Convoy escorts - SPOILER for SNIPPET 8 of HFQ

Highjohn wrote:
packhunter
"163x stories"
What are you talking about here? Are there some stories written by a feline which moves quickly after vegetables that I haven't read?

Weber wrote a short story (IIRC it was titled 'In the Navy') and co-authored '1633' and '1634 The Baltic War'

Main author of the series is Eric Flint but by now there's a plethora of authors of short stories and novels many building on the events in 1633 and 1634 The Baltic War.

Weber was supposed to write another couple of books with a naval theme but it seems that will be postponed indefinitely.

Okay, so I did some research (see below).

According to my numbers, in 1898-99, the French would have 6 armored cruisers, 28 protected cruisers, and about a half dozen unprotected cruisers of extremely dubious value. In the same years, the British would have 11 armored cruisers (of which Nelson and Northumberland would be pretty useless), 13 first-class protected cruisers; 49 second class protected cruisers, and 36 third class protected cruisers. Total French cruisers = approximately 40; total British cruisers = 60, of which 2 have 0 military utility, for all intents and purposes. On the other hand, the three or four oldest French protected cruisers probably wouldn’t be a lot better. So let’s let all the numbers stand and we have a ratio of 6:4 in Britain’s favor.

The French armored cruisers range in speed from 18 knots to 19 knots and the average speed for all of them was approximately 17.5 knots. For the protected cruisers, the speeds ranged between 16 knots and 21.5 knots, and the average for all of them was approximately 17.4 knots, while their unarmored cruisers basically did well to make 12 knots (assuming that any of them were actually still available for operations).

The British armored cruisers ranged in speed from 14 knots (for the Nelsons which I’m pretty sure were no longer in service) through 16 knots to 18 knots, with an average (dropping the Nelsons from consideration) of 17.2 knots. Their first-class protected cruisers ran between a low of 18 and a high of 21 knots (I’m using only service speeds here, not trial speeds) for an average of 18.8 knots. The second class protected cruisers’ speeds ranged between 16.5 and 21 knots, with an average of 19.1 knots, and the third class protected cruisers’ speeds ranged between 15 knots and 18.5 knots, for an average of 16.7 knots.

Overall, the British armored cruisers (and first-class and second-class protected cruisers) had more logical layouts for their guns. In theory, the French had better axial fire ahead and astern, but in practice most of that advantage was illusory because of blast effect on the structure of the ship. The British ships tended to have more freeboard, which automatically gave their guns higher command. The French centerline gun mounts on the armored cruisers had excellent command (although that was somewhat mitigated against on the ships where "centerline" weapons were placed 2 abreast). The broadside weapons were more poorly placed (by and large) than those of their British counterparts, but they compensated for that to some extent by using more turreted mounts, which cut down on the effects of blast interference, although it didn’t do much about spray interference and guns being washed out in a seaway.

On average, there was only about 0.3 knots’ difference between the two sides’ armored cruisers. The British first-class protected cruisers averaged 1.1 knots faster than the French protected cruisers, and the second-class protected cruisers were 1.7 knots faster, but they are third class protected cruisers averaged 0.7 knots slower.

The French armored cruisers were designed for an operational range of 4,000 nautical miles, and their protected cruisers varied between 3,500 and 6,000 nautical miles, but there are an awful lot of them I have no numbers for at all. I am therefore assuming a designed standard range of approximately 5,000 nautical miles. British armored cruisers had a design operational range of 6,500 nautical miles (1.63 as great as the French armored cruisers and 1.3 times that of the protected cruisers), and their first-class protected cruisers endurance was between 10,000 and 15,000 nautical miles, with an average of about 13,000 nautical miles (or about 2.6 times the radius of the French protected cruisers and 3.25 times that of the armored cruisers). British second-class protected cruisers endurances ranged between a low of 6,000 nautical miles and 10,000 nautical miles, with an average of about 8,674 nautical miles (1.74 times the French protected cruisers radius and 2.2 times the armored cruisers radius. The third-class British protected cruisers’ endurance varied between 6,400 nautical miles and 7,200. We have some blanks here, as well, so I’m going to call the average endurance 6,800 nautical miles (1.36 times the French protected cruisers’ radius and 1.6 times that of the French armored cruisers).

