.

Part of what messed up military thinking was the Prussian unification into Germany and their easy defeat of France. That was something of a logistics triumph, with interior lines and railways allowing very rapid troop shifts. Because in that war the defense never got established, people ignored counterexamples, both earlier and later.

To be fair, the first part of WWI was a lot like the Franco-Prussian war. Right up to the Marne. And the eastern front did not in fact result in an instant stalemate either, it was fairly dynamic.

Meanwhile the other lesson of the Russia-Japan war got blown way the hell out of proportion, with battleships being seen as the be-all and end-all of power and prestige. Given the resources and propaganda spent on them, they really never lived up to the hype in the first war (one messy engagement that ended in essentially a draw) and they proved fairly poor at commerce protection or deep water warfare in WWII. They were pretty good for establishing a close blockade around Europe, so I guess the Brits got some value for their money.

And then another example of wrong lessons learned. Maginot line anyone?[/quote]


Hi Solberg B,

It depends on what lessons are really true.

Please read Martin Van Creveld in his book "Supplying War", which goes into some detail how the German reports of railroad logistic superiority in 1870 and 1914 were deliberate lies and propaganda. France's Railways were actually better prepared militarily, and the Prussian books and propaganda afterwords didn't jive with observers like Phil Sheridan during the war.

The fact that the German Army High Command was fascinated by and wound up intensely studying Buffalo Bill's Wild West show in 1888 through the next decade speaks for itself.
They were fascinated by the speed, organization, precision, planning etc, of its preparation in erecting, its shows, the kitchen cars, the carefully loaded freight cars (before there was 'combat loading', there was railroad, or circus or show sequenced loading), and the train's HQ car, etc.
The GA staff observers actually went before them to the next city in special trains, besides following them in another, to learn every thing about the "very American railroad practices", "most efficient" and "very business like" doing time and motion studies of almost every aspect; when these were nothing special by American standards, many being SOP's going back 2+ decades to the ACW, etc. But the Germans did learn a lot, but the German logistics still failed the grade in 1914.

The relative effectiveness of the IJN's 11" guns spurred the 'all big gun ship' and HMS Dreadnought, etc.
Given their expense, relative small numbers, the public promotion and hoopla etc; dreadnoughts were far less expendable, especially politically; unlike previous major warships such as ships of the line, so their use became more political and less military in nature, making them even less useful, so the very limited exposure rate should not be a surprise.
Further, Britain's blockade was enforced by cruisers not Battleships or dreadnoughts.

As for the Maginot line, the original intent had been for a defense line of rather spartan independent fortresses, which were the bases for powerful flexible armored forces patrolling the gaps between them all the way to the channel, etc. That was the concept, but the bureaucracy had other objectives, and what came out was almost the antithesis of the original intent.
Don't forget the Siegfried line mirrored the Maginot, and it was ultimately so strong it was bypassed rather than penetrated, because it wasn't extended to the channel for supposedly foreign political (don't shut Belgium out) and financial reasons; because the mutated line they'd created was too expensive by their standards to properly finish. Actually they could have extended even their expensive mutation if they'd really wanted to, but they'd spent enough to satisfy enough of the public, that they had done enough, rather than their full duty, to get away with shorting national security. So it was for purely internal political reasons that the national defenses were incapable of doing the job everyone expected because of all the propaganda by the elites showing that it could.

Kind of reminds you of the SLN and other things in the honorverse, does it ?

Best always,

L