Convoy escorts - SPOILER for SNIPPET 8 of HFQ

BTW, the reason I was pressed for time was that my daughter Megan had oral surgery yesterday and Sharon and I have been a bit distracted dealing with it. She came through like a trooper, though, and the surgeon says we got an absolutely best-case resolution from it, so it was a "distraction" I was delighted to put up with!

Glad for her!

Glad your daughter is on the mend

The best thing Napoleon did for Europe was he was the catalyst for most countries to unite and stand against him.

I agree RFC that we amateur history buffs tend to forget the bigger picture. Europe was ablaze from one end to the other in many ways during this period and this did not settle really until the end of WW2; but then the Cold War started ....
One day maybe the world might stop realise we all live on little ball of rock - that is until the 4th Imperium makes an appearance .....

Dilandu wrote:
An exellent point!

Actually, the Royal Navy was screwed up in 1850, when the French comissioned their "Napoleon" - first fast screw ship-of-the-line, thah could clearly run circles around any Royal Navy column, tearing the enemy apart with Paxian guns.

Next time, the Royal Navy was screwed in 1862, when the french appeared with six ocean-going ironclads and a fair number of coastal ironclad battery, and the Royal Navy have only three ironclads in comission. And then the nonpleasant situation with the Armstrong breech-loading rifles... well, they were the only naval guns in history, that failed THAT miserably.

Next time - in early 1870, when the Royal navy has a 28 ironclads of 19 (!!!) different classes against french only 23 ironclads... but of only FIVE classes. And the situation for Royal Navy stand up until the middle-1880. The britis admirals simply coulnd't understand, HOW they supposed to bring the "armada" of completely differents ships with different conceptions, different seagoing ability in battle altogether.

And of course in 1880-1890... Well, i always wondered: why there is no statue of the Théophile Aube in front of the Ripley Building of UK admirality?

I know you're a Francophile, Dilandu , but there's a difference between someone's building innovative warships which upset traditional balances of power and someone's being able to build a realistic threat to the greatest naval power in the world.

The French were never in a position to pose the aforesaid realistic threat, despite periodic British outbursts of alarm. France's ability to build a fleet which posed a substantial risk to the RN, at least ion paper, was made possible only by British indifference, as the Brits demonstrated --- more than once --- on the occasions when they chose to engage their shipbuilding industry and bury the French under new construction. I'll concede that the Admiralty was slow to build the new types, but it also had an enormous vested interest in not being the one that broke the paradigm, given the size and numerical superiority of its existing fleet. Moreover, the size of that fleet gave it a "cushion" it could rely upon to oppose innovation with numbers in an emergency while it build the newer types it needed to confront the threat. There's a lot to be said for experimenting with different types and concepts rather than committing to wholesale construction of a new type during a period of rapid, radical change, which is essentially what the Brits did in the years leading up to Sir William White and the classic pre-dreadnought design he produced to stabilize the race.

I've used something of the Brits' mid to late-19th century thinking as part of the basis of the SLN in the Honorverse, but with the difference that the people breaking the paradigm in this case can build a credible numerical threat and that they don't know (through willful blindness, agreed) what's being built "on the other side of the Channel." Neither of those differences obtained for France.

It's important to bear in mind that navies are groups and systems of ships. Building one or two world-beating warships probably won't solve your problems if the other side has two dozen more-or-less adequate, plebian warships and a worldwide support infrastructure you don't have. That's the main reason the Admiralty (as opposed to the popular press in Britain) never panicked over France but were seriously concerned over Imperial Germany once the dreadnoughts had made all previous battleships clearly and genuinely obsolete.

The problem is, that it was the Royal Navy, who was a

Building one or two world-beating warships probably won't solve your problems if the other side has two dozen more-or-less adequate, plebian warships and a worldwide support infrastructure you don't have.