So, on average the British armored cruisers are marginally slower than their French counterparts but with substantially longer range and the British protected cruisers have both the speed advantage and a marked advantage in operating radius. The French protected cruisers carry heavier main batteries (overall) than their British opposite numbers and tend to be more heavily gunned for a given displacement but do not have a marked advantage in broadside fire against British armored cruisers, first-class or second-class protected cruisers. The third-class British protected cruisers are fairly badly outgunned by the French, but aside from the very oldest of them, the differential isn’t hopeless, just pretty darn bad. (As in I sure as heck wouldn't want to be them but I see some Victoria Crosses in the offing.)

If it comes down to a straight contest between the two sides’ cruiser fleets, British numbers are likely to tell in the end. Admittedly, commerce raiding, by its nature, is designed to tie down more ships than the attacker is using, and the Brits have only a 50% advantage in platforms. On balance, then, and bearing in mind the French inferiority in operational radius, it would probably be pretty much of a wash. The British third-class protected cruisers would almost certainly be assigned to convoy work if only because they aren't fast enough for hunter-killer work. (In fact, bearing in mind the "bait" potential of a convoy, that would probably be the best use for a chunk of the second-cless protected cruisers, as well.) The British armored cruisers and first-class protected cruisers would probably have been used more aggressively, since they could take on anything the French had with a fair degree of confidence; if they couldn’t sink the Frenchman outright, they could probably inflict enough damage to drive the French ship back into port for major repairs. The British second-class protected cruisers should be able to pose a sufficient threat to their French counterparts – again, remembering that non-fatal damage is enough to drive a commerce-raider back into port — to deter French attacks by their very presence. The French armored cruisers are certainly tougher than most of what they could expect to run into, but there are only 6 of them at this time, and the British ships are powerful enough (on average) to do exactly what they were designed to do; destroy the weakest French raiders outright and inflict sufficient damage (or threaten to inflict sufficient damage) on the heavier French raiders to make them circumspect and hence significantly less effective than the Jeune Ecole projected.

If the French attempted to use their cruisers to stand in for their battleships covering amphibious expeditions against British possessions, the more numerous and faster (and longer-legged) British cruisers would pose a very significant threat to the lines of communication.

So, I think, the upshot is probably that the French strategy of guerre de course against British merchant shipping would be the best method of employment for their cruisers, but that it – again, probably — would not prove fatal to something the size of the British merchant marine, especially under the cruiser warfare laws resulting from the Paris Declaration of 1856. That’s not to say that things wouldn’t get very, very unpleasant for the Brits, only that I doubt the situation would prove fatal to them if they called in the battleships for the Mediterranean and the Channel.

I suppose I should concede that I'm being somewhat wise after the fact when I point out that steam-powered raiders — and especially coal-fueled steam-powered raiders --- were never as effective in action as their proponents had suggested ahead of time. In fact, it's probably fair to say that the trio of Russian cruisers operating out of Vladivostok in the first several months of the Russo-Japanese War were about the most effective steam-powered commerce raiding cruisers ever. It's possible — maybe even probable — the French, with their greater number of overseas bases — would've done better, but I'm inclined to think they wouldn't have done sufficiently better to turn the tide against the British Empire.

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Here are the stats I came up with. I don’t claim that they are exhaustive or the result of long scholarly research; they are simply the best I could pull out of the readily available sources on my bookshelf. I’m also pretty sure there are some voice-activated induced typographical errors in this.

The number in parenthesis after the ship name indicates the number of that class available. There are a few classes (some on each side) where the availability number is lower than the number of ships actually in class. That's because the cutoff date for this comparison is December 1899. Anything that completed later than that isn't counted.

NOTE: the term "lighter" applied to gun armament usually denotes revolver cannon of 57 millimeters or less. These would be effective against torpedo boats of the period (marginally) and probably against merchantships which a cruiser wanted to stop without sinking outright, but would be less effective against opposing protected cruisers and pretty much useless against opposing armored cruisers.

