HFQ Official Snippet #13

n7axw wrote:The Japanese lost the war because they bit off more than they could chew. They couldn't sustain the size of military they needed for their ambitions because their industrial plant, population and resourses were too small to match the opposition. That's not even to consider the fact that they had no way to get at America's industry which meant that we could expand to our heart's content without fear of being attacked. What happened was the Japanese and Germans were swarmed under by the vast quantity of arms and supplies that was produced by an enemy they couldn't even get at.

Don

That's pretty much what Tonto said, and I agree - Japan would have lost the war anyway, but destroying the sub pens, and fuel dumps, and getting the aircraft carriers would have made the war take a couple of years longer. Yes, the atomic bomb would have been available at about the same time frame, but there were only two weapons built in August 1945, and if they are not enough to force the surrender, then you have an invasion of the Japanese home islands, and that would have been a real nightmare. I don't remember how long it was going to take to build more atomic bombs, but I believe it was about 6 months before any more would be available.

I've ofter wondered what would have happened if on December 7th, Hitler had said "We can never be allies with anyone who conducts a sneak attack", and broke the alliance with Japan immediately, instead of declaring war on the US, as they did. Does that cause the entire weight of the US industrial complex to fall on Japan, leaving Germany free to deal with the other allies without US support? Given the isolationist tendencies of the US in that time frame, I'm not convinced that we would have declared war on Germany.

fallsfromtrees wrote:

n7axw wrote:The Japanese lost the war because they bit off more than they could chew. They couldn't sustain the size of military they needed for their ambitions because their industrial plant, population and resourses were too small to match the opposition. That's not even to consider the fact that they had no way to get at America's industry which meant that we could expand to our heart's content without fear of being attacked. What happened was the Japanese and Germans were swarmed under by the vast quantity of arms and supplies that was produced by an enemy they couldn't even get at.

Don

That's pretty much what Tonto said, and I agree - Japan would have lost the war anyway, but destroying the sub pens, and fuel dumps, and getting the aircraft carriers would have made the war take a couple of years longer. Yes, the atomic bomb would have been available at about the same time frame, but there were only two weapons built in August 1945, and if they are not enough to force the surrender, then you have an invasion of the Japanese home islands, and that would have been a real nightmare. I don't remember how long it was going to take to build more atomic bombs, but I believe it was about 6 months before any more would be available.

I've ofter wondered what would have happened if on December 7th, Hitler had said "We can never be allies with anyone who conducts a sneak attack", and broke the alliance with Japan immediately, instead of declaring war on the US, as they did. Does that cause the entire weight of the US industrial complex to fall on Japan, leaving Germany free to deal with the other allies without US support? Given the isolationist tendencies of the US in that time frame, I'm not convinced that we would have declared war on Germany.

The war plans for the invasion of the southernmost Japanese island allotted a half dozen atomic bombs for tactical use, or so one recent volume claims. My own impression had been that one more would have been available soon, a half-dozen in the Fall, and after the Russians captured Manchuria and Korea and headed south they also had not-great amphibious capacity to invade Hokkaido. They did not have much naval capacity in the Pacific, but we had sunk the Japanese navy.

The more serious issue with the atomic bombs was that the conventional bombing campaign was running out of city targets. Fortunately the Japanese realized that they could surrender to us.

"allotted a half dozen atomic bombs for tactical use, or so one recent volume claims."
***
IIRC, all of the highly enriched Uranium was used in "Little Boy" and there was one more Plutonium core available after "Fat Man". Don't know how much Plutonium was in the "pipeline".

I remember reading about 15 years ago, that records from the Japanese War cabinet indicated that the "final straw" for surrender was the declaration of war by the USSR. Any hope of inflicting mass casualties on the US invasion force, inducing a negotiated truce, were shattered by the Russian declaration.

Steve

SHV wrote:I remember reading about 15 years ago, that records from the Japanese War cabinet indicated that the "final straw" for surrender was the declaration of war by the USSR. Any hope of inflicting mass casualties on the US invasion force, inducing a negotiated truce, were shattered by the Russian declaration.

Steve

Odd, I remember hearing something similar a few years back.

Don't know how much credence to put into the idea.

Hi Tonto Silerheels,

Yep.

Losing everything at Pearl Harbor would not have prevented us from burying the Japanese under the military might we were already building.

While half the navy's battle line was sunk or temporarily lost [all but 2 BB's were salvaged and saw combat], all 15 pre-war BB's were already planned to be replaced by 1945, by the 2 North Carolina's that entered service in 1941, the 4 South Dakota's commissioned in 1942, the 6 Iowa's [only 4 commissioned in 1943-44] and 5 Montana's which were cancelled in 1943 as being surplus to the war's requirements.