Up until the 1880th, the Royal Navy simply haven't any standartisation. How, for example, should work together the "Inflexible" (with her echelon mounts), the "Devastator" (with her ends turrets), the "Alexandra" (with casemate guns) and "Hero" (with her single bow turret)?

It was France, who build the large fleet of more-or-less adequate, plebian warships of "Provence"-class and "Alma"-class. The RN in this time build one or two world-beating warships, as "Minotaur"-class and "Monarch"-class (and especially "Captain" ).

I'll concede that the Admiralty was slow to build the new types,

Er, actually it look like completely opposite. The Admiralty was so fast with building new types, so afraid of being second againsm that they build ships faster then they could think "for what reason?" They tried to found some "exellent solution" by building anything that they could imagine.

The problem was, that they haven't got a fleet. They have a large number of completely differents ships, with completely different conceptions and tactical doctrines.

There's a lot to be said for experimenting with different types and concepts rather than committing to wholesale construction of a new type during a period of rapid, radical change, which is essentially what the Brits did in the years leading up to Sir William White and the classic pre-dreadnought design he produced to stabilize the race.

I'm afraid you are a little too optimistic for Britain in 1860-1870. They are building not just different ships; they are building bad different ships.

The French were never in a position to pose the aforesaid realistic threat, despite periodic British outbursts of alarm.

Well, in 1862 the french were in position to simply go and blast the Royal Navy into the oblivion. The "Warrior" and c.o. was clearly not in the position to stop them; their rifled guns were pathetic, their maneuvrability was poor, and their unarmoured ends maked them actually vunerable. The british industry build really great ships but by poor conception.

And this situation repeat itself until the 1890th.

Nice to know that I'm not the only person who is sometimes tactless.

However in general, the problem isn't IMO British or Ozzie arrogance but that sometimes Brits (and Europeans) come across as saying that the US doesn't deserve to be the "big man on campus".

Yep, the Brits were the "big man on campus" during the war of 1812 (especially compared to the US of that time), but that was then.

::Danger Modern Politics Comment::

Now, the US is the "big man on campus" but when we're not being called "evil" we get the message that other nations want the US to always do what they want the US to do.

We get tired of that attitude on the part of others so may come across too hard when we think somebody else is repeating it.

But then, people aren't perfect.

Thrandir wrote:Geez Lyonheart what's with the aggression?
Come to Oz and I'll buy you a beer

Admittedly I did get carried away a bit but what I stated about the Ghent Conference is historically correct - Britain did not see she had lost.

Unlike some I freely admit the faults of British pride - but it seems when a Briton points something out we are always labelled arrogant (aggressively assertive/presumptuous) - not that we might have a point or could even be right.
Generally Britons are being extremely proud (one of the definitions of arrogant) of our heritage but it seems Britons are not allowed to be proud of our heritage - everyone else is but we aren't; sorry but that does not stack up in any argument.
Before anyone says anything I am being the latter not the former.

Thanks RFC and I totally agree with your summation of British attitudes and thoughts of the time. The trouble with the British Government at the time was they didn't want to listen to Wellington - while he had friends in the Government he also had his detractors who were always quick to point out his mistakes in his campaigns - they glossed over the fact that he more often than not came out on top.
Thirsk reminds very much of Wellington in that he has some very powerful opponents in Government and some very powerful supporters as well.

From some of the logs and other historical records I have read from RN officers who fought the big 44's they all said the same thing - purposely built large frigates were the way to go. They argued long and hard for the RN to adopt the concept - after-all they had enough evidence to show that a purpose built heavy frigate was going to out-muscle and if handled correctly out manoeuvre a smaller 5th and 6th rate. The RN didn't think much of the French 44's because IMHO the French rarely used them as they could have been used.

The RN had a huge shock when they initially encountered the big American 44's and lost or if able to run away. At the time ALL RN commanders were expected to win against any enemy irrespective of the odds.
The RN had a tradition of winning, not all the time but when they really had their backs to the wall the right person stepped up to give them victory.
When they didn't it was not good for morale and the commander concerned had better have good patronage back in Britain if he wasn't to be thrown to the wolves for losing.