NOTE ALSO: armor is not the end-all and be-all measure of a ship's ability to take damage. Armor is a measure of a ship's ability to resist penetration, which may or may not be the same thing at all. Historically, some ships proved capable of absorbing amazing amounts of damage before going down, while others blew up after a single hit or two. These cruisers — all of them, even the "armored" cruisers — truly are the eggshells armed with hammers which Winston Churchill called them, and displacement, compartmentalization, and damage control would probably be more decisive than armor thickness or armor placement, with the proviso that once the armored deck protecting a ship's buoyancy was breached, that ship probably wouldn't remain in action for long.


French armored cruisers:

Dupuy de Lome (1): speed = 18 knots (design speed = 20 knots; endurance = 4,000 nautical miles; 2 x 7.6”; 6 x 6.4”; 12 lighter; 2 x 18” TT (above water). The main battery of 7.6” is poorly arranged, with only one gun in each broadside, and the 6.4” aren’t a lot better. According to reports, the 7.6” suffered from spray and blast when fired on fore or aft bearings, and direct fire ahead or astern was ruled out by blast effect on the superstructure.

Amiral Cherner (4): speed = 16-19 knots (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = 4,000 nautical miles; 2 x 7.6”; 6 x 5.5”; 10 lighter; 4 x 18” TT (above water). A small class with a deep but thin belt. The main battery guns were better arranged on the centerline; the 5.5” were turreted, which was good, but located on what amounted to a hull shelf which was subject to being washed out in a seaway and suffered from spray interference in moderate or severe weather.

Pothuau (1): speed = 18.5 knots (design speed = 21 knots); endurance = 4,000 nautical miles; 2 x 7.6”; 10 x 5.5”; 18 lighter; 4 x TT (above water). Sometimes classed as a protected cruiser, because of the thinness of its belt (2.3”). Her guns were better placed than in either of the previous classes and could have been worked efficiently in most weather conditions.

None of the later French armored cruisers would be available before 1902. In 1899, an additional total of 9 armored cruisers were under construction: 1 Jeanne d’Arc; 3 Gueydon; 3 Dupliex, and 2 of the (ultimately) 4 Gloires. All of them — especially the Dupliexes — were lightly armed for their displacements, but their guns were much better arranged and had much better command under typical Atlantic conditions than was true for the earlier examples of their type. I believe the later armored cruisers also had greater operational radii, although I'm not in a position at this point to say how much greater.


French protected cruisers:

Sfax (1): speed = 16 knots (design speed = ?); Endurance = 5,000 nautical miles; 6 X 6.4”; 10 X 5.5”; 12 X lighter; 5 X 14” TT (above water).

Tage (1): speed = 17-19 knots, depending on the state of her machinery (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = ? (I’ll assume 5,000 nautical miles) 8 x 6.4”; 10 x 5.5”; 20 x lighter; 7 x 15” TT (above water).

Amiral Cecille (1): speed = 19.4 knots (design speed = 21 knots); endurance = ?; 8 x 6.4”; 10 x 5.5”; 20 lighter; 4 15” TT (above water; as built, later reduced to 3).

As far as I can tell from available sources, all three of these had purely broadside armaments with no guns on the centerline.

Davout (1): speed = 20 knots (design speed = 21 knots); endurance = ?; 6 x 6.4” (2 on centerline); 4 x 3.9”; 6 x lighter; 6 x 14” TT (above water).

Suchet (1): speed = 20.4 knots (design speed = 21 knots); endurance = ?; Guns as in Dvout; 7 x 14” TT (6 above water; 1 submerged).

Forbin (3): speed = 20-20.5 knots (design speed = 22 knots); endurance = 3,500 nautical miles; 4 x 5.5”; 7 x lighter; 4 14” x TT (above water); up to 150 mines. Very fine lines; made their speed easily but relatively poor seakeeping ability. Only 2 x 5.5” available in each broadside. Guns very vulnerable to spray interference in anything but calm weather.

Troude (2): speed = 20.5 knots (design speed = ?); endurance = 4,000 nautical miles; armament as for Forbin; hull form and notes as for Forbin. The name ship of this class did not complete until January 1891, at which point 3 of them would have been available.

Linois (3): speed = 20.5 knots (design speed = 21 knots); endurance = 5,000 nautical miles; 4 x 5.5”; 2 x 3.9”; 13 lighter; 4 x 18” (above water); 3 also carried up to 120 mines. Guns arranged as in Forbin and Troude, but with a forecastle design and more freeboard, meaning that they could be worked in most see states.

