Convoy escorts - SPOILER for SNIPPET 8 of HFQ

lyonheart wrote:Hi Thrandir,

Be grateful you have the work.

I'm rather surprised you could take that attitude from RFC's, mine and other comments, but everyone is free to see things differently.

I spent more than 2 years in England, in case you're curious, but your somewhat uninformed arrogance brings back memories of some of the Brits I knew.

Lyon, be nice.

Especially since he's largely right. Mind you, I think British sources probably tend to be as parochial as US sources in terms of exactly how the facts are interpreted, but that doesn't change the fact that the terms of the Treaty of Ghent were essentially as stated, that the Brits never formally renounced the Orders in Council, or that the treaty was negotiated before the Battle of New Orleans and so could not have been imposed upon Britain by the US' demonstrated martial prowess. I mean, take a look at how the invasion(s) of Canada worked out. And you might ask a Canadian how he sees the War of 1812 and the implications of its outcome for firmly cementing Canada into the Empire.

Now, do I personally think the Brits could have "won" a war against the US that would have allowed them to dictate terms to us . . . or that wouldn't have had all sorts of negative repercussions for the Empire 20 or 30 years down the road? Nope. But Britain sure as heck wasn't "driven to the peace table." I strongly suspect that many a British historian (like a couple I've known personally) would argue that the war was "a minor irritant" because even at the time the British Empire was hugely humiliated by what happened to the RN in its engagements with the USN. Trust me, I have seen (and spoken with) British historians who insist almost hysterically that the American 44s were originally designed and laid down as ships-of-the-line and then effectively cut down on the stocks into frigates. This, you see, explains the heaviness of their armament and the stoutness of their structure, despite the fact that the correspondence of men like Joshua Humphreys make it abundantly clear the ships were designed as frigates from the keel up and that the language of the authorizing act clearly describes them as "frigates," and not ships-of-the-line. The fact that the Royal Navy's officers had almost universally derided the Americans for mounting 24-pounders when "everyone knew" (from British best practices which were, of course, the best best practices in the world) that the 18-pounder was both the ideal main battery gun for a frigate and the largest which could be worked effectively in a frigate action (and, of course, that the American ships were far too large to hold their own in eight maneuvering battle) is conveniently ignored by those same historians. (Of course, there was a lot of mutual hostility between the Brits and the Americans at this point which might also have helped explain the oft expressed British contempt for the big American frigates. You might want to check out some of the duels between officers of the two navies.)

As far as the action between the Chesapeake and the Shannon is concerned, there are a few points worth considering. One is that the American ship was a 38, not a 44, which means that she was smaller and more lightly armed than the "big" American frigates. In fact, she and Shannon were basically identical twins. (This is significant because the earlier British frigates defeated by United States and Constitution were pretty heavily outgunned). Secondly, her commanding officer, James Lawrence had been in command for a very brief period of time (no more than a couple of weeks, if I'm remembering correctly) without ever being able to take her to sea. In fact, he'd only exercised the crews on the guns two or three times — in harbor, not at sea. Third, Lawrence was determined to sail at the first opportunity, believing that it was his duty to get to sea and attack British commerce and that he would be able to defeat or at least sufficiently damage so as to outrun a single British frigate. Fourth, Sir Philip Broke, Shannon's CO, had been in command for several years, had drilled his crew to perfection, and had some very progressive notions about gunnery and tactics. And, fifth, once action was joined, Lawrence and every single one of his senior officers were killed or severely wounded in the early broadsides. In other words, yes, the British won very handily, but Captain Hull and the Constitution had won their actions almost as handily, if at somewhat longer-range. (There is, by the way, no evidence that Lawrence was even aware of Broke's formal letter of challenge when he sailed or that it had anything at all to do with his decisions. It does, however, make for damned good naval fiction! )

