HFQ Official Snippet #28

Hi all,

Maybe some of us need to be getting back to the gist of the snippet.

I find it curious that Kaitswyrth, having lost ~2/3 of his rifles to DE [19,000] would even try to hold a line 60 miles long with just ~9,000 or only 150 riflemen max per mile [without any for his flanks or a reserve] or one every 35.2 feet [ie over 25% further than Lee's men at Petersburg, when he abandoned his trenches and fled because the gap was too great], and even if all the 30,000 earmarked to reinforce him from Tanshar were infantry [768 riflemen out of 1975 per division, but possibly 1536 if all pikes were replaced but we don't know that], that's only 11,520-23,040 tops, and assuming he got no replacements for those rifles he lost before Rhobair gave all the rifles he could find to the MHoG back in August, because he still hadn't honestly reported his losses back to Zion, or the rest of the Go4 yet.

But that's still only ~20-30,000 rifles for 60 miles of front, before deciding whether he also got replacement rifles, and the 22,500 of the BS armies probably increase the total to something between 40-50,000 but only when they all arrive over the next couple of month's.

Still, only around 20% of the mentioned ~250,000 figure might have rifles, which is pretty shabby even if 25-30% are cavalry.

Until then, he's extremely short of rifles if not artillery and everything else, and Symkyns has several times that many much better rifles already.

So given his overwhelming artillery and mortars, Symkyn could attack Kaitswyrth and destroy him without waiting for DE and EHM,

Not everyone in the AoG is always at the front; I'd expect only a third or less to actually be manning the front trenches or bunkers at any one time, so only a third to a quarter of the riflemen are there whenever Symkyn decided to attack, the rest being killed, kept away or driven off by his indirect weapons; mortars and angle-guns; over the open ground behind the defenses from their barracks etc as they isolate the few miles Symkyn actually attacked and overwhelmed.

Once he had his penetrations [both sides of the river], his dragoon brigades could spread out behind the rest of the line to keep the rest from escaping until the fast marching infantry replaced them in less than a day and they dashed for Aivahnstyn etc and the scout snipers for Marylys etc.

Sweeping up the small reinforcements afterward, before they arrive in the next two month's is even easier then.

I think that's an entirely possible plan or scenario but feel free to disagree.

Granted that steals the spotlight from BGV, but is that such a bad thing?

Is the timing, waiting for the MHoG to split N&S, rather than form a army group center that seems too big for Symkyn as well, that critical?

L

lyonheart wrote:Hi all,

Maybe some of us need to be getting back to the gist of the snippet.

I find it curious that Kaitswyrth, having lost ~2/3 of his rifles to DE [19,000] would even try to hold a line 60 miles long with just ~9,000 or only 150 riflemen max per mile [without any for his flanks or a reserve] or one every 35.2 feet [ie over 25% further than Lee's men at Petersburg, when he abandoned his trenches and fled because the gap was too great], and even if all the 30,000 earmarked to reinforce him from Tanshar were infantry [768 riflemen out of 1975 per division, but possibly 1536 if all pikes were replaced but we don't know that], that's only 11,520-23,040 tops, and assuming he got no replacements for those rifles he lost before Rhobair gave all the rifles he could find to the MHoG back in August, because he still hadn't honestly reported his losses back to Zion, or the rest of the Go4 yet.

But that's still only ~20-30,000 rifles for 60 miles of front, before deciding whether he also got replacement rifles, and the 22,500 of the BS armies probably increase the total to something between 40-50,000 but only when they all arrive over the next couple of month's.

Still, only around 20% of the mentioned ~250,000 figure might have rifles, which is pretty shabby even if 25-30% are cavalry.

Until then, he's extremely short of rifles if not artillery and everything else, and Symkyns has several times that many much better rifles already.

So given his overwhelming artillery and mortars, Symkyn could attack Kaitswyrth and destroy him without waiting for DE and EHM,

Not everyone in the AoG is always at the front; I'd expect only a third or less to actually be manning the front trenches or bunkers at any one time, so only a third to a quarter of the riflemen are there whenever Symkyn decided to attack, the rest being killed, kept away or driven off by his indirect weapons; mortars and angle-guns; over the open ground behind the defenses from their barracks etc as they isolate the few miles Symkyn actually attacked and overwhelmed.

Once he had his penetrations [both sides of the river], his dragoon brigades could spread out behind the rest of the line to keep the rest from escaping until the fast marching infantry replaced them in less than a day and they dashed for Aivahnstyn etc and the scout snipers for Marylys etc.

Sweeping up the small reinforcements afterward, before they arrive in the next two month's is even easier then.

I think that's an entirely possible plan or scenario but feel free to disagree.

Granted that steals the spotlight from BGV, but is that such a bad thing?

Is the timing, waiting for the MHoG to split N&S, rather than form a army group center that seems too big for Symkyn as well, that critical?

L

Hi Lyon

Interesting observations!

I'd guess that he has concentrated on key points - especially as this is still deep winter. I also suspect that the terrain may come into this too - rivers, hills, marshes all may reduce that nominal 60miles of front into something a lot more managable.