Alger (3): speed = 19 knots (design speed = 21 knots); endurance = 4,800 nautical miles; 4 x 6.4”; 6 x 5.5” (2 on the centerline); 2 x 3.9”; 16 lighter; 5 x 14” TT (above water). None of these ships made their designed speeds, but all were considered good steamers and capable of maintaining their actual speeds for lengthy periods.

Friant (3): speed = 18 knots (design speed = 21 knots) endurance = ?; 6 x 6.4” (2 on centerline); 4 x 3.9” (broadside); 15 lighter; 2 x 14” TT (above water)

Descartes (2) speed = 19.5 knots (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = ?; 4 x 6.4”; 10 x 3.9”; 12 lighter; 2 x 18” TT (above water). Gun arrangement was . . . interesting. The 6.4” were in broadside casemates amidships and 4 of the 3.9” were in 2 pairs mounted side-by-side fore-and-aft. In theory, 4 x 3.9” and 2 x 6.4” could fire straight ahead and astern, but in practice blast effects made that very difficult.

D’Assas (3): speed = 20 knots (design speed = ?); endurance = ?; 6 x 6.4”(2 on the centerline . . . I think); 4 x 3.9”; 15 lighter; 2 x 18” TT (above water). According to reports, this class was deeper than design draft and had stability issues.

Catinat (2): speed = 19.5 knots (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = 5,500 nautical miles; 4 x 6.4”(amidships case makes); 10 x 3.9” (4 as in Descartes; 10 lighter; 2 x 14” TT (above water); 50 mines.

D’Entrecasteaux (1): speed = 19.2 knots (design speed = 21 knots); endurance = 6,000 nautical miles; 2 x 9.4” (centerline turrets); 12 x 5.5”; 18 lighter; 2 x 18” TT (submerged; originally 4 x TT above water, but those were later removed, although I don’t know when). Said to be very hot, which would be a problem in the tropics. The only French protected (or armored) with 9.4” guns.

Guichen (1): speed = 21.5 knots (trial speed was higher at 23.5 knots); endurance = 6,000 nautical miles); 2 x 6.4” (centerline); 6 x 5.5” (broadside); 15 lighter; 2 x 18” TT (above waterline (later removed)

I’ve listed D’Entrecasteaux and Guichen because they completed in 1899, but I have no idea how early in 1899 they commissioned.

In addition, the French built a bunch of unprotected cruisers between 1856 and 1885, but most of them were no longer in service by 1899. As nearly as I can figure it out there was 1 Infernet class still in commission in 1899 (she was stricken in 1901) 1 Dougay-Trouin (but she was hulked in 1900) 1 Duquesne (stricken 1901); 1 Tourville (stricken 1901) 4 x Laperouse (all stricken 1901-02)
1 Iphigenie 1 Dubourdieu (stricken 1899) and one 1 Milan. Most of them had been designed with full sailing rigs, had very limited endurance under steam, and only Milan was capable of more than 14-15 knots. Most of them, in fact, would be doing well to make 12 knots by 1899. Since they had sailing rigs, their endurance was probably pretty good, but their low speed and lack of any armored protection made them doubtful assets.



British armored cruisers:

Nelson (2): speed = 14 knots (design speed = ?); 4 x 10” MLR; 8 x 9” MLR; 6 x 20-pounder. Sailing rig, so assume pretty good endurance, but they’re really included here only because I don’t have any documentation as to when they were taken out of service. They were sold in 1905 and 1910, respectively, however, so I’m figuring their primary function in a war in 1899 would be to either stay anchored in harbor or absorb a few French shells.

Imperieuse (2): speed = 16 knots (design speed = ?); endurance = 6,500 nautical miles; 4 x 9.2” (2 on centerline); 10x 6”; 4 x 6-pounder; 6 x 18” TT (above water). Completed in 1886, their armor was thick but metallurgically inferior and poorly placed. They were good seaboats and steamed well but were not a successful armored cruiser design.