More to the point, perhaps, the Brits had their own notions about what big, double banked frigates should look like, and while their eventual design practices may have been influenced by President, they certainly weren't decisively influenced by their prize. They were already building big frigates – and deploying them to the American station specifically to take on the 44s — well before president fell into their hands. And while it is also true that the Americans were building some very large, very powerful ships-of-the-line by 1814, they were building only a handful of them and the ones they were putting into commission suffered from lack of American experience with the type. The US emphasis on gun power — a feature of American design to the very end of the battleship era — kind of got out of hand with the early liners like Independence, which is why she ultimately had to be cut down a full deck to become an effective worship. Now, in the Ohio and (to a lesser extent) Deleware, the USN produced world-class sailing ships-of-the-line which were actually greatly admired by the Royal Navy, because they finally had the displacement to carry their guns effectively and were far more heavily armed than the vast majority of their supposed peers. However, in 1815, there was no way in the universe that the American navy was going to be able to contend toe-to-toe with the fleet which had kicked Napoleon's arse. And an odd sort of way, British historians have had something of a reverse inferiority complex where the War of 1812 is concerned. They would have won the war at sea in the end, and I don't think there's too much question of that, but the Royal Navy was denied the opportunity to proof that was what would've happened after the initial humiliating defeats. As a result, they've tended to argue (as I pointed out above) that the Americans "cheated" somehow in calling the 44s "frigates" at all and to significantly downplay the extent to which the American privateers succeeded as an asymmetrical means of waging war.

It might put things into proper perspective if you thought of the Wharf 1812 as being at least somewhat analogous to the Vietnam War. Economically and militarily there was absolutely no reason that the United States couldn't have continued the war against North Vietnam for another 10 years. The problem was that a war weary American public saw no outcome which was going to achieve the results it thought the world was being fought for, there was a very vocal and energetic opposition to the war which (revisionist history notwithstanding) never representative majority of US public opinion but was far more effective in its opposition to the war than the portion of the population which actively supported the war, the constant drain of casualties and treasure was deemed unlikely to accomplish American war aims in the end, and, ultimately, the US could walk away from Vietnam, leaving a "stable regime" in place (sound familiar?), without any self-evident sacrifice of critical national interests. The British public in 1814 was exhausted after decades of war against France and, specifically, Napoleon, it saw no critical British interests at risk in North America, the wind down of the naval war in European and Indian waters and greatly eased the manpower crunch which had driven the impressment controversy in the first place, and — as Wellington pointed out when he refused the American command — it seemed unlikely those North Vietn — er, I mean those Americans were going to show common sense about admitting when they were beaten.

The British Army wasn't all that huge, and finding the necessary manpower to wage an effective campaign against something as big as the US was even in 1815 would have been a huge strain, not to mention the difficulties in logistically supporting that operation all the way across the Atlantic (a little problem they'd had a teeny bit of experience with thirty years earlier or so), and there was no way the British public was going to support what was being advertised in Britain by some people as an attempt to "reconquer" the lost colonies when that was clearly a lost cause. When those factors were combined with the losses British maritime interests were suffering and the fact that the Royal Navy knew that the USN was about to start deploying squadrons of light regular man-of-war under regular Navy officers as commerce destroyers, not commerce-raiders, there was no way in the world that Great Britain was going to commit to the level of military effort which would have been required to actually defeat the United States. In addition, Britain's political leaders recognized that the US was going to grow only more powerful over the next several decades, and they really, really didn't want to inaugurate a tradition of bitter hostility and revanchism between themselves and a nation which was likely to be a lot bigger handful than France in the fullness of time.

By the same token, the US negotiators in Europe fully understood that without the distraction of Napoleon, the US couldn't ultimately defeat Great Britain, either. Which is why, in an unusual outbreak of common sense, both sides basically agreed to call it a day without either side imposing terms upon the other.

runsforcelery wrote:

lyonheart wrote:Hi Thrandir,

Be grateful you have the work.

I'm rather surprised you could take that attitude from RFC's, mine and other comments, but everyone is free to see things differently.

I spent more than 2 years in England, in case you're curious, but your somewhat uninformed arrogance brings back memories of some of the Brits I knew.

Lyon, be nice.

Especially since he's largely right. Mind you, I think British sources probably tend to be as parochial as US sources in terms of exactly how the facts are interpreted, but that doesn't change the fact that the terms of the Treaty of Ghent were essentially as stated, that the Brits never formally renounced the Orders in Council, or that the treaty was negotiated before the Battle of New Orleans and so could not have been imposed upon Britain by the US' demonstrated martial prowess. I mean, take a look at how the invasion(s) of Canada worked out. And you might ask a Canadian how he sees the War of 1812 and the implications of its outcome for firmly cementing Canada into the Empire.

