Convoy escorts - SPOILER for SNIPPET 8 of HFQ

Good point on Japanese being the smaller fleet in the Russian-Japanese War, but at Scarborough the Germans had the greater quantity. Seehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_on_Scarborough,_Hartlepool_and_Whitby The Kaiser's orders not to engage the British fleet prevented a possible German victory even though the purpose of the raid was to draw it out to me attacked. Orders Mission killed?

Gave the British more grist for the barbaric Hun propaganda:



Poker

Good point on Japanese being the smaller fleet in the Russian-Japanese War, but at Scarborough the Germans had the greater quantity.

And if Ingenol advanced at Scarborough - that was completely possible, because the german navy actually seek the possibility to ambush some part of RN - what could save the Warrender and Beatty?

Without the Warrender's ships, the Royal Navy would be limited to only 17 dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts up until the 1915, when the first three QE and "Canada" would be avaliable. And it's all assuming that the German Navy wouldn't inflict more casualites in late 1914 and early 1915.

By the way,

but then retreated to port never to sortie again,

You are some mistaken here. There was a german navy sorties after Jutland.

Hmm perhaps, Dilandu, but the main fleet remained in port.

The British poster made me think of a Charisian propaganda poster though:



Poker

pokermind wrote:Hmm perhaps, Dilandu, but the main fleet remained in port.

The British poster made me think of a Charisian propaganda poster though:



Poker

There should be no apostrophe in "its", otherwise the bottom part of the poster would say "Grammar Nazis at it is barbaric work!", rather than the correct possessive form "The Inquisition at its barbaric work!"

O yeah?

Keith_w wrote:

pokermind wrote:Hmm perhaps, Dilandu, but the main fleet remained in port.

The British poster made me think of a Charisian propaganda poster though:



Poker

There should be no apostrophe in "its", otherwise the bottom part of the poster would say "Grammar Nazis at it is barbaric work!", rather than the correct possessive form "The Inquisition at its barbaric work!"

Not to worry, Keith w, given Safehold's creative spelling most Grammar/Spelling Nazis have already died of apoplexy!

Poker

Dilandu, Fantastic! Ohen Koroshow! Clynton will be pleased!



You win Sorry the English pun Smart Ass does not work in Russian.

Poker

Dilandu wrote:But the similar assumptions may have been made for Japan against Russia in 1904.

The japanese were outnumbered much more greatly than the France to the RN: they have at least 3 to 1 in just avaliable numbers. The economical and industrial superiority of Russian Empire was overwhelming; after all, the Japan LOSE the war in 1905 and only the Russian Revolution in 1905 allowed them to win. Let's not forget; by 1905, the Japan were exausted economically and materially, and the Russian Empire just started to "make war serious" by sending the regular troops on Far East. And despite the fact, that the russian navy was largely destroyerd at Tsusima, the Russian Empire still have a significant reserve in Black Sea Fleet, that was much better trained and expirienced that the Second Pacific Squadron. The only thing that allow Japan to win, was the internal problems of the Russia, and Japan didn;t have anything common with them.

So, for any point of view, the IJN was almost insignificant danger for the RIF. Much more insignificant that the French navy for RN. And... who won the R-J war, after all?

Actually, no. The Russo-Japanese War exactly demonstrates the validity of what I'm saying about entire navies and infrastructures. What doomed the Russians (and I realize you have a dog in the fight, which I don't ) was the huge distance the Baltic Fleet had to sail just to engage the IJN in the first place, coupled to the difference in quality of personnel, exacerbated by the length of the voyage and its inevitable effect on morale, training, and equipment reliability. The Japanese fleet was excellent and generally superior in quality to the Russians (and don't forget their introduction of better bursting charges), but what really killed the Russians was precisely the fact that it lacked the basing structure and world wide capabilities of the Royal Navy, Had it simply been a matter of drawing the two navies up in line-of-battle and going at it, the Russians might legitimately have expected to win. As it was, they were screwed from the outset and the voyage of the Baltic Fleet --- epic achievement in seamanship for a steel navy of that era though it was, and even with supportalong the way from their French ally --- was an exercise in futility from the beginning . . . as just about everyone in the RN recognized.

Dilandu wrote:

pokermind wrote:WW I's battle of Jutland confirms to RFC's idea. The more capable German high seas fleet destroyed more British ships, but then retreated to port never to sortie again,IE strategically a mission kill by the less capable, but more numerous British Fleet.

Dilandu, to quote Stalin, "Quantity has a quality all its own."

Poker

Yes, and the RN make so much mistakes during that battle, that the overwhelming numerical superiority of RN was unable to destroy the German Fleet (but i must admit, that Sheer made almost as many. Not the demonstration of great competence....

P.S. And if we go to World War I, than what about Scarborough? What if the Ingenol was a bit wore lucky and obliterate the Beatty and Warrender? Would the Royal Navy be able to comprehend the all possible consequenses of this?

Given visibility-only sensors, the time of day, the weather conditions, and the German determination to avoid action as soon as the HSF realized what was happening to it, the chance of a decisive tactical engagement was off the table almost from the beginning of the actual fleet engagement. Admittedly, Beatty got his butt kicked on the run south, but he did his job of delivering the HSF to the GF exactly where he was supposed to, and Scheer ran for it the instant he realized what was happening. Of course, he did his best to hand the battle back to Jellicoe with his second battle turn, but --- again --- visibility and the torpedo threat favored him. What really shaped Jutland, however, was that the Brits didn't need "a Second Trafalgar," and Jellicoe --- one of the best naval strategists ever --- realized it from the outset. He'd actually made his strategic views in that regard clear to the Admiralty long before the battle, including his intention to turn away from any mass torpedo attack rather than risk Britain's control of the North Sea by 'A resolute pursuit," which was the only way to counter another fleet's determination to run for it. (He also took the precaution of lodging a copy of the correspondence with his bank, just in case. )

As for Ingenhol, he undoubtedly did throw away the best chance the Germans ever had of inflicting a serious defeat in detail on the Brits . . . and it was why he was sacked by the Kaiser. The opportunity was handed to him largely by the Admiralty which, acting on "intelligence received" (i.e., Room 40) overrode Jellicoe's desire to take the entire GF south instead of dispatching only Warrender to support Beatty. And Ingenhol came damned close to offsetting that error by leaving Hipper to the Brits' mercy while he headed for home.

The key thing about Jutland, though, was that the day after the Battle, Jellicoe was still at sea with an overwhelming battle line and the Germans were still trying to get Scharnhorst into the Jade and wouldn't be able to pout to sea again for months while they made repairs. Any way you look at it, that's a decisive strategic victory for Britain.