Orlando (7): speed = 17-18 knots (designed for 17 knots but made between 18.8 and 19.5 on trials [running light]; endurance = 6,500 nautical miles; 2 x 9.2” (centerline); 10 x 6”; 16 lighter; 6 x 18” TT (4 broadside above water; 1 bow and 1 stern submerged). Good seaboats and good steamers, but their armor belt was very narrow.



First-Class British protected cruisers:

Blake (2): speed = 20 knots (22.5 knots forced draft) (design speed = e 20 knots); endurance = 10,000 nautical miles; 2 x 9.2” (centerline); 10 x 6”; 16 lighter; 4 x 14” TT ( 2 above water & 2 submerged).

Edgar (9): speed = 18 knots (20 knots forced draft) (design speed = 19 knots); endurance = 15,000 nautical miles; 2 x 9.2” (centerline); 10 x 6” [2 of them mounted 1 x 9.2” and 12 x 6”) 17 lighter; 4 x 18” TT (submerged).

Powerful (2): speed = 21.8-22.4 knots (trials); 20 knots (service speed); 22 knots (design speed); 2 x 9.2” (centerline); 12 x 6”; 16 x 12-pounder (3”); 12 lighter; 4 x 18” TT (submerged). Very good seaboats, good freeboard (guns reusable under virtually all weather conditions) and pretty well protected to but uneconomical in service (really big crews) and cost twice as much as the E#dgars to build.



Second-class British cruisers:

Iris (2): speed = 18 knots (design speed = 18 knots); endurance = 6,000 nautical miles; 13 x 5” (1 centerline); 6 lighter; 4 torpedo carriages.

Leander (4): speed = 16.5 knots (design speed = 17 knots); endurance = 11,000 nautical miles; 10 x 6”; 16 machine guns; 4 TT (above water; don’t have their size).

Mersey (4): speed = 17 knots (18.5 knots forced draft) (design speed = 18 knots); endurance = 10,000 nautical miles; 2 x 8” (centerline); 10 x 6”; 3 lighter; 9 machine guns; 2 TT (submerged); 2 torpedo carriages.

Medea (5): speed = 20 knots (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = 8,000 nautical miles; 6 x 6” (2 centerline), 9 lighter; 3 machine guns; 2 torpedo tubes (submerged); 2 torpedo carriages.

Apollo (15): speed = 20 knots (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = 8,000 nautical miles; 2 x 6” (centerline); 6 x 4.7”; 8 lighter; 4 machine guns; 4 x 14” above water. (6 additional ships of this class were never completed).

Astrea (5): speed = 19 knots (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = 7,000 nautical miles; 2 x 6”; 8 x 4.7”; 10 lighter; 4 x 18” TT (above water). Good seaboats; lightly armed but with good command for all guns.

Eclipse (9): speed = 19 knots (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = 10,000 nautical miles; 5 x 6” (3 centerline and 1 in each broadside); 6 x 4.7”; 8 x 12-pounder (3”); 6 lighter; 2 machine guns; 3 18” TT (1 above water aft; 2 submerged).

Arrogant (3): speed = 19 knots (design speed = 18 knots); endurance = 8,000 nautical miles; 4 x 6” (2 centerline); 6 x 4.7”; 8 x 12-pounder (3”); 3 lighter; 5 machine guns; 3 18” TT (no notes on arrangement but I assume they were arranged as in eclipse.

Highflyer/Challenger ((2): speed = 21 knots (design speed = 20 knots); endurance = 10,000 nautical miles; 11 x 6” (3 centerline); 9 x 12-pounder (3”); 6 lighter; 2 x 18” TT submerged. (Three more ships of this class completed 1900-05.)


Third class British cruisers:

Scout (2): speed = 16 knots (design speed = 18 knots) endurance = 6,900 nautical miles; 4 x 5”; 1 x 14” TT (above water); 2 torpedo carriages. (Maybe even more useless than Dilandu’s estimates.)

Archer (8): speed = 15 knots (design speed = ?) (Serpent and Raccoon of this class speed = 18 knots); endurance = 6,400 nautical miles (lower in the Serpent/Raccoon, but I don’t know by how much); 6 x 6”; 8 x lighter; 3 x 14” TT (above water light)

Barracouta-class (4): speed = 15 knots (design speed = 15 knots); endurance = ?, but supposed to have been higher than Archer-class) 6 x 4.7; 4 lighter; 2 machine guns; 2 x 14” TT (above water).