Now, do I personally think the Brits could have "won" a war against the US that would have allowed them to dictate terms to us . . . or that wouldn't have had all sorts of negative repercussions for the Empire 20 or 30 years down the road? Nope. But Britain sure as heck wasn't "driven to the peace table." I strongly suspect that many a British historian (like a couple I've known personally) would argue that the war was "a minor irritant" because even at the time the British Empire was hugely humiliated by what happened to the RN in its engagements with the USN. Trust me, I have seen (and spoken with) British historians who insist almost hysterically that the American 44s were originally designed and laid down as ships-of-the-line and then effectively cut down on the stocks into frigates. This, you see, explains the heaviness of their armament and the stoutness of their structure, despite the fact that the correspondence of men like Joshua Humphreys make it abundantly clear the ships were designed as frigates from the keel up and that the language of the authorizing act clearly describes them as "frigates," and not ships-of-the-line. The fact that the Royal Navy's officers had almost universally derided the Americans for mounting 24-pounders when "everyone knew" (from British best practices which were, of course, the best best practices in the world) that the 18-pounder was both the ideal main battery gun for a frigate and the largest which could be worked effectively in a frigate action (and, of course, that the American ships were far too large to hold their own in eight maneuvering battle) is conveniently ignored by those same historians. (Of course, there was a lot of mutual hostility between the Brits and the Americans at this point which might also have helped explain the oft expressed British contempt for the big American frigates. You might want to check out some of the duels between officers of the two navies.)

As far as the action between the Chesapeake and the Shannon is concerned, there are a few points worth considering. One is that the American ship was a 38, not a 44, which means that she was smaller and more lightly armed than the "big" American frigates. In fact, she and Shannon were basically identical twins. (This is significant because the earlier British frigates defeated by United States and Constitution were pretty heavily outgunned). Secondly, her commanding officer, James Lawrence had been in command for a very brief period of time (no more than a couple of weeks, if I'm remembering correctly) without ever being able to take her to sea. In fact, he'd only exercised the crews on the guns two or three times — in harbor, not at sea. Third, Lawrence was determined to sail at the first opportunity, believing that it was his duty to get to sea and attack British commerce and that he would be able to defeat or at least sufficiently damage so as to outrun a single British frigate. Fourth, Sir Philip Broke, Shannon's CO, had been in command for several years, had drilled his crew to perfection, and had some very progressive notions about gunnery and tactics. And, fifth, once action was joined, Lawrence and every single one of his senior officers were killed or severely wounded in the early broadsides. In other words, yes, the British won very handily, but Captain Hull and the Constitution had won their actions almost as handily, if at somewhat longer-range. (There is, by the way, no evidence that Lawrence was even aware of Broke's formal letter of challenge when he sailed or that it had anything at all to do with his decisions. It does, however, make for damned good naval fiction! )

More to the point, perhaps, the Brits had their own notions about what big, double banked frigates should look like, and while their eventual design practices may have been influenced by President, they certainly weren't decisively influenced by their prize. They were already building big frigates – and deploying them to the American station specifically to take on the 44s — well before president fell into their hands. And while it is also true that the Americans were building some very large, very powerful ships-of-the-line by 1814, they were building only a handful of them and the ones they were putting into commission suffered from lack of American experience with the type. The US emphasis on gun power — a feature of American design to the very end of the battleship era — kind of got out of hand with the early liners like Independence, which is why she ultimately had to be cut down a full deck to become an effective worship. Now, in the Ohio and (to a lesser extent) Deleware, the USN produced world-class sailing ships-of-the-line which were actually greatly admired by the Royal Navy, because they finally had the displacement to carry their guns effectively and were far more heavily armed than the vast majority of their supposed peers. However, in 1815, there was no way in the universe that the American navy was going to be able to contend toe-to-toe with the fleet which had kicked Napoleon's arse. And an odd sort of way, British historians have had something of a reverse inferiority complex where the War of 1812 is concerned. They would have won the war at sea in the end, and I don't think there's too much question of that, but the Royal Navy was denied the opportunity to proof that was what would've happened after the initial humiliating defeats. As a result, they've tended to argue (as I pointed out above) that the Americans "cheated" somehow in calling the 44s "frigates" at all and to significantly downplay the extent to which the American privateers succeeded as an asymmetrical means of waging war.

It might put things into proper perspective if you thought of the Wharf 1812 as being at least somewhat analogous to the Vietnam War. Economically and militarily there was absolutely no reason that the United States couldn't have continued the war against North Vietnam for another 10 years. The problem was that a war weary American public saw no outcome which was going to achieve the results it thought the world was being fought for, there was a very vocal and energetic opposition to the war which (revisionist history notwithstanding) never representative majority of US public opinion but was far more effective in its opposition to the war than the portion of the population which actively supported the war, the constant drain of casualties and treasure was deemed unlikely to accomplish American war aims in the end, and, ultimately, the US could walk away from Vietnam, leaving a "stable regime" in place (sound familiar?), without any self-evident sacrifice of critical national interests. The British public in 1814 was exhausted after decades of war against France and, specifically, Napoleon, it saw no critical British interests at risk in North America, the wind down of the naval war in European and Indian waters and greatly eased the manpower crunch which had driven the impressment controversy in the first place, and — as Wellington pointed out when he refused the American command — it seemed unlikely those North Vietn — er, I mean those Americans were going to show common sense about admitting when they were beaten.