The Japanese industrial sector while growing considerably [auto and aircraft production etc] in the 1930's by their standards was still tiny compared to the US.

Even at the worst of the depression the USA produced 60 MT of steel ten times the best the Japanese could do during the war, and quickly expanded up to 100 MT during the war, which swamped not just the Japanese, but the rest of the axis, while supplying the Soviets and the Brits with vast amounts of both war materiel, food, and critical economic equipment to sustain their civilian populations and economies.

Calling the quantity of all types of industrial equipment the US produced vast or huge doesn't begin to cover the scope of the US industrial production, which literally rearmed the rest of the world.

Remember that German vehicle production then was not large, much smaller than Britain of France's, indeed 3/4 of all German artillery still used horses in 1944, the panzer and motorized divisions represented only a tiny part of the German army which used more horses in WW2 than WW1; and had to 'demotorise' 10 semi-motorized divisions before the war in 1939 because the accident rate exceeded the army's motor vehicle allotment [including lots of motorcycles], shortages of steel plagued German war requirements throughout the war, especially the navy.

A surrendered German general in April-May 1945 watching one US infantry division after another rush down the autobahn on each side of him, one every hour, all completely motorized, declared that if Germany had known the US could do this so easily "we would have never started the war in the first place!"

Granted that presumes the military could have kept Hitler from taking advantage of the situation in 1939, or that it should have known the US industrial capacity and power long before 1939, but strategically the Germans seemed much more short sighted than was good for them in their first several decades of unified government.

The example set by the industrial production of the "Arsenal of Democracy" was one reason no one wanted to directly challenge the US to another WW2 conventional war for decades after the war.

L

Tonto Silerheels wrote:fallsfromtrees wrote:

My understanding of the original US strategy in the Pacific was to use the line of battleships sweeping across the Pacific to engage the Japanese fleet in a determintive battle. That was the Japanese plan as well, which they screwed up by attacking all of the battleships at Pearl Harbor, and missing the aircraft carriers. The eventual US Pacific Strategy was based on the fact that the Japanese had missed the carriers, missed the sub pens, and missed the fuel storage facilities at Pearl. Those submarines and aircraft carriers, burning that fuel, led to the loss of the war by the Japanese.

Before I opine any, let me say that I am by no means an expert on military matters.

Now, with that out of the way, I'll say that my understanding differs slightly from yours. My understanding was that a large contingent of USA Admirals believed that battleships represented the war of the future. A much smaller contingent believed that the day of the battleship had passed, and aircraft carriers represented the navy's future.

In Japan, there was a much greater belief in the aircraft carrier, but battleships were still in high regard. Aircraft carriers had slightly greater prestige (read: reliance). Japan greatly desired to destroy the USA aircraft carriers, and reports from 30 NOV 41 said that three carriers and many battleships were in Pearl Harbor. The Japanese decided to proceed with the planned 7 DEC 41 attack.

In what was surely an oversight on the part of the Americans, they had neglected to inform the Japanese that their carriers had moved out of the harbor in the meantime to participate in unrelated maneuvers. The Japanese attacked the battleships because the battleships were in the harbor, and so were the Japanese (well, they were in the area. They weren't in the harbor). The Japanese missed the carriers because the carriers weren't where the Japanese were.

Initial reports from the attacking force to the task force were that the Americans were taken completely by surprise, and that the battleships had received massive damage. Because of those results the Japanese decided to call off the third (?) wave of attacks as it was felt that they could accomplish very little, and the third wave would face more resistance as the Americans had more time to develop a response. The third wave was to attack the repair facilities and the fuel storage facilities. The fuel storage facilities weren't so much 'missed' as they were declined. I don't remember anything about submarine pens.

Subsequently, as the Americans had aircraft carriers and they didn't have battleships, the pro-carrier contingent amongst the Admiralty won by a sort of a bye. "You think aircraft carriers are the way to fight a war; well, here's your chance."

Now, here's my thoroughly unprofessional opinion: the Japanese would have lost the war even had the aircraft carriers, the fuel storage facilities, and the repair facilities been destroyed.

~Tonto

Hi FallsFromTrees,

The rumor that we only had two bombs ready to go isn't supported by the evidence, we had an industrial production line in place and the invasion of Japan intended to use more than 6 to isolate the immediate invasion areas starting in November.

Given the record and preference of Hitler and Mussolini for surprise attacks, I have to laugh at your suggestion of Hitler posturing so piously and righteously.

The idea the vast support already going to the Brits would suddenly have stopped after Pearl Harbor when we were practically already at war in the Atlantic is simply a non-starter.