DrakBibliophile wrote:But then, people aren't perfect.

Maybe we should start a thread where everyone describes their favorite stereotype of their country/citizens that foreigners have.

Dilandu wrote:The problem is, that it was the Royal Navy, who was a

Building one or two world-beating warships probably won't solve your problems if the other side has two dozen more-or-less adequate, plebian warships and a worldwide support infrastructure you don't have.

Up until the 1880th, the Royal Navy simply haven't any standartisation. How, for example, should work together the "Inflexible" (with her echelon mounts), the "Devastator" (with her ends turrets), the "Alexandra" (with casemate guns) and "Hero" (with her single bow turret)?

It was France, who build the large fleet of more-or-less adequate, plebian warships of "Provence"-class and "Alma"-class. The RN in this time build one or two world-beating warships, as "Minotaur"-class and "Monarch"-class (and especially "Captain" ).

I'll concede that the Admiralty was slow to build the new types,

Er, actually it look like completely opposite. The Admiralty was so fast with building new types, so afraid of being second againsm that they build ships faster then they could think "for what reason?" They tried to found some "exellent solution" by building anything that they could imagine.

The problem was, that they haven't got a fleet. They have a large number of completely differents ships, with completely different conceptions and tactical doctrines.

There's a lot to be said for experimenting with different types and concepts rather than committing to wholesale construction of a new type during a period of rapid, radical change, which is essentially what the Brits did in the years leading up to Sir William White and the classic pre-dreadnought design he produced to stabilize the race.

I'm afraid you are a little too optimistic for Britain in 1860-1870. They are building not just different ships; they are building bad different ships.

The French were never in a position to pose the aforesaid realistic threat, despite periodic British outbursts of alarm.

Well, in 1862 the french were in position to simply go and blast the Royal Navy into the oblivion. The "Warrior" and c.o. was clearly not in the position to stop them; their rifled guns were pathetic, their maneuvrability was poor, and their unarmoured ends maked them actually vunerable. The british industry build really great ships but by poor conception.

And this situation repeat itself until the 1890th.

I think this is another spot where you and I are going to have too agree to disagree. I've read more of the primary sources for England than for France (my spoken French is nonexistent these days, and even my ability to read it isn't what it was in college), but you are grossly over optimistic about the French ability to "blast the Royal Navy into oblivion." The truth is that he French ships were rather less than Plebian. I'm not talking about initial concepts here; I'm talking about execution and what was happening on the other side of the hill.

The three Gloires were all laid down in 1858, and took better than two years each to complete. The Couronne, ordered the same day as Gloire wasn't laid down for almost another year, and although she was the first iron-hulled battleship laid down, she launched and completed only after Warrior. And while you may think highly of French artillery, the performance figures I've seen on the 6.4 RMLs with which they were originally armed are pretty darn bad. Now, admittedly, they were rearmed with 6.4" BLs pretty quickly, and the entire battery was changed in 1865, and in 1868 both Invincible and Normandie had been completely rearmed yet again.

The French ships had the advantage of being designed with a "clean sheet of paper," and I'm not trying to downplay the fact that they set new standards of protection. Nor am I attempting to argue that they didn't push the envelope – and the British — into an upward spiral of tonnages, armor, and gun power. All of them took a lot longer to build than the Brits proved (repeatedly) that they could build ships with equal or better engineering, and my sources suggest that British artillery was at least as good — and in most cases better — at armor penetration than the French guns were. Moreover, the British wire wound tubes were superior in manufacturing (and cost) to the hooped French designs.