Hi Lyonheart.

There is one assumption here that bothers me a bit. That is that we can really know what Kaitswryth has by way of rifles and artillery. To be sure we can come up with a pretty good guess for what he had tight after he was forced back into Cliff Peak. And we know something about what he has gotten since. We also know that the MHOG is being prioritized.

But how much replenishment might he have received off stage? It is not as though we get to inventory what Kaitswryth has on hand. He could have received a substantial number of rifles, for example and they would only turn up as a rounding error in Duchairn's books.

Don

lyonheart wrote:Hi all,

Maybe some of us need to be getting back to the gist of the snippet.

I find it curious that Kaitswyrth, having lost ~2/3 of his rifles to DE [19,000] would even try to hold a line [SNIP]

So given his overwhelming artillery and mortars, Symkyn could attack Kaitswyrth and destroy him without waiting for DE and EHM,
[SNIP]
I think that's an entirely possible plan or scenario but feel free to disagree.
Granted that steals the spotlight from BGV, but is that such a bad thing?
Is the timing, waiting for the MHoG to split N&S, rather than form a army group center that seems too big for Symkyn as well, that critical?

On the first issue: Kaitswyrth would be executed if he decided to retreat not being under attack. That should be a strong incentive, putting aside the logistical nightmare a retreat would be for him in the winter weather and his underestimation of what is coming for him.

As to Symkyn attacking on his own: I agree that he could probably force the retreat of Kaitswyrth, even at current weather conditions. What I'd be very sceptical about would be his ability to utterly destroy Kaitswyrth's troops and - given the losses to Symkyn's units and again the weather - sustain a quick advance up the Daivyn River into Westmarch.
Waiting for his substantial reinforcements and better weather for quick strategic movement therefore makes a lot of sense. With DE and EHM joining into the attack, they can probably envelope Kaitswyrth and destroy his units quickly. Then, they advance up the Daivyn and form the second arm of the strategic pincer movement on the CoGA troops. The first arm is of course BGV, who'll likely unplug the Sylvahn Gap. All that doesn't bode well for the advancing MHoG...
So, I find the strategic approach as outlined to us sensible.

Don and anwi, between them, have hit the high points: there is no reason to think that Kaitswyrth hasn't been [partially] re-equipped, there's every reason to think that he has been reinforced, although not - yet - substantially, and every reason to expect that a frontal attack would _not_ destroy Kaitswyrth.

As for Kaitswyrth's dispositions, he probably doesn't think he can hold the entire line, although he may well think he can do a better job of it than we do. He almost certainly thinks he doesn't have any choice. We know that he held as long as he could before withdrawing to the prepared positions along the current line, so he didn't choose it at random. What he seems to have done is find the best available solution to a classic problem in infantry warfare: how not to get flanked by the opposition. You can't just hang a line of troops out in the middle of nowhere and expect that the enemy will come charging straight at you [well, not unless he's from Desnair]. You have to force him to do that, and there are, essentially, 3 ways to do it. First, by refusing your flanks: bending them back to cover the rear of your main line, which in the extreme version gives you a closed position like the one the AoS cavalry broke their teeth on north of Maiyam. Second, by finding a position where your flanks are wider than the space the enemy has to deploy into for the attack - exactly what High Mount's mounted infantry did in the Kyplynger. Finally, you can anchor your line on terrain that is either impassible or provides a strong defensive position. Both sides have gone with [functionally] impassible in the Sylmahn Gap; Kaitswyrth has the marshes on his left, but has no option but to find a defensible place to park his right. He _can't_ go all the way to the Snake Mountains - I don't think any army on Safehold, MHOGATA included, could. Tyrath is probably the first decent position south of the marshes where he can do that, and Symkyn does a pretty good job of explaining why this line works. And how it can be turned, as well, which is why warfare at this level is primarily a war of movement. The wars of the French Revolution lasted 25 years, armies marched the length and breadth of Europe, and you can still just about count the number of serious engagements with one shoe still on. Those armies basically danced around each other until they were ready for a decisive fight, at which point you either found a position the other guy had to come through, or one he had to hold, and then it came down to whose flank folded first under the pounding.

Currently, it's the Allies who are in the _have_to_hold_ position, although they're also the ones with the initiative. Unfortunately, that means that the only constraints on the AoG's ability to scuttle off to another defensible position any time its flank is turned are political. Those constraints are, of course, formidable, but can still be worked around by the better commanders.

anwi wrote:

lyonheart wrote:Hi all,

Maybe some of us need to be getting back to the gist of the snippet.

I find it curious that Kaitswyrth, having lost ~2/3 of his rifles to DE [19,000] would even try to hold a line [SNIP]

So given his overwhelming artillery and mortars, Symkyn could attack Kaitswyrth and destroy him without waiting for DE and EHM,
[SNIP]
I think that's an entirely possible plan or scenario but feel free to disagree.
Granted that steals the spotlight from BGV, but is that such a bad thing?
Is the timing, waiting for the MHoG to split N&S, rather than form a army group center that seems too big for Symkyn as well, that critical?