The British Army wasn't all that huge, and finding the necessary manpower to wage an effective campaign against something as big as the US was even in 1815 would have been a huge strain, not to mention the difficulties in logistically supporting that operation all the way across the Atlantic (a little problem they'd had a teeny bit of experience with thirty years earlier or so), and there was no way the British public was going to support what was being advertised in Britain by some people as an attempt to "reconquer" the lost colonies when that was clearly a lost cause. When those factors were combined with the losses British maritime interests were suffering and the fact that the Royal Navy knew that the USN was about to start deploying squadrons of light regular man-of-war under regular Navy officers as commerce destroyers, not commerce-raiders, there was no way in the world that Great Britain was going to commit to the level of military effort which would have been required to actually defeat the United States. In addition, Britain's political leaders recognized that the US was going to grow only more powerful over the next several decades, and they really, really didn't want to inaugurate a tradition of bitter hostility and revanchism between themselves and a nation which was likely to be a lot bigger handful than France in the fullness of time.

By the same token, the US negotiators in Europe fully understood that without the distraction of Napoleon, the US couldn't ultimately defeat Great Britain, either. Which is why, in an unusual outbreak of common sense, both sides basically agreed to call it a day without either side imposing terms upon the other.

Lyonheart needs a beer. I confess I have sinned. I recommended one from the wrong universe.

Don

Hi Keith_w

Hey, I was only responding to what he said.

Actually I'm quite an anglophile, very proud of my heritage of English [the queen mother was a umpteenth cousin from a mutual Scottish royal relative some centuries back] and other Scottish ancestors besides some Irish.

I've been trying to write a novel about how England wins the second world war and saves the empire, but books like Corelli Barnett's make improving the political, social, educational and industrial aspects far harder than the military.

I was going to mention how much of an incompetent Madison was, but the post was already getting rather long, and I had to get to the dentist.

Two crowns and a cavity in 2&1/2 hours, almost $1100!

Regarding Canada, I'm quite proud of having many Canadian friends, I spent almost two years at Niagara Falls and really enjoyed the visits I've taken across the country, particularly to Vancouver and Vancouver Island; Victoria reminded me of some of the best parts of London, but was much cleaner.

Haven't you heard the joke Brit's tell about the difference between Americans and Canadians?

They ask people they're almost sure are Americans, by their accent mainly, if they're Canadian, because they'll take it as a compliment, while they'd learned Canadians consider being asked if they're Americans an insult.

With too many reasons in many cases, unfortunately.

We certainly burned York first [now its Toronto] in retaliation for a few public buildings burned in New York that were burned first, but let that lay.

The western 'War hawks' were certainly idiots, and the general American notion that the many ex-American Tory Brits and French Catholics wanted to be submerged in the larger American population to lose their identities and privileges guaranteed by Great Britain is an indication that the people, especially those in Washington DC were less than what any objective observers would consider rational even way back then.

With the exception of generals Winfred Scott and Alexander Macomb in the north, the army and militia's war record was certainly execrable, though one can easily argue that under such generals the future was much brighter.

But when Madison was making the decisions based on what party some idiot's a member of, the end results were almost guaranteed to be bad.

Bear in mind Washington DC wasn't that much bigger than York at the time, the government buildings rather few, the near swamp capitol was avoided as much as possible even by congressmen and senators, there was very little to recommend it, the biggest loss was easily the Library of Congress.

Even Eisenhower couldn't understand why the Canadians didn't want to be Americans, and the Canadian Interior Minister at the time explained why his father crossed the border into Canada in 1835 [during one of the Jacksonian economic crises] and stayed.

I could also rehearse the story of the St Lawrence Seaway in some detail, and why Canada delayed it before WWII, because a joint effort would have been easier and much more neighborly, but the New York senators had too much clout and refused, considering it too much competition for the then renamed Erie Canal, but Canada gave FDR notice they would do it after the war; when Eisenhower realised they were serious, he overrode New York's objections, and pushed it through.

Want me to go on?

