The Battle Of Samar - Odds? What are those?

I ran across this on YouTube and found it worthwhile, so I thought to post it here in case anyone was interested.

I hope people enjoy this as much as I did.



https://youtu.be/4AdcvDiA3lE

Generally IJN admirals have an addiction to the over-complicated, multi-stage plans, and if something went awry in one, they became extremely uncertain, incapable to dealt with situation.

Dilandu wrote:Generally IJN admirals have an addiction to the over-complicated, multi-stage plans, and if something went awry in one, they became extremely uncertain, incapable to dealt with situation.

haha - very good.
that Halsey was a real plonker!

I'm about 30 minutes through and the descriptions of the planes landing for refule take off on any support carrier going, somehow reminds me of some of DW's starfire books battle sequences - especially those against the spiders!!

that Johnson was amazing!!

Samar was probably a good functional plan that ran into a couple of things not anticipated.
It was only one piece of a much larger, and if complicated and dependent on timing, some of that plan went according to script.
The IJN sacrificed (and appeared to acknowledge that) by sending out carriers as a decoy fleet to pull off the US heavy ships and fleet carriers. That worked as far as pulling off some of the warships and did result in the loss of much of the decoys.

The problem became two fold....the 2nd part of the problem was that what was the US BB component (not the fast battleships) were originally tasked for shore bombardment and quickly were retested by changing information to cover that northern IJN task force which was (as had the southern/Samar group) coming though the channel between sets of islands. Not only had the timing slipped and the middle force not come though at the same time as the southern force, enough light craft (PT Boats etc) had been then forward deployed and started attacking as soon as the IJN showed up in that passage. Between sending off the report that the IJN was comming in force, they at least harassed them if not inflicting much significant damage but they also cause delays. And so when they came out of the passage it was to getting their T crossed by the US BBs and beaten badly against the combined basic broadside fire at range and radar controlled by the US.

The 1st problem that it seems the IJN (presuming that Halsey had taken perhaps a lot more than he did going after the carrier bait, also didn't think there was going to be either much in their way nor close enough to intervene while they destroyed the landing fleet.
They also didn't figure on the US light forces putting up any sort of fight and possibly expected them to run away from the juggernaut that came steaming out of the passage. Big mistake. Not a great comparison but think Jack Russel Terriers attacking Cape Buffalo. You read some of what was written and the escort screen for Taffy and it becomes clear that, once having been surprized, they figured they they were not going to survive in any case and first doing the practical defensive thing (laying smoke while the jeep carriers turned to run, turned back through their own screen and attack. More like cornered rats but run with weapons unused. The IJN admiral discovered he had a problem with torpedos and gunfire (if "only" 5") coming at him and ships being damaged and forced to dodge around and taking damage. Then every aircraft that could fly off those little carriers jumped and and started making runs and using thier weapons. The ultimate concluding (helped by misidentifying what the jeep carriers were) was that the only reason these men were apparently driven to madness with Samurai like ferocity and bravery, was that the major components of the US battle fleet had NOT been drawn off and these small ships were buying time for for the US carriers 1st and then that gunships were soon to get close enough to engage, So, having destroyed the escorts at the cost of a lot of damage and all the IJN formation/plan scattered over way too much ocean, he called for withdrawal. And kept getting stung by the surviving Taffy aircraft as long as he was in their range.
It wasn't supposed to happen like that, the IJN was supposed to punch though a "light" screen and slaughter transports and marines before the 2nd fleet came around the other side of the islands and destroyed what was left of the Americans. Ooops.

Drachinifel's dry British humor is just brilliant. I so much love his quips duri g the narration...

There are a lot of factors in this battle that are not obvious.
When the Japanese Center Force set out, they were lead by the 4 ships of the Takao class (a modified version of the Nachi class with extended superstructure for additional flag staff to act as fleet flagships) Admiral Kurita was onboard the lead ship Atago (a veteran of 2nd Guadalcanal which had engaged South Dakota). 2 days earlier, on the morning of Oct 23, while approaching the Philippines from the west, USS Darter slammed 4 torpedoes at point blank range into the Atago, sending her and 360 of her crew under in 13 minutes. Among those lost were 1/2 of Kurita's Flag Staff. The Admiral had to be plucked from the water by a Destroyer and transferred his flag to Yamato. Meanwhile her sister USS Dace was firing her own spread. The result was 2 of Atago's sisters, Takao and Maya were also taken out, Maya exploding from a magazine hit and Takao's engine rooms being gutted like a fish (she didn't go down but was towed to Singapore and never sailed again).
After this disaster, the fleet continued into the Sibuyan Sea. (remember that Kurita had transferred to Yamato when he was plucked from the sea) Musashi (Yamato's sister ship) became the subject of attention from the entire 3rd fleet, was hit by about 29 torpedoes and Armor Piercing bombs and was sent to the bottom. It was only after Kurita ordered the fleet to turn back west that the airstrikes finally ended. He turned back around that night and came around Samar the next morning. - so in 3 days, he had his flagship blown out from under him, plucked from the water, then saw the "unsinkable" sister ship, of the ship he was standing on, get blasted to pieces! That would be enough to dishevel anyone, I would think.
On top of that, contact and ID was not 100% for the IJN. When the Gambier Bay was sunk, it is almost certain that no distinguishing terms were used, she was simply reported as a "Carrier" having been sunk. At the same time, the USS Johnston fought off a Heavy Cruiser and 2 destroyers (hiding in the troughs of waives and using her radar FCS to direct her 5"/38s with indirect fire). She badly damaged the cruiser with several hits to her superstructure, and was thus reported as a "Heavy Cruiser". These reports of "sunk a carrier" "sunk a heavy cruiser" combined with the air groups of - not 6 CVEs but 15 CVEs from all 3 Taffys - Kurita wasn't afraid that 3rd fleet would return, he certainly thought he was in the middle of it.

_