At any time in the process, the British could have — had Parliament been prepared to vote the necessary funds — out build the French with one hand tied behind their backs. As it was, the Royal Navy had an enormously deep 'bench' of wooden ships-of-the-line (many of which were converted into ironclads) which were gradually phased out in favor of iron-hulled vessels. With that pool of liners available, the Brits had greater freedom to build samples and try different ideas. And while you are disparaging British designs, there are always French designs to consider like, oh, Redoubtable, which gave (theoretically) all around fire at the expense broadside firing arcs so limited that only a single battery gun would bear in many directions. The British policy was a combination of benign neglect and deliberate experimentation in this period, and Britain had the industrial power and the naval depth of strength to get away with that.

Your contempt for Warrior and her handiness is, I think, rather overstated. Now, when you get to something like the British Minotaur class, you have a point, but ironclads aren't supposed to be maneuvering agaiinst enemy ships at point-blank range, and it's highly unlikely that Warriors turning radius and lack of power assisted steering would have posed a significant tactical disadvantage, while the unprotected steeriing was addressed --- and fixed --- in Achilles. As far as the ironclad fleet of the 1860-1880 period is concerned, most of its units were, indeed, wooden-hulled, but that was also true of the French ironclads (aside from Couronne, Heroine, and --- I think --- Friedland) between 1859 and 1879 or so. It’s also true that there was greater variation in the designed speeds of the British ships, but maritime engineering of the period was still more of an art than a science and the effective speeds of almost all of these ships were lower than the designed and/or trial speeds. The British speed ranges tended to be more reliable than most (certainly than for the French), and the ability to maintain a given fleet speed was more important than the speed of individual ships. That is, tactical cohesion meant the speed of the fleet was that of its slowest unit and the ability to maneuver cohesively was more important than the layout of the armament of any single unit of the fleet. Really bizarre gun mountings, as you observe, could make it difficult to come up with tactical formations which allowed fire to be massed effectively, but the situation was nowhere near as bad for the Brits as your example suggests.

The point that I’m making here is that while there may have been brief periods in which the French Navy appeared to be superior to the Royal Navy, that appearance (1) was more apparent than real when the capabilities of both navies are considered rather than looking at cherry-picked individual ships and (2) resulted far more from British indifference to what the French were up to than from any French ability to shift the balance of naval power in France’s favor or fundamental inability of Britain to design superior warships. Britain permitted France to attain bursts of semi-equality, but the UK could take back superiority any time it chose to do so . . . as it demonstrated more than once throughout your period and as it had pretty damned clearly established by 1890.

I’m not a great admirer of all things British, and I’m one of the people who think Fisher gets way too much credit as the “father of the dreadnought revolution,” but arguing that any other naval power was in a position to realistically challenge Great Britain at any time between 1815 and 1905 is just plain silly. It’s too easy to get trapped in the material school of thought — of comparing inches of belt armor, speed of individual ships, etc. — and miss the reality that seapower depends on an entire constellation of capabilities, platform numbers, and infrastructure. The British Army, quite frankly, would have been fighting way above its weight in a conflict with any major European land power in that same period from 1815 through 1905, but the same is true for any naval power going after Great Britain.

Thanks for the detailed answer!

and in most cases better — at armor penetration than the French guns were.

Er... Are you talking about the 110pd breech-loading rifled Armstrong? It was worse that useless: it broke even with 1/3 of normal charge, and it simply couldn't be used.

And the Royal Navy early muzzle-loaded rifles... i couldn't prove that the french guns wasn't worse, but the Lissa in 1866 and the "Huascar" ans "Shah" incident pretty clearly show that 7-inch, 8-inch and 9-inch RML completely failed as armour-piercing. In the last one, the "Shah" even have pallisers; all that she was able to do is to break one 3-inch armour plate.

With that pool of liners available, the Brits had greater freedom to build samples and try different ideas.

The problem is, that is actually work only in situation when you are shure that you would be able to stand against initial enemy attacks and have the ability to use your superior industrial power. In the possible situation when the comissioned RN's ironclads destroyed or blockaded, and the enemy is preparing to land, the supply of "wooden ships, that could be turned to ironclads" is useless.