L

Keith_w wrote:<snipped the entire set of long quotes, 'cause I don't want to be mean to people and tie up too much of their bandwidth>

Good thing we're only talking about British arrogance here Lyonheart. We wouldn't want to mention that the Americans got their assed kicked everywhere on the northern frontiers - Quebec, Niagara, Detroit surrendered without a fight, or that President Madison hadda cut and run. You burned York (good riddance) we (yeah, British born Canadian here) burned Washington.

lyonheart wrote:Hi Keith_w

Hey, I was only responding to what he said.

<Big Snip>

Want me to go on?

L

Nope.

Hi RFC,

Hey, he started it.

Why did I know you'd take his side?

One guess.

I know, I know.

I said nothing about New Orleans enabling the US to impose its will upon England, although there may have been a whisper about bad generals making good ones look better from a recent book...

My Canadian friends were far more familiar with 1812 etc history than at least 95% of Americans to start with, not that the recent bicentennial coverage did anything to improve that.

Living at Niagara Falls for almost two years, we were exposed to a lot of history regarding the local battles including Lundy's Lane and Chippawa, where the British veterans of the Napoleonic wars were shocked at the tenacity of the American soldiers they expected to despise; and even though I was only 11, my knowledge of military history so impressed one Canadian Officer visiting our house at one of the many exchange parties that he sent me a copy of the history of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment and its distinguished record in WWII.

The Age of Fighting Sail by CS Forester [1956] is still one of the great books on the naval aspects of the War of 1812 since it incorporates a wealth of detail of the land battles and economics; NTM as a Brit he had quit a bit to say about the RN's many ineptitude's during the war.

I first read it during the Vietnam War and found the same similarities, which were both amusing, fascinating and frustrating at the time.

I never said or suggested Britain was driven to the
Peace table, but since feelers from Russia had been going on for a year, both sides had had the time to realise the war wasn't worth what it was costing either of them, and end it equitably, which England could have done very easily at any time had she chosen a wiser course.

Except the Burning of Washington made the Brits too big for their britches; the British government and delegates began to make some ridiculous demands regarding keeping any territory they took [encouraging the American view it was the second revolutionary war], despite Wellington telling them that was absolute idiocy; which they only dialed back only when news of Fort McHenry and some anonymous American farmer shooting General Ross, so his army fell into the hands of lesser lights who decided to retreat; plus the news that the perennial Brit favorite northern invasion route had failed again at Lake Champlain and Plattsburgh despite 16,000 more' incomparable' veterans of those Spanish campaigns, further north than the last time in the revolutionary war.

So they finally dropped their outrageous demands, and eager to get the war over, the US abandoned bringing up the reasons it had gone to war in the first place, yet the speed of its acceptance indicates how weary both sides were.

I could mention in passing the despicable treatment of American POW's by the Brits, and their deliberate efforts to kill as many as possible by malnourishment and disease etc, but courtesy trumps honesty these days.

The British hadn't noticed much what the French 44 gun frigates were capable of, despite capturing some or perhaps because they had despite the heavy losses a couple of times until "Master and Commander" apparently; nor was Pat O'Brian all that objective in reporting the battle capturing the USS Chesapeake though I enjoyed the series, while the Chesapeake was also indirectly mentioned in RAH's "Starship Troopers".

I knew you were going to say the RN got it double banked frigate designs from somewhere else, so given how much catch up the RN did with the French on their early steam designs and modifications, was it the same after the Napoleonic wars up to Le Napoleon and then the ironclads?

It's rather long again.

L

runsforcelery wrote:

lyonheart wrote:Hi Thrandir,

Be grateful you have the work.

I'm rather surprised you could take that attitude from RFC's, mine and other comments, but everyone is free to see things differently.

I spent more than 2 years in England, in case you're curious, but your somewhat uninformed arrogance brings back memories of some of the Brits I knew.

Lyon, be nice.

Especially since he's largely right. Mind you, I think British sources probably tend to be as parochial as US sources in terms of exactly how the facts are interpreted, but that doesn't change the fact that the terms of the Treaty of Ghent were essentially as stated, that the Brits never formally renounced the Orders in Council, or that the treaty was negotiated before the Battle of New Orleans and so could not have been imposed upon Britain by the US' demonstrated martial prowess. I mean, take a look at how the invasion(s) of Canada worked out. And you might ask a Canadian how he sees the War of 1812 and the implications of its outcome for firmly cementing Canada into the Empire.