On the first issue: Kaitswyrth would be executed if he decided to retreat not being under attack. That should be a strong incentive, putting aside the logistical nightmare a retreat would be for him in the winter weather and his underestimation of what is coming for him.

As to Symkyn attacking on his own: I agree that he could probably force the retreat of Kaitswyrth, even at current weather conditions. What I'd be very sceptical about would be his ability to utterly destroy Kaitswyrth's troops and - given the losses to Symkyn's units and again the weather - sustain a quick advance up the Daivyn River into Westmarch.
Waiting for his substantial reinforcements and better weather for quick strategic movement therefore makes a lot of sense. With DE and EHM joining into the attack, they can probably envelope Kaitswyrth and destroy his units quickly. Then, they advance up the Daivyn and form the second arm of the strategic pincer movement on the CoGA troops. The first arm is of course BGV, who'll likely unplug the Sylvahn Gap. All that doesn't bode well for the advancing MHoG...
So, I find the strategic approach as outlined to us sensible.

Louis R wrote:SNIP

As for Kaitswyrth's dispositions, he probably doesn't think he can hold the entire line, although he may well think he can do a better job of it than we do. He almost certainly thinks he doesn't have any choice. We know that he held as long as he could before withdrawing to the prepared positions along the current line, so he didn't choose it at random. What he seems to have done is find the best available solution to a classic problem in infantry warfare: how not to get flanked by the opposition. You can't just hang a line of troops out in the middle of nowhere and expect that the enemy will come charging straight at you [well, not unless he's from Desnair]. You have to force him to do that, and there are, essentially, 3 ways to do it. First, by refusing your flanks: bending them back to cover the rear of your main line, which in the extreme version gives you a closed position like the one the AoS cavalry broke their teeth on north of Maiyam. Second, by finding a position where your flanks are wider than the space the enemy has to deploy into for the attack - exactly what High Mount's mounted infantry did in the Kyplynger. Finally, you can anchor your line on terrain that is either impassible or provides a strong defensive position. Both sides have gone with [functionally] impassible in the Sylmahn Gap; Kaitswyrth has the marshes on his left, but has no option but to find a defensible place to park his right. He _can't_ go all the way to the Snake Mountains - I don't think any army on Safehold, MHOGATA included, could. Tyrath is probably the first decent position south of the marshes where he can do that, and Symkyn does a pretty good job of explaining why this line works. And how it can be turned, as well, which is why warfare at this level is primarily a war of movement. The wars of the French Revolution lasted 25 years, armies marched the length and breadth of Europe, and you can still just about count the number of serious engagements with one shoe still on. Those armies basically danced around each other until they were ready for a decisive fight, at which point you either found a position the other guy had to come through, or one he had to hold, and then it came down to whose flank folded first under the pounding.

Currently, it's the Allies who are in the _have_to_hold_ position, although they're also the ones with the initiative. Unfortunately, that means that the only constraints on the AoG's ability to scuttle off to another defensible position any time its flank is turned are political. Those constraints are, of course, formidable, but can still be worked around by the better commanders

.

Very cogent exposition!

Wouldn't it be nice to have a mini map (with units) in the chapter when a battle occurs.

Louis R wrote:Don and anwi, between them, have hit the high points: there is no reason to think that Kaitswyrth hasn't been [partially] re-equipped, there's every reason to think that he has been reinforced, although not - yet - substantially, and every reason to expect that a frontal attack would _not_ destroy Kaitswyrth.

Hi Louis R

This is a nice post and I pretty much agree with you. I would like to qualify your paragraph above a bit. Whether or not a frontal attack would succeed probably depends on how much artillery can be brought to bear on Kaitswryth's front and how hardened his defensive positions are. That was really what happened when he tried to bull his way through DE. If Kaitswryth's front is broken, whether or not his army is destroyed will depend on his being able to retreat in good order.

Remember that DE routed Kaitswryth with only 13,000 men. Symkyn has in the range of 70,000. So if the AOG is routed again, I think that Kaitswryth is toast. However I also agree that the prudent thing for Symkyn to do is wait on DE and EHM to arrive and form blocking positions so that the AOG cannot get away.

Don

More interesting than the number of rifles he has in my mind is the amount of ammunition he managed to pull back. That was a very fast and uncoordinated retreat, and I suspect that most of his supplies got left behind. The rifles were in the hands of the soldiers as they fled, and they certainly had some ammunition on them. But how many wagons did the bring? 9,000 rifles is not going to do a lot of good if you only have ammunition for one skirmish.

Hildum wrote:More interesting than the number of rifles he has in my mind is the amount of ammunition he managed to pull back. That was a very fast and uncoordinated retreat, and I suspect that most of his supplies got left behind. The rifles were in the hands of the soldiers as they fled, and they certainly had some ammunition on them. But how many wagons did the bring? 9,000 rifles is not going to do a lot of good if you only have ammunition for one skirmish.

That is very true. However one would pretty much have to presume that ammumition would be included as a high priority item for resupply in the aftermath of a battle, win or lose.

However we don't have details from textev at this point.

Don