Barham (2) — service speed = 16.5 knots; forced draft speed = 19 knots (design speed = 19.5 knots); endurance = 6,400 nautical miles; armament as Barracouta-class. These ships failed to achieve their designed endurance — I don’t know by how much — and could not be driven at forced draft speeds without serious engine damage, so 16.5 knots was effectively their top speed.

Pearl (9): speed = 17 knots; forced draft speed = 19 knots; endurance = ?; 8 x 4.7”; 8 lighter; 4 machine guns; 2 x 14” TT (above water — I think); 2 torpedo carriages. (From the sources available to me, I suspect their maximum speed by 1898 would be no more than 15 knots.)

Pelorus (11): speed = 18.5 knots; forced draft speed = 21 knots; design speed = 20 knots; endurance = 7,200 nautical miles; 8 x 4.7”; 8 lighter; 3 machine guns; 2 x 18” TT (above water). (By 1898 a more realistic speed would be 16.5-17 knots.)


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And on that note, Dilandu, I'm going to have to bow out of this particular thread. I've enjoyed it immensely, but it truly is cutting into my writing time. Of course, one reason I've been able to devote as much time as I have to it over the weekend is that the hard drive on my desktop computer crashed at about 4 a.m. on Thursday morning. I'm supposed to have it back sometime tomorrow, at which point I really need to get back to work on the current book. So, as much fun as this is been, I'm afraid I won't be able to play in the sandbox for the next little bit.

Ok, in any case thank you for the valuable and interesting discussion, RFC! And special thanks for the analysis.

runsforcelery wrote:The British had more extensive trade routes and overseas colonial possessions to protect than anyone else in the world. They needed numbers of platforms, to give them presence, and they needed those platforms to be individually cheap enough that they could build enough of them. Their protected cruisers were never intended to defeat enemy battle fleets, nor were they intended to take on armored cruisers (once the armored cruisers began to put in an appearance) in one-to-one combats. This really isn’t any different from the fact that between World War I and World War II, the Brits consistently built smaller, more lightly armed cruisers than either the USN or the IJN. They didn’t need the cruising endurance of the Pacific naval powers and they did need to be able to build sufficient numbers within their allocated cruiser tonnage (which was a treaty-mandated equivalent of earlier budgetary considerations). Their function, like that of the protected cruisers you deride) was to be sufficiently widely deployed that only the most powerful of commerce-raiders could hope to prevail against them. The French built Dupuy de Lomme in 1895 to be precisely that, just as the Russians built the first Rurik (the one sunk at Ulsan in 1904) in the same year. Prior to that time, the protected cruisers had been fully adequate to deal with anything anyone was likely to send their way, and they remained capable of dealing with anything lighter well after those armored cruisers had appeared. The British Orlando-class armored cruisers (the youngest of them six years older than the French or Russian ships) were better armed s, had more reliable machinery, and a greater steaming endurance. They had weaker armor which was more poorly distributed — primarily because their belts were so much narrower and (I think) metallurgically inferior; I really don't have a source in front of me that tells me where they were in the composite armor-to-face hardened armor spectrum) — but their guns were better distributed (certainly a pair of 9.2” in centerline mounts firing in both broadsides was better than Dupuy de Lomme’s pair of 7.6” in wing mounts rising from the tumblehome where spray and blast were guaranteed to be major problems in any sort of seaway and only one of them would bear in either broadside, while Rurik had no centerline guns at all).

The British had absolutely no strategic interest in pushing the parameters on warship design in this period. Yes, they built some “experimental” units, but there was no reason for them to begin building designs which were “more ship” than they needed for the mission in hand and they had every reason to discourage the construction of “super cruisers” by other navies. Once it was evident that those other navies were going to press ahead with efforts to up the ante with progressively more powerful armored cruisers, the Brits had no option but to respond, which they did by improving on Orlando with the Powerful-class, built specifically as answers to Rurik I and Rossia. And, if you want an example for why the Brits preferred protected cruisers to armored cruisers, they had twice the tonnage — and cost almost twice as much per ship — as the contemporaneous Edgar-class protected cruisers which were only 1 knot slower. The Edgars had almost 50% more cruising endurance and carried the same battery of 2x 9.2” guns, although they had only 10x6” guns compared to Powerful’s 12x6" and carried 6-pounder QFs rather than Powerful’s 12-pounders. They were, however, adequate to the vast majority of the Royal Navy’s cruiser requirements for a lot less money, which meant the Brits could have twice as many of them in twice as many places.