Now, do I personally think the Brits could have "won" a war against the US that would have allowed them to dictate terms to us . . . or that wouldn't have had all sorts of negative repercussions for the Empire 20 or 30 years down the road? Nope. But Britain sure as heck wasn't "driven to the peace table." I strongly suspect that many a British historian (like a couple I've known personally) would argue that the war was "a minor irritant" because even at the time the British Empire was hugely humiliated by what happened to the RN in its engagements with the USN. Trust me, I have seen (and spoken with) British historians who insist almost hysterically that the American 44s were originally designed and laid down as ships-of-the-line and then effectively cut down on the stocks into frigates. This, you see, explains the heaviness of their armament and the stoutness of their structure, despite the fact that the correspondence of men like Joshua Humphreys make it abundantly clear the ships were designed as frigates from the keel up and that the language of the authorizing act clearly describes them as "frigates," and not ships-of-the-line. The fact that the Royal Navy's officers had almost universally derided the Americans for mounting 24-pounders when "everyone knew" (from British best practices which were, of course, the best best practices in the world) that the 18-pounder was both the ideal main battery gun for a frigate and the largest which could be worked effectively in a frigate action (and, of course, that the American ships were far too large to hold their own in eight maneuvering battle) is conveniently ignored by those same historians. (Of course, there was a lot of mutual hostility between the Brits and the Americans at this point which might also have helped explain the oft expressed British contempt for the big American frigates. You might want to check out some of the duels between officers of the two navies.)

As far as the action between the Chesapeake and the Shannon is concerned, there are a few points worth considering. One is that the American ship was a 38, not a 44, which means that she was smaller and more lightly armed than the "big" American frigates. In fact, she and Shannon were basically identical twins. (This is significant because the earlier British frigates defeated by United States and Constitution were pretty heavily outgunned). Secondly, her commanding officer, James Lawrence had been in command for a very brief period of time (no more than a couple of weeks, if I'm remembering correctly) without ever being able to take her to sea. In fact, he'd only exercised the crews on the guns two or three times — in harbor, not at sea. Third, Lawrence was determined to sail at the first opportunity, believing that it was his duty to get to sea and attack British commerce and that he would be able to defeat or at least sufficiently damage so as to outrun a single British frigate. Fourth, Sir Philip Broke, Shannon's CO, had been in command for several years, had drilled his crew to perfection, and had some very progressive notions about gunnery and tactics. And, fifth, once action was joined, Lawrence and every single one of his senior officers were killed or severely wounded in the early broadsides. In other words, yes, the British won very handily, but Captain Hull and the Constitution had won their actions almost as handily, if at somewhat longer-range. (There is, by the way, no evidence that Lawrence was even aware of Broke's formal letter of challenge when he sailed or that it had anything at all to do with his decisions. It does, however, make for damned good naval fiction! )

More to the point, perhaps, the Brits had their own notions about what big, double banked frigates should look like, and while their eventual design practices may have been influenced by President, they certainly weren't decisively influenced by their prize. They were already building big frigates – and deploying them to the American station specifically to take on the 44s — well before president fell into their hands. And while it is also true that the Americans were building some very large, very powerful ships-of-the-line by 1814, they were building only a handful of them and the ones they were putting into commission suffered from lack of American experience with the type. The US emphasis on gun power — a feature of American design to the very end of the battleship era — kind of got out of hand with the early liners like Independence, which is why she ultimately had to be cut down a full deck to become an effective worship. Now, in the Ohio and (to a lesser extent) Deleware, the USN produced world-class sailing ships-of-the-line which were actually greatly admired by the Royal Navy, because they finally had the displacement to carry their guns effectively and were far more heavily armed than the vast majority of their supposed peers. However, in 1815, there was no way in the universe that the American navy was going to be able to contend toe-to-toe with the fleet which had kicked Napoleon's arse. And an odd sort of way, British historians have had something of a reverse inferiority complex where the War of 1812 is concerned. They would have won the war at sea in the end, and I don't think there's too much question of that, but the Royal Navy was denied the opportunity to proof that was what would've happened after the initial humiliating defeats. As a result, they've tended to argue (as I pointed out above) that the Americans "cheated" somehow in calling the 44s "frigates" at all and to significantly downplay the extent to which the American privateers succeeded as an asymmetrical means of waging war.

