Comparing weapons

And let's not forget that Charis' first "Dreadnought" was a wooden galleon. True, the name was suggested by Merlin, but Merlin was obviously inspired by the historical Dreadnought because galleon!Dreadnought was as much a game changer for its time as historical!Dreadnought was.

JeffEngel wrote:

Louis R wrote:The irony is that Safehold is skipping the whole line-of-battle era [take a look: naval battles have all taken place between fleets arranged in multiple columns, a common galley formation, when they weren't outright melees], so to them the term will always mean 'the biggest, meanest ship out there'

Thank you for exactly the right attitude about the terminology.

A question though - I don't have it available for easy reference, but the galleon on galleon combat for the first round of the ICN vs. RDN in the Gulf of Dohlar under Manthyr: didn't they manage honest line on line combat then?

Actually, Charisian galleons have been using the line of battle from the beginning of broadside combat. They haven't always been able to form up properly, and they've avoided the formalism (i.e., sterility) of locking into line ahead, but that's precisely the formation Cayleb used in his initial attack on the Dohlaran/Desnarian galley fleet off Armageddon Reef (although the line broke up during the general chase which followed), and he used two independent lines of battle in his attack in Darcos Sound (breaking up --- in that case --- when he essentially signaled general chase for his easternmost column in an effort to reach Royal Charis before his father was killed). The western of his two lines, under Staynair, never broke up at all; it maintained its formation to the end, while the lighter units secured the prizes left in its wake. Gwyllym Manthyr formed his lamed galleons into line-ahead for the fight against Thirsk to cover the retreat of his remaining galleons in the Gulf of Dohlar, as well. In fact, it was only his compact formation which let him hold on as long as he did and inflict as much damage as he inflicted as the Dohlarans came in on him in "mob" formation. In that case, as in the earlier ones, the final phases of the battle "degenerated" into melee . . . which happens also to have been true of virtually every battle fought to a decisive conclusion during the Age of Sail. In HFQ, Ahbaht formed his fleeing survivors into line ahead in his effort to fight out of the trap while Dreadnought covered his retreat in the Narrows, as well. The Dohlaran pursuit was so determined (and they had so many ships) his line disintegrated to some extent, but that was the result of enemy maneuvers and numbers, not something he wanted to do. In Lock Island's attack on the NoG ships in which he was killed, he maneuvered in line right up until the moment he broke the Church's line, but in that case he was deliberately seeking a close-range melee because he had limited numbers of shells (on the ships which had any of them at all) and had to get in close enough for therm to be decisive. That is, it was his intention from the beginning to bring on a point-blank melee before revealing the existence of the shells at all in order to finish the action quickly, before his ships shot themselves out of ammunition. And when Rock Point attacked the anchored Desnarian fleet, he did so in line of battle, doubling the Desnarian line and engaging it from both sides with two lines.

There have been no formal battle line duels (i.e., slugfests between two opposing fleets with all of their heavy combatants formed up in single lines to engage one another) in the books because of the nature of the tactical situations, and the Charisians have been perfectly willing to fight in columns of divisions (rather than attempting to form their entire strength into a single grand line of battle) where that's allowed them to use their firepower most effectively, but they definitely understand (and use) the formation. And, on the other side of the hill, Thirsk is as well aware as anyone in Charis of the advantages of the line ahead for broadside-armed ships, and so is the RDN. He and his men also happen to be aware that --- in most of the battles they've fought --- that sort of formation would actually favor the Charisians because of the differences in gun power and rate of fire. Accordingly, they've sought close action and to break up the Charisian line and, in tactical situations where they've had the advantages of wind and/or numbers, that's precisely what they've done (and the reason they've won battles against the ICN and no one else has).

ChronicRder wrote:Hi all, for starters I'd like to talk about the King Haarahlds. I was brushing up on some naval history and found some interesting ship classifications and the distinctions between the ironclad, pre-dreadnought, dreadnought, and battleship categories.
What I found interesting was that Safehold's idea of a ironclad pretty well matched up, but the King Haarahlds are classed as battleships.

On Earth they would be classified as either second-rate pre-dreadnought battleships or armored cruisers of the mixed franco-british scheme. The second is closer. They have relatively light main battery and armour, so they couldn't be classified as first-rate battleships. On the other hands, they have intermediate calibre and relatviely high speed.

Actually, the closest analogue would, probably, be something like that:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiftsure ... battleship

Exepth the fact that Charisians for some reason decided to put both 8-inch and 6-inch guns on them. Frankly, it didn't look like a perfect solution. But, after all, i never liked "King Harrahld's" at all...

