stewart wrote:I disagree with this because you don't know when the pace will change and for how long it will remain stagnant. If someone comes up with a technology that makes my fleet obsolete and they have ill intentions towards me then I am screwed if I have a fleet that is now obsolete or no fleet at all. On the other hand if you become aware of a drastic change in technology you can make adjustments and try to catch up because you have the shipyards with experience, the construction workers, the military expertise etc... For a fleet the crew is just as important and in some situations it could very well be the bottleneck.
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There's 2 basic parts of any reserve program --
1) Personnel Training -- this is the "comparatively easy" portion -- on-going personnel training and hands-on familiarization with current hardware, doctrine and policies. Potentially all classroom and lab.
2) Equipment -- This takes on-going and initial design planning -- In the real world (ours) or the Honorverse (or any other), a fleet (whether ships, aircraft or armored vehicles) need to be designed with both on-going maintenance and internal system upgrades/replacements in mind. What you are basically designing is a framework/infrastructure that "parts" can be plugged into. There are always limitations -- a submarine built with 33 in tubes will not be able to fire torpedoes (or sub-launched Harpoon missiles) that are 44 to 48 in. ; An Avalon-Class light cruiser will not be able to support a Mk 16, despite being "newer".
There are missions a Spru-Can can do, there are missions a Burke-Can can due and missions a Zumwalt-Can can do.
-- Stewart
An Article I found interesting about the change in Rail Roads from Steam to diesel power and why Alco was unable to make the transition from a steam locomotive builder to a Diesel locomotive builder. http://utahrails.net/articles/alco-v-emd.php The change in tech is seldom in one year, and obsolete does not mean useless. Diesels actually became effective for long haul on the rail roads circa 1935, the end of steam as the primary motive power was not until the period 1950-1960.
Part of the problem is that the presence of the large reserve fleet gave key people in the SLN both excuses and incentives to ignore changing paradigms. Problems of both sunk cost fallacies, and refusal to accept that paradigms were changing left the SLN thinking they were the first rate power after they were shown to not be. Nothing is more expensive than being shown you have the second best military in a war.