It might put things into proper perspective if you thought of the Wharf 1812 as being at least somewhat analogous to the Vietnam War. Economically and militarily there was absolutely no reason that the United States couldn't have continued the war against North Vietnam for another 10 years. The problem was that a war weary American public saw no outcome which was going to achieve the results it thought the world was being fought for, there was a very vocal and energetic opposition to the war which (revisionist history notwithstanding) never representative majority of US public opinion but was far more effective in its opposition to the war than the portion of the population which actively supported the war, the constant drain of casualties and treasure was deemed unlikely to accomplish American war aims in the end, and, ultimately, the US could walk away from Vietnam, leaving a "stable regime" in place (sound familiar?), without any self-evident sacrifice of critical national interests. The British public in 1814 was exhausted after decades of war against France and, specifically, Napoleon, it saw no critical British interests at risk in North America, the wind down of the naval war in European and Indian waters and greatly eased the manpower crunch which had driven the impressment controversy in the first place, and — as Wellington pointed out when he refused the American command — it seemed unlikely those North Vietn — er, I mean those Americans were going to show common sense about admitting when they were beaten.

The British Army wasn't all that huge, and finding the necessary manpower to wage an effective campaign against something as big as the US was even in 1815 would have been a huge strain, not to mention the difficulties in logistically supporting that operation all the way across the Atlantic (a little problem they'd had a teeny bit of experience with thirty years earlier or so), and there was no way the British public was going to support what was being advertised in Britain by some people as an attempt to "reconquer" the lost colonies when that was clearly a lost cause. When those factors were combined with the losses British maritime interests were suffering and the fact that the Royal Navy knew that the USN was about to start deploying squadrons of light regular man-of-war under regular Navy officers as commerce destroyers, not commerce-raiders, there was no way in the world that Great Britain was going to commit to the level of military effort which would have been required to actually defeat the United States. In addition, Britain's political leaders recognized that the US was going to grow only more powerful over the next several decades, and they really, really didn't want to inaugurate a tradition of bitter hostility and revanchism between themselves and a nation which was likely to be a lot bigger handful than France in the fullness of time.

By the same token, the US negotiators in Europe fully understood that without the distraction of Napoleon, the US couldn't ultimately defeat Great Britain, either. Which is why, in an unusual outbreak of common sense, both sides basically agreed to call it a day without either side imposing terms upon the other.

Hi, RFC!

The British Army wasn't all that huge, and finding the necessary manpower to wage an effective campaign against something as big as the US was even in 1815 would have been a huge strain, not to mention the difficulties in logistically supporting that operation all the way across the Atlantic (a little problem they'd had a teeny bit of experience with thirty years earlier or so), and there was no way the British public was going to support what was being advertised in Britain by some people as an attempt to "reconquer" the lost colonies when that was clearly a lost cause. When those factors were combined with the losses British maritime interests were suffering and the fact that the Royal Navy knew that the USN was about to start deploying squadrons of light regular man-of-war under regular Navy officers as commerce destroyers, not commerce-raiders, there was no way in the world that Great Britain was going to commit to the level of military effort which would have been required to actually defeat the United States. In addition, Britain's political leaders recognized that the US was going to grow only more powerful over the next several decades, and they really, really didn't want to inaugurate a tradition of bitter hostility and revanchism between themselves and a nation which was likely to be a lot bigger handful than France in the fullness of time.

By the same token, the US negotiators in Europe fully understood that without the distraction of Napoleon, the US couldn't ultimately defeat Great Britain, either. Which is why, in an unusual outbreak of common sense, both sides basically agreed to call it a day without either side imposing terms upon the other.

There was another problem for the british point of view. The Russian Empire was... well, she was overwhelmingly strong at this time, at least in military point of view. After the France was defeated, there were simply no other army that could realisticly stand against russia in 1815. The "La Sainte-Alliance" clearly demonstrated that the Russia have the ambitions to stay as the ruling power of the continent.

And the Russian Empire wasn't in exactly good relations with the Britain. So, if the Britain would be forced to proceed with war with USA, they may very well found themselves unable to control or balance the russian military and political domination in Europe. And the one thing that british were certain of - the russian army and navy learned quickly.

lyonheart wrote:I could review other examples of unwarranted British arrogance, but Corelli Barnett for one, already did a great job of explaining how and why Britain has screwed up almost everything for the past 150 years or so; or we could review the fears expressed in London by the visit of the USS Miantonomoh after the civil war, quite entertaining!

An exellent point!

Actually, the Royal Navy was screwed up in 1850, when the French comissioned their "Napoleon" - first fast screw ship-of-the-line, thah could clearly run circles around any Royal Navy column, tearing the enemy apart with Paxian guns.