Given the 1940 Tripartite treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan [who saw it as a defense against the Soviet Union] both were already committed to declare war on the US, which they did on December 11, and the US added them to it declaration of war against Japan only a few hours later.

Hitler had already discussed fighting the US roughly 6 month's earlier with his generals and staff etc, and had felt the impression it was inevitable; although that wasn't the general's precise reaction, they wanted the US kept out of the war as long as possible, so many were shocked and worried when Hitler went ahead with little concern or discussion for the already evident downsides.

Roosevelt understood Hitler's thinking and the Tripartite treaty's requirements, he knew German and could understand Hitler's speeches without needing a translator, so he expected both Mussolini and Hitler to declare war on the USA within days of his declaration of war against Japan, which they did, playing into his hands.

American isolationism pretty much evaporated in the smoke over Pearl Harbor, not that it had stopped FDR in any significant way in 1941, being already considerably weakened by the obvious threat and the isolationists own inept actions, and while there was considerable support for more action against Japan sooner, the industrial logic of the "Germany first" program meant it sailed through congress and Washington fairly quickly and well, if not as comfortably as Churchill might have liked.

The turnaround at Midway was a shock to US planners in that they hadn't expected it to happen so soon, so the invasion of Guadalcanal was still quite a shoestring operation in August, but still far easier for us to support than Japan could respond and absorb its losses.

A year after Pearl Harbor the axis was already in retreat and their smart generals knew it was only beginning.

L

fallsfromtrees wrote:

n7axw wrote:The Japanese lost the war because they bit off more than they could chew. They couldn't sustain the size of military they needed for their ambitions because their industrial plant, population and resourses were too small to match the opposition. That's not even to consider the fact that they had no way to get at America's industry which meant that we could expand to our heart's content without fear of being attacked. What happened was the Japanese and Germans were swarmed under by the vast quantity of arms and supplies that was produced by an enemy they couldn't even get at.

Don

That's pretty much what Tonto said, and I agree - Japan would have lost the war anyway, but destroying the sub pens, and fuel dumps, and getting the aircraft carriers would have made the war take a couple of years longer. Yes, the atomic bomb would have been available at about the same time frame, but there were only two weapons built in August 1945, and if they are not enough to force the surrender, then you have an invasion of the Japanese home islands, and that would have been a real nightmare. I don't remember how long it was going to take to build more atomic bombs, but I believe it was about 6 months before any more would be available.

I've ofter wondered what would have happened if on December 7th, Hitler had said "We can never be allies with anyone who conducts a sneak attack", and broke the alliance with Japan immediately, instead of declaring war on the US, as they did. Does that cause the entire weight of the US industrial complex to fall on Japan, leaving Germany free to deal with the other allies without US support? Given the isolationist tendencies of the US in that time frame, I'm not convinced that we would have declared war on Germany.

Hi SHV,

I believe you're referring to the publishing of books regarding the Enigma and Japanese code intercepts, some going back to the early 1990's.

Given that the Japanese leadership in Tokyo, including the emperor, but not their ambassador in Moscow, had put so much hope into making some deal with Stalin throughout 1945 that would save them from the American Juggernaut indicates how deep in denial they all were, since Stalin had already given notice he was letting the non-aggression pact between them lapse, and the Japanese couriers on the Siberian Railroad noticed long trains full of tanks etc all going east [and none west] etc, but Tokyo refused to listen, so the dashing of their dreams of Stalin succoring them was indeed a shock, although the official stoic or blase reactions seem a bit much even for the Japanese.

While the loss of Manchuria and Korea were important psychological blows to the Japanese militarists, who had invested so much into the China aspect of their new hegemony, given the isolation Japan was suffering from the USN submarines, NTM the rest of the navy and the USAAF's mining campaign, there was darn little they could do to help their Manchurian army once the Soviets attacked.

Because there was now no hope left, the emperor made the recording acceding to the Allies demands, which triggered the attempted coup by the militarists, some of whom were willing to kill him, despite the emperor's semi-divine nature; sort of like Christians attempting to crucify Christ to stop him from doing something drastic they don't agree with.

Because they knew the end of the war meant the end of them.

L

SHV wrote:"allotted a half dozen atomic bombs for tactical use, or so one recent volume claims."
***
IIRC, all of the highly enriched Uranium was used in "Little Boy" and there was one more Plutonium core available after "Fat Man". Don't know how much Plutonium was in the "pipeline".

I remember reading about 15 years ago, that records from the Japanese War cabinet indicated that the "final straw" for surrender was the declaration of war by the USSR. Any hope of inflicting mass casualties on the US invasion force, inducing a negotiated truce, were shattered by the Russian declaration.

