And it appears you are still unclear on the concept of aerial early warning being of immense military value.
Jonathan_S wrote:Mil-tech bard wrote:You seem to be a little unclear on the concept of "early warning" here --
Yes, such a network gives early warning and limited raid tracking, allowing you to scramble and position your fighters (pursuit aircraft). A wonderful advantage for them in the pre-radar days.
But without early '30s pursuit airplanes (200+ mph top speed) or high-velocity AA guns in high angle mountings, I'm not sure what even Chennault could have done against 100+ mph high altitude bombers.
So such a network may become a useful part of countering dragons once the Sharonans get aircraft of their own. But prior to that it really only gives you a heads up to take cover - but doesn't assist much in being able to actually hit back against the dragons.
The ability of such networks to Voice-queue distance viewers to track Arcanian air mobile insertions after they pass through a gate oriented early warning networks means Arcanian raiding strategies within 100 plus miles of a portal or rail road nodal force position are doomed to run into a Bison and heavy artillery equipped Sharonan reaction forces with Voice direction from said distance viewer talents.
Remember, the Sharonan nodal forces can be on armored trains to rapidly get near Arcanian ground forces after the dragon transport drops them off. Trains that can move at up to 60 miles (100km) an hour.
Once the Sharonans get any Arcanian ground force -- other than unicorns -- under their Bison towed artillery fan. They are not getting away.
Arcanians cannot afford to commit dragons to pick up Arcanian forces inside Sharonan timed fragmentation artillery shell range.
Of course, the Arcanians have to take the casualties to learn this first.
Ok, but that's not what the sub-thread I was in was talking about. We were discussing the ability of Arcanan dragons to directly assault Sharonan defenses - not to raid around them.
Hence my confusion on how significant early warning would help defenders when it only take a couple minutes to bring online what guns they have with any AA usefulness.
But in the wider discussion of Arcanan raiders inserted behind the lines I can see where a robust spotting network can reduce the effectiveness of that strategy.
(If you'd given the context of your thought I wouldn't have been so confused at the apparent non-sequitur)
The military value of early warning is not limited simply to vectoring fighters nor anti-aircraft fire.
Although in the latter case having all your guns looking at the proper threat vector means the guns can all engage at maximum range as opposed to whatever in range cam can engage after a 360 degree hemispheric search picks up the threat.
Another example of early warning usefulness was the WW2 Germans use of radar/visual early warning networks of air raids to set off smoke generators around their oil and coal-liquification refineries to hide them from B-17 Nordon bomb sights. (There are implications in that historical example.)
Your inability to see the full implications of early warning are the same sort of paradigm blindness/frame of reference errors US Navy Admirals Turner and Nimitz made at Okinawa with Japanese land based radars.
The Japanese never developed US/UK/German style radar fighter direction and the US Navy assumed early warning radars not performing it were little threat at Okinawa.
The existence of Japanese E.W. radars on islands inside the US Navy's destroyer picket screen at Okinawa was as responsible for the blood bath the US pickets took at there as the attacking planes themselves.
The Japanese radar could see all the US Navy combat air patrol stations around Okinawa in real time.
See the following, it is typed from the after action report (AAR) of the naval invasion force commander for Kume Shima in early July 1945 --
Commander Task Group 31.24 ( ComDes Ron 63)
Subject: Action Report - Capture of KUME SHIMA, Okinawa Gunto, 25-27 June 1945
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6. Conclusion
Destroyers who hare done Radar Picket duty around Okinawa the past three months have long been suspicious of KUME SHIMA. bogies seemed to appear if by magic, from the shadows of this island; and on the few occasions they were able to use a round trip ticket, disappear as strangely into KUME.
The landing strip, immediately behind Green Beach, contained a number of wrecked planes. indicating it my have been used for emergency landings. The strip itself, however, was reported to be in such poor shape that it could hardly have been used as an operational or even staging field. It seems probable that a radar and radio on KUME SHIMA served as a beacon to bogies approaching the Okinawa Area from the south and west.
The destroyers, then, perhaps more so than any other units, will be glad to see this island out of enemy hands. It should make a first rate, unsinkable Radar Picket, and soon relieve the destroyers of their vigil along the FORMOSA-OKINAWA Air Highway."