Admittedly the initial stages of the War of 1812 were bad but I think you are missing the points of how the RN changed tactics to deal with the Privateer threat.
Also didn't HMS Shannon on the 1st June 1813 capture the USS Chesapeake in 11 minutes?
Lyonheart you mention the extra prizes in 1814 but in 1815 the USS President (flagship of the American navy) was defeated and subsequently re-used by the RN. She was renamed HMS President and the name is still on the RN ship's list So from the point of view of prestige who had the last laugh?
Britain considered the entire 1812-1814/15 war an irritant because it appeared America (Jefferson / Madison) were supporting a despot (Napoleon) who wanted to dominate all of Europe; therefore their focus was Europe and the only objective for Britain in the North Americas was not for any Canadian territory to fall to America. No extra forces were dispatched to prevent this, instead local assets were to be used.
Lyonheart your comments about the Ghent Conference forgot this information:
"The decisive event of the war was the abdication of Napoleon in April, 1814. This gave the British the option of increasing their military effort to secure a decisive victory. But the Duke of Wellington’s army remained in Europe, sending a few regiments to facilitate the capture of Washington. The British focus on Europe remained absolute from 1803 to 1815: securing a peaceful, stable and durable settlement on the continent was far more important than the Canadian frontier.
Even when the British agreed to negotiate with the U.S., the discussions at Ghent remained entirely subordinate to the main diplomatic gathering at Vienna. Eventually the British offered a status quo ante bellum peace, without concession by either side: the Treaty of Ghent ignored the Orders in Council, the belligerent rights and impressment. By accepting these terms the Americans acknowledged the complete failure of the war to achieve any of their strategic or political aims. Once the treaty had been signed, on Christmas Eve 1814, the British returned the focus to Europe.
The wisdom of their decision soon became obvious: Napoleon returned to power in 1815, only to meet his Waterloo at the hands of Wellington. Had the U.S. stayed in the war, the army that defeated Napoleon might have been sent to America. Anglo-American relations remained difficult for the next fifty years, but when crises erupted over frontiers and maritime rights, British statesmen subtly reminded the Americans who had won the War of 1812, and how they had won it. In case any doubt remains the results were written in stone all along the American coast. Between 1815 and 1890, American defence expenditure was dominated by the construction of coastal fortifications on the Atlantic seaboard."
This quote is directly from a British perspective of the war of 1812.
Britain never committed more than 5-7% of her total military power to the war of 1812. The vast majority of the fleet was engaged in ensuring the French didn't try anything sneaky - the last time they tried a wee little battle called Trafalgar was the result.
Another point; didn't Washington DC get burnt by second string battalions / native troops?
If Britain had sent her first line regiments to 'teach you damn Americans a lesson' you'd be drinking tea in Boston
Before you say that would have been easily beaten - just remember these troops had not only fought an extremely mobile and successful campaign they were lead for the most part by commanders who knew how to fight and win. Wellington even with his faults knew how to get the best out of his troops and more importantly knew when to press an engagement and when not too. Many may argue this but Wellington had learnt his lessons well in India and then his later campaign up through the Peninsula.
The fact remains Britain concentrated on the war in Europe and not the side show of America.
lyonheart wrote:Hello RunsForCelery!
"Wow! Cool! Neat!"
Thanks very much for such an exposition on so many aspects of commerce warfare, it's fascinating.
The fate of the USS Essex immediately came to mind early in your comparison and I notice the USS Firefly, Captain Porter's next command, seems far closer to your Desnari commerce raiding schooner as it was a 300 ton brig of just 14 guns only 109 feet long etc.
However, I was under the impression that American privateers were still quite a nuisance in 1814, even in the Irish Sea; to wit tripling or quadrupling British marine insurance rates, if insurance could be found, due to greater losses than during just the Napoleonic wars [~1811, before the American 1812 war] while the rest of Europe was benefiting from the peace and resumption of trade, generating some internal political pressure to end the American war quickly, that among other things privateers had captured something like ~1350 ships, nearly all merchants and something like 24,000+ prisoners, roughly 4 times what the US Army captured, and while that may have been only ~2.5% of the British merchant fleet, it was far better than anyone else had ever done in tweaking the British Lion's tail.
Granted that reducing many of the privateer shipyards was one reason for the RN's ongoing Chesapeake Bay campaigns [echoed on Safehold], and the RN captured about half of the privateers or ships with 'letters of marque' [which were very easy for a merchant captain to get] most prizes were taken by 10% or less, echoing U-Boat experience.
Thus despite the end of Napoleon and the RN's ability to concentrate on the US, our privateers were still harassing British shipping even as Washington was being burned; Lloyd's reported 2 US Navy warships and several privateers had captured 108 British prizes that month alone, including even in the Thames estuary, with the year's total at or near the 400 of 1813, more than the 300 of 1812, though that was in just over 6 month's.
While news of the Treaty of Ghent reached most of the US by February 1815, the last privateers didn't return until June, with another 250 prizes for that near half-year!
So while the RN may have considered it successfully protected most of its convoys, losses to privateers were at best only about 1% in any single year; it obviously could have been much worse, pushing Britain to get the rest of Europe to condemn and end the practice in 1856.
L