Your contempt for Warrior and her handiness is, I think, rather overstated.

Hm. She has unarmored ends, she was very hard to turn (as i recall, on the full speed the circulation range was about 900 meters, and even on the lesser speed she wasn't able to turn less that 600) and until the 1868 rearming her artillery was just as useless against enemy ironclad as any other (actually, the only guns of the early 1860-th that could have SOME real effect against armour was probably the Dahlgre and Rodman types)

unlikely that Warriors turning radius and lack of power assisted steering would have posed a significant tactical disadvantage,

Actually, it was a great disadvantage, cause the Lissa clearly demonstrated, that in 1860th conditions the ramming was the only way to do something really nasty with the enemy ironclad. The lack of maneuvrability means that the "Warrior" couldn't ram and could be easly rammed simply because it would be hard for her to turn out from ramming attack.

Really bizarre gun mountings, as you observe, could make it difficult to come up with tactical formations which allowed fire to be massed effectively, but the situation was nowhere near as bad for the Brits as your example suggests.

Hm. Let's take the "Devastation", the "Alexandra", the "Monarch" and the "Inflexible" and put them into squadron. How does they are supposed to work together? The "Devastation" is the low-freeboard turret ironclads (breastwork monitor, as i recall), with a top speed of about 13 knots. The "Alexandra" is the casemate ironclad and 15 knots. The "Monarch" is a turret ship with no bow or stern fire and 14,5 knots. And the "Inflexible" is a medium-freeboard ships with eshelon armament, citadel armour and 14,7 knots.

How on earth this ships could work together without being in total disadvantage? The "Devastation" and "Monarch" would be useless in heavy sea; but they have the more armored area, so against medium-caliber guns they would be better protected. But the "Monarch" couldn't stand against heavy rifled guns.

The "Inflexible" and "Alexandra" are more adapted to the frontal fire; but the "Devastation" have a disadvantage is bow fire, and the "Monarch" haven't any at all.

Britain permitted France to attain bursts of semi-equality, but the UK could take back superiority any time it chose to do so . . . as it demonstrated more than once throughout your period and as it had pretty damned clearly established by 1890.

With all respect, but i doubt that they "premitted". It look more like that they simply didn't understand until 1890 "what are our navy supposed to do"?

It’s too easy to get trapped in the material school of thought — of comparing inches of belt armor, speed of individual ships, etc. — and miss the reality that seapower depends on an entire constellation of capabilities, platform numbers, and infrastructure.

Well, the 1914-1918 somehow failde to demonstrate the british naval superiority even against the much lesser and strategically locked enemy... And the Deutchland didn't have at all naval traditions of capabilites or platform numbers until 1900th.

And in 1904-1905 the japan demonstrated something about the situation of great numerical superiority, industrial overwhelming, naval capabilites and other things...

Keith_w wrote:... the Americans got their assed kicked ... Detroit surrendered without a fight, ...

My son's regiment, the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, was recently given battle honors for Detroit as the direct successor regiment to the Newfoundland Fencibles who fooled the silly Americans into believing they were outnumbered.

NOT a glorious chapter in the history of the US Army. Forget who the commander was, but I remember he was court martialed and I think convicted.

Release from 2012 near bottom... http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2012/09/14/war-1812-battle-honours.

I am US, but the Brits were on the side of right in the 1812 incursions.

I can't go to bat with Dilandu and RFC in this discussion about ships and navies.

But I will say this much. We backed the wrong horse in 1812. No way should we have been backing Napoleon's attempt to dominate Europe. Our spiritual and intellectual heritage rests with the Brits and we should have been lending a helping hand, probably as a friendly neutral rather than acting as a hostile.

The Brits had their messup contributing to the problem too, particularly in the matter of impressment.

I understand why things went as they did, but I can never make my way through this period without shaking my head.

Don