Silverwall wrote:However the KH VIIs are massivly overgunned by the standards of any historical ship from the period. A more realistic loadout for a ship of that weight would be 2 x 10 inch and 12-14 6 inch guns. The closest I can find in armourment were the Pisa class https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pisa-class_cruiser

Frankly, i agree. Especially considering the fact that there is no target on Safehold that could need something like 10-inch naval rifle to destroy.

P.S. Just recently discussed the matter of naval bombardment with some friends on russian naval forum... We discussed the possibility of surprize russian attack on the Tokyo Bay in 1905, during Russo-Japanese war. Basically we agreed that using the battleships to suppress the coastal fortification - even relatively outdated, like the japanese "fortress Tokyo" in 1905 - is just a waste of money and lives. It's too easy to made coastal defense almost invuneralbe to even the most powerful guns.

Dilandu wrote:

Silverwall wrote:However the KH VIIs are massivly overgunned by the standards of any historical ship from the period. A more realistic loadout for a ship of that weight would be 2 x 10 inch and 12-14 6 inch guns. The closest I can find in armourment were the Pisa class https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pisa-class_cruiser

Frankly, i agree. Especially considering the fact that there is no target on Safehold that could need something like 10-inch naval rifle to destroy.

P.S. Just recently discussed the matter of naval bombardment with some friends on russian naval forum... We discussed the possibility of surprize russian attack on the Tokyo Bay in 1905, during Russo-Japanese war. Basically we agreed that using the battleships to suppress the coastal fortification - even relatively outdated, like the japanese "fortress Tokyo" in 1905 - is just a waste of money and lives. It's too easy to made coastal defense almost invuneralbe to even the most powerful guns.

Uhhh.... No. To have guns that can be used means you have a weak point in your fortifications. An example of this is that El Morro (main fort at the entrance to San Juan, PR) has the remains of a shell in the inside of the thickest part of it's walls from bombardment by the US Navy in 1898. The balance between fortress guns and ship borne guns changed with the transition from black powder to white or nitrious powders. Prior to ~1870 forts could mount larger longer ranged guns than ships; after ~1890 ships mounted larger longer ranged guns and as a bonus were mobile. Then there is the expense of upgrading the fortress guns when better guns were developed. In the US once the "disappearing" guns were emplaced they were almost never replaced. I suspect that these guns and emplacements were a significant percentage of the cost of a ship that could carry them.

Castenea wrote:Uhhh.... No. To have guns that can be used means you have a weak point in your fortifications. An example of this is that El Morro (main fort at the entrance to San Juan, PR) has the remains of a shell in the inside of the thickest part of it's walls from bombardment by the US Navy in 1898. The balance between fortress guns and ship borne guns changed with the transition from black powder to white or nitrious powders. Prior to ~1870 forts could mount larger longer ranged guns than ships; after ~1890 ships mounted larger longer ranged guns and as a bonus were mobile. Then there is the expense of upgrading the fortress guns when better guns were developed. In the US once the "disappearing" guns were emplaced they were almost never replaced. I suspect that these guns and emplacements were a significant percentage of the cost of a ship that could carry them.

No. The problem isn't the guns. The problem is the gun's defenses. It's much easier to improve guns defenses on land than on ship. You could protect your land-based guns with any kind of defense economically possible.

No. To have guns that can be used means you have a weak point in your fortifications.

The embrasures is pretty small, so, actually, the "weak point" mean nothing. The probability of hitting the embrasure with the shell from moving ships is almost insignificant.

The balance between fortress guns and ship borne guns changed with the transition from black powder to white or nitrious powders. Prior to ~1870 forts could mount larger longer ranged guns than ships; after ~1890 ships mounted larger longer ranged guns and as a bonus were mobile.

I'm afraid, completely wrong. Prior to 1870, the range mean essentially nothing, because any guns could penbetrate ship armor only on very short ranges. And after 1890, the longer-range guns were still unsupported by the proper fire control, that would allow them to hit something as small as gun.

The World War II artillery manuals proposed the expense of 500-600 six-inch shells to suppress the battery on field positions. On the fortified positions, this number would be even greater.

and as a bonus were mobile.

This means only one thing. That the ships could - due to their mobility - concentrate superior firepower agains part of enemy defense, suppressing the batteries one after another.