Next time, the Royal Navy was screwed in 1862, when the french appeared with six ocean-going ironclads and a fair number of coastal ironclad battery, and the Royal Navy have only three ironclads in comission. And then the nonpleasant situation with the Armstrong breech-loading rifles... well, they were the only naval guns in history, that failed THAT miserably.

Next time - in early 1870, when the Royal navy has a 28 ironclads of 19 (!!!) different classes against french only 23 ironclads... but of only FIVE classes. And the situation for Royal Navy stand up until the middle-1880. The britis admirals simply coulnd't understand, HOW they supposed to bring the "armada" of completely differents ships with different conceptions, different seagoing ability in battle altogether.

And of course in 1880-1890... Well, i always wondered: why there is no statue of the Théophile Aube in front of the Ripley Building of UK admirality?

Geez Lyonheart what's with the aggression?
Come to Oz and I'll buy you a beer

Admittedly I did get carried away a bit but what I stated about the Ghent Conference is historically correct - Britain did not see she had lost.

Unlike some I freely admit the faults of British pride - but it seems when a Briton points something out we are always labelled arrogant (aggressively assertive/presumptuous) - not that we might have a point or could even be right.
Generally Britons are being extremely proud (one of the definitions of arrogant) of our heritage but it seems Britons are not allowed to be proud of our heritage - everyone else is but we aren't; sorry but that does not stack up in any argument.
Before anyone says anything I am being the latter not the former.

Thanks RFC and I totally agree with your summation of British attitudes and thoughts of the time. The trouble with the British Government at the time was they didn't want to listen to Wellington - while he had friends in the Government he also had his detractors who were always quick to point out his mistakes in his campaigns - they glossed over the fact that he more often than not came out on top.
Thirsk reminds very much of Wellington in that he has some very powerful opponents in Government and some very powerful supporters as well.

From some of the logs and other historical records I have read from RN officers who fought the big 44's they all said the same thing - purposely built large frigates were the way to go. They argued long and hard for the RN to adopt the concept - after-all they had enough evidence to show that a purpose built heavy frigate was going to out-muscle and if handled correctly out manoeuvre a smaller 5th and 6th rate. The RN didn't think much of the French 44's because IMHO the French rarely used them as they could have been used.

The RN had a huge shock when they initially encountered the big American 44's and lost or if able to run away. At the time ALL RN commanders were expected to win against any enemy irrespective of the odds.
The RN had a tradition of winning, not all the time but when they really had their backs to the wall the right person stepped up to give them victory.
When they didn't it was not good for morale and the commander concerned had better have good patronage back in Britain if he wasn't to be thrown to the wolves for losing.

Dilandu wrote:Hi, RFC!



There was another problem for the british point of view. The Russian Empire was... well, she was overwhelmingly strong at this time, at least in military point of view. After the France was defeated, there were simply no other army that could realisticly stand against russia in 1815. The "La Sainte-Alliance" clearly demonstrated that the Russia have the ambitions to stay as the ruling power of the continent.

And the Russian Empire wasn't in exactly good relations with the Britain. So, if the Britain would be forced to proceed with war with USA, they may very well found themselves unable to control or balance the russian military and political domination in Europe. And the one thing that british were certain of - the russian army and navy learned quickly.

A very valid point, and one I'd intended to touch on. However, as you may have suspected from the number of voice-activated recognition errors that got past me into my original somewhat, um . . . lengthy post , I was pressed for time and didn't get a chance to do a final edit of it.

I think most historians --- and certainly most amateur historians find it difficult to remember how many heads Hydra has when they start analyzing historical events. Discussion of the War of 1812, for example, is often couched in terms of a bipolar contest between the UK and the US, possibly with France as a secondary issue off in the wings somewhere. The impact of Spanish and Dutch interests in the Caribbean and Mediterranean, tensions in the Baltic (where Russia was certainly a player), British concerns about its newfound footholds in India, and the general balance of power in Europe (not to mention the concern over all the notions floating around a politically radicalized Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars) tends to get short shrift.


BTW, the reason I was pressed for time was that my daughter Megan had oral surgery yesterday and Sharon and I have been a bit distracted dealing with it. She came through like a trooper, though, and the surgeon says we got an absolutely best-case resolution from it, so it was a "distraction" I was delighted to put up with!

[quote="runsforcelery" ]SNIP
BTW, the reason I was pressed for time was that my daughter Megan had oral surgery yesterday and Sharon and I have been a bit distracted dealing with it. She came through like a trooper, though, and the surgeon says we got an absolutely best-case resolution from it, so it was a "distraction" I was delighted to put up with! [/quote]

Excellent news