In general terms, the British didn’t build armored cruisers at all until foreign navies pushed the envelope, at which point the Brits relied (as they had before) on the unsurpassed capabilities of their shipbuilding industry to build more of them faster than anyone else. By the time the second Rurik was completed in 1908, the British counterpart was the Warrior-class ships. The Russian had 4x10” (centerline; all firing in either broadside), 8x8” (wing turrets; 4 firing in either broadside) and 20x4.7” (10 firing in either broadside) whereas the Brits had 6x9.2” (centerline and wing turrets; 4 firing in either broadside) and 4x7.5”(2 firing in either broadside) and 26 3-pdrs. The 4.7” shell was about fourteen times as heavy as the 3-pounder, so even though the 3-pounder’s rate of fire was three times that of the 4.7”, the Russian light gun was clearly superior. There’s no doubt that Rurik II was the superior ship in a one-to-one confrontation, however, the Tsar had one of them, whereas there were three Warriors. Again, the Brits had deliberately chosen to build marginally less powerful ships in order to build them in the numbers they required. The follow-on Minotaurs was more heavily gunned but more lightly armored, with 4x9.2” in twin centerline mounts and 10x 7.5” (ballistically superior to the Russian 8”) in 5 single mounts in each broadside, backed up by 16-12-pounders (still inferior to the Russian 4.7”, although the 12-pounder threw almost half the same weight of metal per minute, given the differences in rate of fire). And, of course, the successor in British service to Minotaur was something called a “battlecruiser,” which pretty much made all existing armored cruisers obsolete overnight.

Belatedly jumping into this thread (and taking it on a bit of a tangent); Norman Freeman's book Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter Through Three World Wars made the interesting observation that the original plans for utilizing the new "battlecruisers" was effectively an early form of networked warfare. (hopefully my paraphrasing won't totally mangle his point)

An enemy would have to deploy a pretty powerful commerce raider to overwhelm the "legacy" protected cruisers the RN still had scattered around the world. The RN couldn't afford to replace all of those with armored cruisers or battlecruisers. But what they could do was take advantage of wireless and their almost unsurpassed undersea cable network to dispatch the (relative) few battlecruisers they could afford directly to where one of their enemies (few) powerful commerce raiders was reported.

And most of that reporting could happen from British cable stations, without the pile of wireless traffic to give early warning that the BCs were on their way.

In that respect the BC relatively high strategic (cruise) speed, was a critical asset, allowing them to rush out, find and crush the raider, and pull back to be dispatched after another one. Their tactical speed helped ensure that the raiders wouldn't be likely to escape once sighted, but the strategic speed is what allowed a centrally (or at least nodally) dispatched, networked, unit to effectively respond to a crisis in a distant station.


The Battle of the Falkland Islands (1916) was an almost textbook example of how the BC were envisioned to be used. Not just that they crushed armored cruisers, but that they were dispatched and targeted based on reports received over the British cabled and wireless network, and plotted by the Admiralty.

Dilandu wrote:Ok, in any case thank you for the valuable and interesting discussion, RFC! And special thanks for the analysis.

As a Kansas landlubber I am extremely grateful to both Dilandu and RFC/MWW for this extremely interesting discussion thread. This in no way is meant to disparage the contributions of others. I wrote my 12th Grade research paper on first generation Dreadnoughts using the limited resources available in central Kansas in 1970. What a surprise in that those sources didn't cover much beyond US, German, and United Kingdom ships. (I did learn that my UK cousins spell some words differently as my English teacher took a half point off for each time I spelled "armor" as "armour.") I have learned so much from this thread about the navies of other nations and really appreciate the civil way in which disagreements have been discussed. This is especially true given the different cultures and national viewpoints involved.