The mobility actually mean nothimg here. Yes, the mobility made ship a harder target, but it also make less accurate the ship's fire. The coastal batteries are greatly more stable, their position are always perfectly known to their gunners, and they usually have all protected area zero in.

Dilandu wrote:The mobility actually mean nothimg here. Yes, the mobility made ship a harder target, but it also make less accurate the ship's fire. The coastal batteries are greatly more stable, their position are always perfectly known to their gunners, and they usually have all protected area zero in.

Also, especially in the era before radar, the coastal batteries usually had much much better range finding and spotting capabilities. (remote spotters, hillside possitions for elevatation, longer baseline rangefinders than can be mounted on ships, etc)

So in addition to being more stable gun platforms, they usually benefit from more accurate knowledge of their target's location, and better ability to correct fire by spotting splashes.

I wouldn't want to be a WWII battleship tangling with the 16" coast defense batteries protecting San Fransisco (for example).

Jonathan_S wrote:Also, especially in the era before radar, the coastal batteries usually had much much better range finding and spotting capabilities. (remote spotters, hillside possitions for elevatation, longer baseline rangefinders than can be mounted on ships, etc)

So in addition to being more stable gun platforms, they usually benefit from more accurate knowledge of their target's location, and better ability to correct fire by spotting splashes.

Absolutely. The controlled area was divided by sectors and for all sectors there were pre-calculated fire solutions. They also have buoys, placed on prepared positions to make the target position determination more effective. And the gun batteries usually were placed so that the terrain protected them.

I wouldn't want to be a WWII battleship tangling with the 16" coast defense batteries protecting San Fransisco (for example).

And Galipoli naval campaign clearly demonstrated, that even the old-style coastal barreties with only a few modern guns could sucsessfully drive off the much more powerfull fleet.

Basically, the Dardanell battle of 1915 was a clear demonstration, how unfit actually large ocean-going battleship for dealing with coastal forts. They simply could not hit them effectviely. Their long-barreled guns were really bad for plunging fire, and the long-distance bombardment usually simply do nothing.

This situation was demonstrated again in Norway 1940, when the outdated coastal forts with poorly trained crews sucsessfully disabled "Blucher" and damaged "Koenigsberg"

Various comparisons have been made versus the KH VII and OTL vessels. My two cents would be either the Imperial Russian 1906 Rurik (although somewhat smaller) or the Italian San Giorgio. Rurik= 15,170 tons displacement, 21 knots, 4 10" guns 2x2 and 8 8" 4x2. San Giorgio was a slightly evolved Pisa with greater range and better armor.

ChronicRder wrote:Hi all, for starters I'd like to talk about the King Haarahlds. I was brushing up on some naval history and found some interesting ship classifications and the distinctions between the ironclad, pre-dreadnought, dreadnought, and battleship categories.
What I found interesting was that Safehold's idea of a ironclad pretty well matched up, but the King Haarahlds are classed as battleships.

According to the way it is described in the books, these ships have 1-2 masts for emergency usages, but they are built with steel frames, wooden interiors/decks, and reinforced steel on the flanks, plus a couple gun batteries. My understanding from real-life history is that a battleship has to be made entirely from steel with reinforced steel on the exterior with no galleon-like masts, an omni-direction main battery, plus 1-2 lighter batteries (and, o yea, electricity).

So, what Charis is describing as a battleship is really a dreadnought of some fashion (the only distinctions I can find between the two dreadnought types is the number of masts it uses and a difference in amount of armor it has). Also, what are the projected crew compliments of the King Haarahlds? I'm thinking not more than 750-850, but I can't find that detail in the books.

You seem to have mixed things up a bit.

A Dreadnought is a battleship.
A Pre-Dreadnought is a battleship.
An Ironclad is a battleship.

The term started as a contraction for 'ship of the line of battle' or variations on that, with ironclads it started to gain a more specific meaning as "ironclads" could mean a lot of things, from small too big, from weak to powerful.

With the pre-dreadnought era it finally became a more clearly distinct shiptype of its own, separating away from armoured cruisers for good for example.

And wouldn´t it have been fun if the Satsuma had been the first "Dreadnought" instead of "Dreadnought"?
(Satsuma was meant to have a unified heavy gun armament but didn´t get it because enough 12" guns would take too long to make, and the second ship of the class(Aki) also got steam turbines instead of triple expansion engines less than 2 years later, while the Satsuma was launched a year before Dreadnought, as the first Japanese homebuilt capital ship, so it was pretty much just one or two political decisions away from being the kind of ship Dreadnought was, but a year earlier)