Steve

lyonheart wrote:Hi FallsFromTrees,

The rumor that we only had two bombs ready to go isn't supported by the evidence, we had an industrial production line in place and the invasion of Japan intended to use more than 6 to isolate the immediate invasion area.

The problem was in the production of U235 and plutonium. The amount that had been produced to date was used up building 1 test bomb (detonated 16 July 1945 at Alamagordo, NM) and two actual weapons. That amount had taken about 2 years to accumulate. Granted the production facilities were now in place at Oak Ridge, TN and Hanover, WA, but it was still going to take time to produce the required materials.

lyonheart wrote:Given the record and preference of Hitler and Mussolini for surprise attacks, I have to laugh at your suggestion of Hitler posturing so piously and righteously.

And why would you be surprised that a politician like Hitler could poster piously and righteously? I agree that this was never going to happen, I just like to speculate on what would have happened if Hitler had stabbed his ally in the back.

lyonheart wrote:The idea the vast support already going to the Brits would suddenly have stopped after Pearl Harbor when we were practically already at war in the Atlantic is simply a non-starter.

]
It would not have stopped, but it could have been drastically reduced, as instead of the 10% of the war effort directed at Japan might have jumped up to something like 50%, which would represent an almost 50% reduction in what was going to the allies.

lyonheart wrote:Given the 1940 Tripartite treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan [who saw it as a defense against the Soviet Union] both were already committed to declare war on the US, which they did on December 11, and the US added them to it declaration of war against Japan only a few hours later.

Hitler had already discussed fighting the US roughly 6 month's earlier with his generals and staff etc, and had felt the impression it was inevitable; although that wasn't the general's precise reaction, they wanted the US kept out of the war as long as possible, so many were shocked and worried when Hitler went ahead with little concern or discussion for the already evident downsides.

Roosevelt understood Hitler's thinking and the Tripartite treaty's requirements, he knew German and could understand Hitler's speeches without needing a translator, so he expected both Mussolini and Hitler to declare war on the USA within days of his declaration of war against Japan, which they did, playing into his hands.

American isolationism pretty much evaporated in the smoke over Pearl Harbor, not that it had stopped FDR in any significant way in 1941, being already considerably weakened by the obvious threat and the isolationists own inept actions, and while there was considerable support for more action against Japan sooner, the industrial logic of the "Germany first" program meant it sailed through congress and Washington fairly quickly and well, if not as comfortably as Churchill might have liked.

The turnaround at Midway was a shock to US planners in that they hadn't expected it to happen so soon, so the invasion of Guadalcanal was still quite a shoestring operation in August, but still far easier for us to support than Japan could respond and absorb its losses.

A year after Pearl Harbor the axis was already in retreat and their smart generals knew it was only beginning.

L

Certainly it was extremely unlikely that Hitler would have made the call to try to keep the US out of the war in Europe. I suspect that if he had done so, the war would have ended not much later, as the atomic bomb was something that the Germans were not even close to. At the end of the war, they had still not achieved a sustained chain reaction, which had been done in the US in 1942 (in the middle of Chicago - try doing that today).

Hi Charybdis,

I expected RFC to respond to your post long before now with another of his great informative posts, but hopefully he's very busy writing [or speaking so the computer does the writing], so here goes my more limited response.

The majority of both the IJN and USN admirals strongly supported BB's over carriers, [darn few Essex carriers were originally intended to be built] but the IJN knowing they couldn't match the US in numbers chose quality as the equalizer, and built the Yamato and Musashi starting in 1937, with the Shinano following three years later.

There was no way the Japanese would have converted the first two before the carrier had really proven itself, NTM the two year conversion process required would have still delayed them beyond Midway.

Furthermore they were so big they were rather slow to be fleet carriers [only 27 knots top speed], so the converted Shinano was intended to be a support or reserve carrier, providing replacement aircraft [120] as needed to the fleet carriers, except by the time it was completed, there wasn't a trained IJN carrier force to support, ie both aircrew and flattops were now quite scarce since most of the remaining flattops had been expended as decoys at Leyte Gulf, and the remaining aircrew poorly trained due to lack of fuel and modern aircraft, and the Shinano had taken too many liberties with standard safety and damage control regulations that it became the largest ship sunk by a submarine all too easily.

L

Charybdis wrote:

runsforcelery wrote:]=== SNIP ===
The Japanese indignantly — and truthfully — denied that they were doing anything of the sort. The bit of the truth they omitted from their official statements was that they were building 70,000-ton battleships with 18" guns.

