jeremyr wrote:It would be easier to just fill in the canal several miles ahead, then when the ships go by, fill it in behind. Then they could probably even drain it to strand the boat. I think ships operating with the army in canals would be very vulnerable if they got too far away from ground forces.
I'd like to point something out, not necessarily in response to this post, but rather in response to quite a few I've seen on this thread and others. And I'm not saying whether or not this has any bearing on actual events in Midst Oil and Tribulation.
Mobility comes in several different flavors. For example, over the short-haul a cavalry force is faster than an infantry force; an armored column is faster than leg infantry. Troop concentrations also come in several different flavors, from densely deployed battalions advancing across a battlefield to small detachments scattered over a relatively large geographical area.
The critical equation is speed X firepower / enemy concentration. In order to do anything about a cavalry force raiding your rear areas, for example, you have to have troops available to intercept it. If you're pursuing the raiding force, you have to be faster than it is so that you can overtake it; if you're going to intercept it, you have to be somewhere in front of it, know it's coming, and either already be in its path or have the speed to place yourself in its path before it gets past you. What that means in a campaign tied to fixed communication routes — railroads, canals, what-have-you — is that you have to have line of communications security detachments in the right places at the right times. That, of course, subtracts available warm bodies from your field force, so a commander has to couple his known vulnerabilities with his communications capability and decide — on that basis — how many troops he's going to take away from his primary combat formations.
Note that critical point: known vulnerabilities. Now, obviously, the Church has the semaphore, which gives it major advantages over other preindustrial armies in terms of its ability to communicate over long distances and move troops in response to newly discovered threats. But that hasn't repealed or revoked Nathan Bedford Forest's pithy summation of successful tactics. While Forest wasn't necessarily a very nice man (in, oh, so many ways!), he was a very good cavalry commander, and I don't think anyone has ever improved upon "what matters is the one who gets there firstest with the mostest."
I think people need to go back and look at the sheer scale of the area across which armies in the Republic of Siddarmark are likely to be maneuvering and think in terms of troop densities. In terms of field armies fighting other field armies, concentrations of troops are likely to draw other concentrations into collision with them, since the objectives of one side are to destroy or neutralize the other side. In terms of maintaining rear area security, however, density becomes critical and far harder to maintain. You might want to consider how effective the German Army wasn't at protecting railroads and bridges against sabotage in places like Russia and Yugoslavia during WW II.
Just saying.