Captain Igloo wrote:This problem reached its nadir during the fall of 1944, when the US artillery in Europe was reduced to strict rationing of ammunition. At one point, the artillery was limited to fewer than twenty 105mm rounds-per-day-per-gun. From 11 October to 7 November 1944, Third Army fired a total of 76,325 rounds of all types (an average of 2,726 per-day), which was less than the number fired on a single day during the Battle of the Bulge. Indeed, at the end of the Battle of the Bulge, ammunition reserves in the ETO were 31 percent of the War Department's planning levels (which were already conceded to be too low). Like the personnel replacement problem, the ammunition shortage was only truly solved by the ending of the war.
Henry Brown wrote:Interesting. Any idea what was the chief cause of the problem? For example, was it due to: 1. The factories in the United States not being able to make enough shells in the first place, 2. Lack of shipping to get them from the US to the European theatre, or 3. Difficulties with transporting them overland from the channel ports to the front?
Keith_w wrote:Number 1 is unlikely. The US had been in the war since 1941, and had been supplying ammunition before that, as well as sutley preparing for it's own entry. More likely would be continuing U-Boat activity in the Atlantic, causing the direct loss of ammunition as well as other supplies and personnel and reducing the amount of transportation available, and a lack of Channel port space to receive the supplies as they arrived.
Third Army's problem with ammunition and fuel supply was not due to manufacturing shortages but was due instead to the inability of Allied forces to keep Third Army supplied. Sufficient quantities of ammunition and fuel were stacked up at Normandy, but there was not enough heavy transport to keep Patton supplied. Some supplies designated for Third Army were also diverted to Montgomery's "Operation Market Garden" and could have been better used if sent to Patton. The ammunition and fuel in supply depots in the areas of Northern Europe under may have been sufficient for the entire European theater, but the Allies suffered from inadequate amounts of transport for the supplies they had.
After being forced to halt on September 25, 1944, due to a lack of fuel and ammunition, Patton took advantage of captured enemy weapons to conserve his own ordnance and ammunition. There is an interesting description of what Patton did in the article "Refuel on the Move: Resupplying Patton’s Third Army" by Captain Daniel G. Grassi, published in Quartermaster Professional Bulletin - Summer 1993. You can read the article at
http://www.qmfound.com/pol.htm.