In hindsight, a great many allied military remained alive to see the war's end from that decision as opposed to building additional aircraft carriers. The Yamato and her sister ship, Musashi, were designed, like their German, British and American counterparts, to be the big-fist in an all-out battle between fleets that never happened. If the Japanese had changed over and converted them to A/C Carriers and maybe built, for the costs another 1 or 2 Carriers, Midway would not have been so crippling for the IJN.

FYI: Changing intentions did work for the US in that the counterparts of the Yamato for the US were the post-Iowa class of Battleships, the Montana Class. Planned but never built, the funding eventually went towards the Aircraft Carriers and faster Cruisers.

Hi FallsFromTrees,

The problem about increasing the fraction of the war effort devoted to the Japanese [which was quite a bit more than 10%] is that more wasn't needed; the "Arsenal of Democracy" was easily able to support both theaters and all our allies with more than enough to make up losses despite a tragic learning curve for all too many.

The main difference between Montgomery and the previous Brit CO's was that he had Detroit on his side; regardless how he wasted assets, especially time, he could easily overwhelm whatever Rommel scrapped together, NTM our contributions to the inevitable Soviet victory [after August 1941] were still only fractions of our overall production, lend lease to the USSR was pegged at only $11.3 Billion IIRC, or just over a quarter of
Lend-Lease which was still only a fraction of our overall effort.

Yes, the first chain reaction was under the UC tennis courts, and the German atomic effort was inept in almost every way, but given the Nazi leadership it wouldn't have needed atom bombs to destroy them.

L

fallsfromtrees wrote:

lyonheart wrote:Hi FallsFromTrees,

The rumor that we only had two bombs ready to go isn't supported by the evidence, we had an industrial production line in place and the invasion of Japan intended to use more than 6 to isolate the immediate invasion area.

The problem was in the production of U235 and plutonium. The amount that had been produced to date was used up building 1 test bomb (detonated 16 July 1945 at Alamagordo, NM) and two actual weapons. That amount had taken about 2 years to accumulate. Granted the production facilities were now in place at Oak Ridge, TN and Hanover, WA, but it was still going to take time to produce the required materials.

lyonheart wrote:Given the record and preference of Hitler and Mussolini for surprise attacks, I have to laugh at your suggestion of Hitler posturing so piously and righteously.

And why would you be surprised that a politician like Hitler could poster piously and righteously? I agree that this was never going to happen, I just like to speculate on what would have happened if Hitler had stabbed his ally in the back.

lyonheart wrote:The idea the vast support already going to the Brits would suddenly have stopped after Pearl Harbor when we were practically already at war in the Atlantic is simply a non-starter.

]
It would not have stopped, but it could have been drastically reduced, as instead of the 10% of the war effort directed at Japan might have jumped up to something like 50%, which would represent an almost 50% reduction in what was going to the allies.

lyonheart wrote:Given the 1940 Tripartite treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan [who saw it as a defense against the Soviet Union] both were already committed to declare war on the US, which they did on December 11, and the US added them to it declaration of war against Japan only a few hours later.

Hitler had already discussed fighting the US roughly 6 month's earlier with his generals and staff etc, and had felt the impression it was inevitable; although that wasn't the general's precise reaction, they wanted the US kept out of the war as long as possible, so many were shocked and worried when Hitler went ahead with little concern or discussion for the already evident downsides.

Roosevelt understood Hitler's thinking and the Tripartite treaty's requirements, he knew German and could understand Hitler's speeches without needing a translator, so he expected both Mussolini and Hitler to declare war on the USA within days of his declaration of war against Japan, which they did, playing into his hands.

American isolationism pretty much evaporated in the smoke over Pearl Harbor, not that it had stopped FDR in any significant way in 1941, being already considerably weakened by the obvious threat and the isolationists own inept actions, and while there was considerable support for more action against Japan sooner, the industrial logic of the "Germany first" program meant it sailed through congress and Washington fairly quickly and well, if not as comfortably as Churchill might have liked.

The turnaround at Midway was a shock to US planners in that they hadn't expected it to happen so soon, so the invasion of Guadalcanal was still quite a shoestring operation in August, but still far easier for us to support than Japan could respond and absorb its losses.

A year after Pearl Harbor the axis was already in retreat and their smart generals knew it was only beginning.

L

Certainly it was extremely unlikely that Hitler would have made the call to try to keep the US out of the war in Europe. I suspect that if he had done so, the war would have ended not much later, as the atomic bomb was something that the Germans were not even close to. At the end of the war, they had still not achieved a sustained chain reaction, which had been done in the US in 1942 (in the middle of Chicago - try doing that today).