Question for those of a historical bent. What were the three world wars. WWI and WWII are obvious but I've never know what the other one was though I've heard mention of it before. The closest I can come is either the Franco-Prussian war, but that only involved Germany(pre-Germany) and France, or the cold war, but that doesn't seem right as a full scale conflict never erupted.

Highjohn wrote:Question for those of a historical bent. What were the three world wars. WWI and WWII are obvious but I've never know what the other one was though I've heard mention of it before. The closest I can come is either the Franco-Prussian war, but that only involved Germany(pre-Germany) and France, or the cold war, but that doesn't seem right as a full scale conflict never erupted.

That's because WW III's never been fought . . . yet, at least. It's the one everyone was expecting in the 50s, dreading in the 60s, more or less resigned to in the 70s, too busy to worry about in the 80s, figured was a relic of the past in the 90s, and shifted to jihad around 2001.

It would have been accurate to define the French and Indian War (US designation) as a world war, as well, but then we couldn't have called the 1914-1918 unpleasantness World War One, I'm afraid.

That help?

Runsforcelery wrote: Of course, one reason I've been able to devote as much time as I have to it over the weekend is that the hard drive on my desktop computer crashed at about 4 a.m. on Thursday morning. I'm supposed to have it back sometime tomorrow

Ouch! 4 or 5 days downtime from a disk crash.

Nobody likes a smartass, but can I diffidently suggest you might benefit from getting at least mirrored disks in a network attached storage box to keep your stuff on? I'm not up on US prices but would guess 2 or 3 hundred dollars would do it. That plus a copy of your voice recognition software for one of your other computers would keep you going almost seamlessly next time a disk crashes. (I'm going off to think about how to back up my own hard disk right now )

runsforcelery wrote:

Highjohn wrote:Question for those of a historical bent. What were the three world wars. WWI and WWII are obvious but I've never know what the other one was though I've heard mention of it before. The closest I can come is either the Franco-Prussian war, but that only involved Germany(pre-Germany) and France, or the cold war, but that doesn't seem right as a full scale conflict never erupted.

That's because WW III's never been fought . . . yet, at least. It's the one everyone was expecting in the 50s, dreading in the 60s, more or less resigned to in the 70s, too busy to worry about in the 80s, figured was a relic of the past in the 90s, and shifted to jihad around 2001.

It would have been accurate to define the French and Indian War (US designation) as a world war, as well, but then we couldn't have called the 1914-1918 unpleasantness World War One, I'm afraid.

That help?

I just had to put this here:

Albert Einstein wrote:
I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.

Randomiser wrote:

Runsforcelery wrote: Of course, one reason I've been able to devote as much time as I have to it over the weekend is that the hard drive on my desktop computer crashed at about 4 a.m. on Thursday morning. I'm supposed to have it back sometime tomorrow

Ouch! 4 or 5 days downtime from a disk crash.

Nobody likes a smartass, but can I diffidently suggest you might benefit from getting at least mirrored disks in a network attached storage box to keep your stuff on? I'm not up on US prices but would guess 2 or 3 hundred dollars would do it. That plus a copy of your voice recognition software for one of your other computers would keep you going almost seamlessly next time a disk crashes. (I'm going off to think about how to back up my own hard disk right now )

well depending on sourcing there are dedicated NAS units from ~$300 up to over $1000 with a lot of the price increase related to the amount of storage (in TB) available.
then there is your backup program which may or may not be included and .....

with all that said restoration from a drive crash can be time consuming regardless of what's involved.

one thing that we did at a previous employer was they maintained "ghost" images (you can use other applications but that was what they used while I was there. ) basically you would use a bootable cd to load up and store an image of the configured os with apps installed, and if anything happened you could restore to that point with little fuss, other than data imports.

on the backup software there are online services for that like "carbonite" and others, or you can use a backup app similar, that saves to a designated drive (network share, or usb drive or similar. ) the point is there are options.

one "joke" about computer users....
there are two types of users those that have lost data, and those that will loose data. its not a question of if it will happen but when. :p
and if you only have 1 copy of information you are asking to loose it, after you have at least 1 backup how many you need is based on your personal paranoia level.
you might feel ok with stuff saved on a thumb drive or external HD, or you might not feel comfortable until it is saved on 3 external devices, cd's online backup and .....